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Social Perspectives on National Security: A review of recent literature

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

Working Paper Series

Social Perspectives on National Security: A review of recent literature

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Introduction

In November 2013, TSAS held a workshop in Ottawa entitled "Security Policies and Community Relations". The workshop brought together government officials, from the RCMP and CSIS, academic researchers, community leaders, and an international contingent of individuals working in counter-terrorism in the US, Australia, the UK, Netherlands, and Germany. Over the course of the two days concerns were raised over how government, state security agents, social workers, and communities could best engage young people in efforts to prevent radicalization to violent extremism.

The content of this literature review has been shaped by concerns and issues raised by workshop participants, who frequently echoed contentious issues in the international academic literature on terrorism that has been published over the past decade. In 2013 Canada outlined a new approach to national security in its first counterterrorism strategy, "Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counterterrorism Strategy". In that document, local communities were identified as a key resource for countering violent extremism. The Prevent strand of the strategy follows counterterrorism models used in the UK, Australia, the US, and in Europe. A preventative counterterrorism strategy assumes that resilient national communities arise out of robust, inclusive, and cohesive local communities and, further, that positive individual identities produce resilience against the possibility of radicalization to violent extremism.

This review was commissioned by TSAS to survey the ways in which academic researchers have been trying to understand the experiences of exclusion by marginalized youth, and how these might relate to trajectories of radicalization to violent extremism, and community-level security interventions. The primary purpose of this review is to consider the turn to community engagement, or "soft" security measures, as a strategy for countering violent radicalization and extremism. While community engagement as a security strategy is not entirely new, our understanding of its use and effects is still being developed. As such, this review was commissioned to encourage dialogue, evaluation, and discussion about these strategies and their implementation in Canada, by considering the international academic literature on community engagement for

the purpose of countering violent extremism.

We have tried to be comprehensive in the geography and scope of our literature review. However, we acknowledge that a great deal of the work we cite comes from the UK, where preventative community-based approaches have been used since 2006. Since 2006, the UK's Prevent strategy has been revised, and new versions produced. Unfortunately the most recent versions of the policy and associated practices have not yet been subjected to much academic scrutiny, so the critiques presented in the literature (and in this review) tend to be one generation behind policy iterations. Nevertheless, there has been a wealth of analysis coming out of the UK, which dominates the critical terrorism academic literature. We acknowledge that the UK context is quite different from the Canadian one, and therefore cite this literature with the stipulation that it be considered in light of its context. We would argue, though, that many of the concerns it raises are relevant to the way in which Canada's counterterrorism approach advances in the coming years.

This review proceeds in three main parts.

Part One focuses on the relationship between youth radicalization and social inclusion/exclusion. This part begins by noting some of the main trajectories of radicalization that have been outlined in academic and policy texts. Turning then exclusively to the academic literature, we examine three key emergent themes in understanding the socio-cultural, political, and personal contexts through which researchers understand youth violent radicalization and its tenuous links to social exclusion.

Part Two considers community outreach as a mode for countering violent radicalization and counterterrorism (or, to use the abbreviation frequently found in the literature, CVE, countering violent extremism). We refer to community outreach practices as soft security, as opposed to hard security that includes more direct interventions–i.e. profiling, security at airports, surveillance, and intelligence gathering. In this part, we trace the circumstances that led to a change in security strategy–from "hard" to "soft"–and contemporary concerns over what has been termed homegrown or domestic terrorism, together with a growing perception that disenfranchised youth present a new kind of threat to national security. Additionally, there is a significant body

of scholarly research that has linked harder security tactics with negative social impacts seen to contribute to social exclusion and marginalization of minority young people. Through policy frames of "social cohesion" and "resilience" community outreach has therefore become a priority in preventing homegrown and domestic terrorism through communities' partnerships, in the hope that these efforts will avoid the negative impacts often associated with more traditional hard forms of counterterrorism.

We also highlight some of the main concerns and criticisms of these community-outreach strategies. The majority of the literature speaks to radicalization associated with al Qaida and groups inspired by its views, or what has been problematically termed "Islamist extremism". In part this is because preventative models have been developed in response to major terrorism events that have occurred in western countries, frequently by individuals who were born there and who have become radicalized at home. When addressing the concerns associated with homegrown terrorists, security, and law enforcement agencies may inadvertently pathologize minority communities. In surveying the literature on soft strategies of community outreach, which is so heavily dominated by discussions of how to work with Muslim groups, we face a dilemma: in outlining the literature we may contribute to the idea that the only serious threat to Canada (and similar countries) is from Islamist extremism and therefore throw suspicion on an already marginalized group. We are mindful of this possibility and incorporate this concern in our presentation of the literature.

Part Three speaks directly to this concern by reviewing the emerging literature on the impacts of community outreach as a form of counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism. First, we consider some of the difficulties that accompany attempts to evaluate and assess soft security programs and interventions. Second, we review the literature that suggests that these forms of intervention are producing "suspect communities" and negatively affecting those who become engaged in preventative interventions. In doing so we return to the question of social exclusion, and its relationship to trajectories of violent radicalization, but from the perspective of counter-terrorism programs and their effects.

It is important to understand that this literature review is based on academic publications and does not address operational issues directly. Academic researchers have become interested in policies and programs related to radicalization toward violence, but have not examined these initiatives in operational detail. For example, from time to time government officials or law enforcement officers are contacted by distraught parents who believe their children have come under the influence of recruiters for extremist causes. It is critical that the response to such a contact be a productive one, since the well-being of the individual and those around him or her is at stake. The academic literature simply does not consider this kind of detailed, operational issue. We regret that our review has little to offer in this sense. However, we hope that in reviewing the literature we can provide a set of useful general points about the factors that counter-terrorism policies must take into consideration when they seek to engage with minority communities and prevent the violent radicalization of individuals, particularly youth.

We also feel compelled to note that we are somewhat unlikely authors of this review, since neither of us specializes in the issues of terrorism or counter-terrorism. Our primary fields of interest are in community/social planning, migrations studies, and the changing nature of cultural diversity in cities. We have encountered the literature on radicalization to violence and community-based programs to prevent extremism from this side of the equation. We hope that our perspective helps initiate and sustain a conversation between those interested in terrorism and security, and those interested in social issues and, more broadly, social justice. In this sense this review is well aligned with the overarching mission of the TSAS network (bridging the work of scholars and practitioners in the fields of terrorism, security, and society).

Key Terms

Speaking about countering violent radicalization, terrorism, and social policy requires attention to language. Many terms employed in this arena are highly contested and have been subject to research, as well as community, scholarly, and political debate. As such, we try to be careful with the language used within this report, and acknowledge that in future the use of certain words or concepts may be rendered inappropriate. In order to manage this complexity, we list

the most contentious terms and, for the purpose of this report, their interpretation.

Radicalization.

The term radicalization is usually used in a way that suggests a common understanding of its meaning (Sedgwick 2010). However, consensus does not exist, and much research has been dedicated to understanding the concept of radicalization and, especially, when it is associated with violent extremism (Kirby 2007; Horgan 2008; Dawson 2009; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Borum 2011; Doosje et al. 2013). In this document, we use the term carefully, acknowledging that radicalization is not in itself problematic–it is worth remembering that throughout history, positive societal change and progress has come from radicalized individuals (Bartlett et al. 2010; Bartlett and Miller 2012).

The Canadian counter-terrorism strategy, “Building Resilience Against Terrorism” (2013, 15) defines radicalization as follows:

> Radicalization, which is the precursor to violent extremism, is a process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extremist views. This becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives.

We adopt this understanding of radicalization. In this report, we address the ways that definitions of radicalization have been constructed within the frame of counter-terrorism strategies, and in so doing highlight some of the impacts and effects. One major distinction that must consistently be made is the distinction between violent and non-violent radicalization (Bartlett et al. 2010, 10).

Extremism.

This is a difficult term that is politically, socially, and culturally contingent, and as such, inevitably changes over time. In policy revisions adopted since “Building Resilience to Terrorism: Canada’s Counterterrorism Strategy” (2013, 6-9), extremism is associated with particular terrorist

threats: those inspired by the al Qaida narrative; other extremist groups including but not limited to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Hamas and Hezbollah; and domestic issue-based extremism including issues related to animal rights, white supremacy, environmentalism, and anti-capitalism.

The Danish Government's description (2008) of extremism is more comprehensive. Extremism "is characterised by totalitarian and anti-democratic ideologies, intolerance to the views of others, hostile imagery and a division into 'them' and 'us'. Extremist ideas may be expressed in different ways, and ultimately they may bring individuals or groups to use violent or undemocratic methods as a tool to reaching a specific political objective. So they may seek to undermine the democratic social order or make threats or carry out demeaning harassment against groups of people based on, e.g. their skin colour, sexuality or beliefs" (cited in Lindekilde 2012c).

In this report, as with the term radicalization, we use the term specifically as extremism that results in violence. However, we again point to the contested nature (e.g. rationality/irrationality, context-specific, etc.) of this term and its impacts (Brannan et al. 2001).

Terrorism.

According to Alex Schmid, in 1984 there were over 100 different definitions of terrorism circulating in both scholarship and in general use (cited in Dexter 2012). In this review, we acknowledge that the term is contested and controversial, with multiple dimensions and effects (Gunning 2007; Jackson 2012; Richards 2014; Stampnitzky 2013). In this document, we use the term as it is outlined in the Canadian Criminal Code, and by Canada's counter-terrorism strategy.

The Canadian Criminal Code defines terrorism as activity that includes "an act or omission undertaken, inside or outside Canada, for a political, religious, or ideological purpose that is intended to intimidate the public with respect to its security, including its economic security, or to compel a person, government or organization (whether inside or outside Canada) from doing or refraining from doing any act, and that intentionally causes one of a number of specified forms of

serious harm" (2013 Public Report Terrorist Threat to Canada, 26).

In Canada's "Building Resilience Against Terrorism", understandings of terrorism are shaped by the leading threat to Canadian national security, which is primarily related to al Qaida (2013, 2). Second to this threat are other international terrorist groups including Hizballah, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and issue-based domestic extremists.

Islamism/Islamists.

The controversial term "Islamism" has increasingly been circulated in discourses of terrorism research, mainstream media, national security, and counter-terrorism policy. In scholarly work, the term has been used to describe "a spectrum of ideologies united by the claim that Islam has a political as well as religious manifestation, according to which, 'Islamists' are committed to the establishment of a political entity governed by the precepts of Islamic law as a normative base" (Bartlett et al. 2010, 165).

However, concerns raised by participants at the TSAS workshop on "National Security and Community Relationships" held in Ottawa in November 2013, highlighted the way this term too easily conflates religious communities with terrorism, and thus alienates Muslim Canadians. For example, during episodes of violence in Northern Ireland, nobody introduced terms like "Protestantist" or "Catholocism" to refer to the segment of these groups espousing or engaging in terrorism, or the ideologies supporting these views. This concern has been echoed in the literature, with researchers at DEMOS arguing that "the word Islamism is fraught with difficulties and any simple definition is to be avoided. Indeed, some self-pronounced 'Islamists' do recognize the value of the separation between church and state" (165). In this review, we avoid the term, except when discussing texts that specifically use it.

Part One: The Social Context: Is There a Relationship Between Social Inclusion/Exclusion & Extremist Radicalization?

In this part, we focus on the relationship between youth radicalization and social inclusion/exclusion. We begin with a brief review of how trajectories of radicalization to violence have been outlined both in the academic literature and through policy development. Our purpose is not to discuss the entire radicalization literature, but to highlight a few key elements that are most pertinent to our consideration of a possible link between social exclusion/inclusion, and extremism (note that TSAS will also publish a literature review specifically on the issue of radicalization). These themes are: formations of reactive identities, relative deprivation, fraternal and egoistic empathy, and political disenfranchisement (i.e. lack of voice).

We acknowledge that there is an inherent risk in emphasizing the situation of youth associated with certain ethno-cultural or religious groups, potentially branding them as "suspects". We are determined to avoid this common practice, and will return to this challenge from time to time in our review.

Much of the recent literature on violent radicalization and extremism has been propelled by homegrown terrorism events that have been inspired by the al Qaida narrative or affiliated with it in some way. This relationship has dominated recent discussions, both in the policy and academic arenas, and has tended to obscure other forms or brands of terrorism–i.e., violence against the State that is directed at civilians–such as eco-terrorism, other diasporic political and ideological conflicts that in exceptional cases can lead to terrorist acts, anti-immigration and white supremacist mobilization, and individuals acting on specific issues such as "right to life" campaigns.

It is also worth raising another issue at the outset of this review. In the 1970s, as Lisa Stampnitzky (2013) notes, scholars working on terrorism were criticized for seeking out root causes; some were even labeled morally repugnant for taking what was seen to be a sympathetic stance on violence instead of pathologizing it. Jackson (2012) refers to Alan Dershowitz (2002) who advanced a similar position, arguing that by looking for root causes we legitimize terrorist actions.

According to Dershowitz, efforts would be better channeled toward punishment and condemnation.

We disagree with this view. While there is little agreement in the literature over the conditions that cause violent radicalization, the search for root causes remains a core concern for many scholars. If we accept that terrorism cannot be stopped by force or after-the-fact punishment, then it seems expedient to better understand why radicalization towards violence occurs in order to prevent it by different means. With this in mind, however, we heed Heath-Kelly's critical warning about the consequences of "getting it wrong" (2012, 70):

The more knowledge that is produced about "pre-terrorist" behaviours and risks, the greater the uncertainty about the "tipping point" where a suspect subjectivity morphs into the figure of the terrorist. And the greater this "gap" becomes, the greater the need to suppress and conceal such indeterminacy within counterterrorism discourse. We might see more mistakes, more "false positives", now that the policy is explicitly concerned with the lives of those "vulnerable" to extremism, because terrorism knowledge can never encompass the "tipping point" between the suspect subjectivities it produces and the figure of the terrorist.

That is, if we seek to draw links between social exclusion and radicalization towards violence, we risk pathologizing those individuals who already bear the burden of socio-economic marginalization. As noted earlier, we must guard against this tendency.

Social Exclusion/Inclusion

Social exclusion can be defined in a number of ways but we prefer to use this concept quite simply: individuals experience exclusion when they lack a sense of belonging, acceptance, and recognition in their society**.** It is, in effect "unequal access to critical resources that determine the quality of membership in society" which, "ultimately produces and reproduces a complex of unequal outcomes" (Galabuzi 2006, 236). Conversely, social inclusion derives from emotional, social, and political connections to a society, combined with access to resources. This definition of social inclusion versus exclusion is prominent in the youth radicalization literature, which incor-

porates these themes:

- lack of a sense of belonging
- lack of acceptance by the host society (the right to difference, social acceptance)
- lack of recognition (to have voice and to be heard, political access)
- effects of exclusion (lower social status, social capital, and more economic vulnerability)

Tenuous Links Between Social Exclusion & Violent Radicalization

Are young people who experience an array of political, social, cultural, and/or economic disadvantages more likely to become radicalized than young people with greater cultural, social, and/or human capital, and who have an expectation of upward socio-economic mobility? The hypothesis that this is the case—i.e., that those experiencing marginalization and disadvantage are more vulnerable to extremist radicalization—has provided a rationale for counter-radicalization policies emerging in several countries (Spalek 2007; Lindekilde 2012a). However, for the most part, scholars have dismissed the premise of a clear causal connection between social exclusion and a susceptibility to extremist radicalization (e.g. Piazza 2006).

Most broadly, causal connections have been dismissed on the basis of there being no single predictive narrative of radicalization to violence (Dawson 2009). For example, correlations between low socio-economic status, low levels of education, and a lack of social integration have been widely rejected as providing the grounds for disenfranchisement and alienation that leads to radicalization to violence (d'Appolonia 2010). Of course, a predictive formula of risk calculation or distinctive set of phases would be useful, and scholars such as Horgan (2005; 2008), Moghaddam (2005), Silber and Bhatt (2007), and Glees and Pope (2005) have tried to map these out, for the benefit of policing agencies. However, Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia reports that in many instances of homegrown terrorism since 9-11, investigations have uncovered profiles that do not fit with this trajectory. Instead, she reports that culprits have been well integrated, middle-class, without criminal records, and educated (2010, 128).

How have connections been drawn between social exclusion and violent radicalization?

In late 2011 riots broke out in several London neighbourhoods. *The Globe and Mail* reported "London police overwhelmed in explosion of violence by futureless youth" (Saunders 2011). What was described in *The Globe and Mail* and elsewhere was an outbreak of violence, evocative of riots elsewhere (i.e., the suburbs of French cities), that revealed deep-seated dissatisfaction, disaffection, and disenfranchisement of marginalized young people (Body-Gendrot 2012). This narrative of disaffected youth resorting to violence has gained currency, and is frequently the starting point for research dealing with youth experiences of social exclusion.

In the case of counter-terrorism policies, social exclusion is frequently considered as paving a pathway toward violent extremism. Soft security approaches are designed to be preventative. They address conditions that are seen to produce "vulnerable" young people. In other words, they tackle the precursors of youth radicalization to violence, and are expressed in policy through a discourse about the vulnerability of minority youth.

This discourse is most evident in efforts to explain homegrown terrorism. In the case of al Qaida inspired homegrown terrorism, Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010, 889) suggest that a conventional wisdom has developed over time, in particular through media coverage and the political response to homegrown terror events. "To a significant extent, this shift in focus away from international to 'homegrown' terrorism reflected the need of politicians and the media for easy-to-understand narratives that explained how a 'good Muslim boy' (or 'a good Asian boy') became a suicide bomber" (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010, 889-890).

They argue that this conventional wisdom is not based on evidence, but has become a familiar narrative that is thus generally accepted (889). D'Appolonia (2010, 127-128) similarly observes how accepted and unsubstantiated social exclusion rationales, such as socio-economic deprivation, serve to explain how a young person could come to feel hostility toward his or her host society. According to d'Appolonia, it is at this point that a young person could begin to see violence as the best expression for their frustration and disenfranchisement.

The concept of vulnerability is central to counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism fo-

cused on prevention. A spectrum of vulnerability is imagined, along which youth identity struggles are key in explaining how a young person could come to turn on their host society. Vulnerability is incorporated in policies through an acknowledgement of youth identity struggles, with youth from minority populations seen as particularly at risk (see Benard 2005; McDonald 2011; Lindekilde 2012c).

However some scholars believe this line of research to be peripheral. For instance, although acknowledging that root causes are important, Richards (2011) argues that talking about potential terrorists in terms of vulnerability is distracting. Richards worries that in viewing terrorism and radicalization in terms of vulnerability deflects attention from, what many terrorism studies scholars believe, seeing terrorist acts as "rational and calculated acts of violence" (151).

Despite these assertions, some factors linked to experiences of social exclusion have been signalled in the literature as worthy of attention (and also continue to influence counter-terrorism policies). Scholars are generally quick to qualify their studies with the insistence that while they might propose a correlation, there is no "single fit" model of radicalization, no single factor that can necessarily be identified as an exclusive indicator of extremist radicalization. With this in mind, then, we concur with scholars trying to chart tentative explanatory links between social exclusion and radicalization to violence, provided that this exercise is conducted cautiously, recognizing that it cannot provide formulaic understandings.

Social Exclusion by a Lack of Acceptance and Belonging

There are two contradictory discourses applied to young people in western societies. Young people are simultaneously characterized as vulnerable, in need of protection, and as risky, requiring control (Valentine 1996). It is in this way that young people hold a particularly vital position in our contemporary social imaginations. As Pain et al., (2010, 972) put it, young people are becoming the "focus of fears, rather than the hopes, of western societies."

Imagining young people as a threat is not a new phenomenon. Stanley Cohen's famous book, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (Cohen 1972) first introduced the concept of youth as "folk devils." During the mid-1960s, British Mods and Rockers were cast as a violent threat, living

alternative lifestyles perceived to undermine the dominant Western Christian faith. Media coverage at the time incited moral panic in response to a perception of an acute threat to public order (Valentine 2001). In recent discourses of homegrown terrorism, these anxieties are resurfacing as the media, policy makers, and the public grapple with exceptional cases, in which young people have become perpetrators of terrorism.

Identity Struggles and Reactive Formations

Young people today are in a difficult position, negotiating complex identity struggles, in order to define themselves in the context of globalization, diasporic attachments, intergenerational differences, and in many places, religious affiliations within secular society (Valentine 2000). According to Dillabough and Kennelly (2010), today's folk devils are drawn in the image of "deeply disaffected low-income young people, characteristically, but not always, from ethnic or religious minorities" (1).

The coalescence of this suspicion, projected incrimination, and the youthful experience of identity definition, produces a challenging context in which young people must go through this process. This struggle is perceived by many as a moment in which young people are looking for purpose and meaning in their lives, looking for a place in which they can feel confident, and part of a community. The NYPD describe "a crossroad in life–those who are trying to establish an identity or a direction while seeking approval and validation for the path taken" (Silber and Bhatt 2007, 32). Like the moment Dawson (2012) describes, at some point in time many young people are open to possibility, in the search for a sense of significance and their "true self" (8).

In various multicultural societies, scholars have focused on youth negotiating hyphenated identities. Rima Berns-McGown's (2013) research with second-generation migrant youth elucidates this unique identity struggle. Berns-McGown, reflecting on Canadian understanding of integration, suggests that there is discord between integration expectations and the specific difficulties faced by Somali youth settled in Canada. Asked to comment on the experience of being diasporic in Canada (i.e. having identity attachments to two different places), young Somali Canadians and hundreds of other second-generation youth, engaged by Berns-McGowan

"consistently emphasize two facts: they feel Canadian but struggle to balance other connections and cultures as well; 'back home' is a strong influence in their lives, and they are under very real pressure from their parents not to 'lose their culture.' " According to Berns-McGowan, this experience is not unique to any one group of diasporic Canadian youth, but is "as true of young people from Poland as it is of young people from Pakistan or from Somalia" (Berns-McGown 2013, 21). In terms of policy implications Berns-McGowan's message is clear: "Integration takes time, and people who are balancing those connections and who run into barriers to their participation in the form of racism will react to it not by feeling less Canadian, but by feeling that they are being told they do not fully belong in this country" (21).

By producing a dichotomous and irreconcilable set of identities or loyalties (e.g. Muslim and secular Canadian)–through experiences of racism, rejection, alienation, and social exclusion–a false and limited choice is communicated. Reactive identity formation is a term coined by Baljit Nagra (2011) which seeks to make sense of the effects of social exclusion on minority youth. Nagra set out to interview young Canadian Muslims post-9/11, with the hypothesis that after 9/11 they would have distanced themselves from their religious affiliations. Instead he found the opposite. Drawing on Portes and Rumbaut's (2001) theory of reactive ethnicity, Nagra defines reactive identity formation as a response to prejudice, persecution, suspicion, and racism. Rather than concealing those qualities that make an individual subject to alienation and exclusion, those qualities are instead amplified, and an increased identification is observed (426).

Nagra's work gives some credence to Abbas' (2007) concerns over radicalization trajectories; however Nagra is careful not to speak specifically to potential radicalization, instead simply explaining the impact of such discourses on Muslim youth. Nagra instead focuses on the reasons behind the reactive identity formations of his research participants who affirmed their Muslim identities in different ways. First, in order to cope with the discrimination they faced; second, as a display of resistance and religious reclamation; and third, thanks to increased religious exposure and understanding, a stronger religious bond had formed (Nagra 2011, 438).

Returning specifically to discourses of violent radicalization, Berns-McGowan's message is

reiterated by other scholars, particularly in relation to Muslim youth growing up in the West. Diane Frost (2008) argues that it is young supporters and followers of Islam that are most incriminated and alienated by post-9/11 secular society. Further, Sobolewska (2010) argues that experiences of rejection, alienation, and the effects of discrimination, are better predictors than socio-economic status or social mobility, in defining youth at risk of violent radicalization. Tahir Abbas (2007), similarly, explains that Islamaphobia, racism, racial profiling, and the failure of the State to address foreign policy in relation to homegrown threats preclude the possibility of feeling a sense of acceptance, belonging, and political agency.

According to Abbas (2007), al Qaida is attentive to this experience, and initiates the process of radicalization to violence by appealing to this sense of social exclusion and disenfranchisement among young Muslims to aide their recruitment process. Vulnerability is ultimately defined then by the moment in which "already marginalized and predisposed" young Muslims seek alternative information, in isolation from their local communities (297). In this narrative, minority youth feel a dual sense of dislocation–from their host country and from their local community, and go in search of answers and acceptance in places in which they are at risk of being radicalized to violence.

This narrative is troubling because it can quickly translate to panic, with the assumption that disengagement from the host society or the mainstream necessarily means that radicalization is inevitable or likely. Bartlett and Miller (2012) highlight the critical distinction between youth resistance as not necessarily violent. Bartlett and Miller insist on the possibility of being safely radical (i.e. non-violent)–after all, youth resistance and radical thinking has been the source of countless positive changes throughout modern history. Furthermore, they are sure to remind us that while minority youth face specific challenges in places like Canada, they also face youthful clichéd desires in terms of radicalization not dissimilar to those identified in gang recruitment: emotional pull, adventure and being "cool", status, and peer pressure (see also Chettleburgh 2012). In terms of producing a predictive formula of radicalization toward violence, these elements are crucial in emphasising the irregularity of trajectories, and the highly personalized nature of identity formation (Bartlett and Miller 2012, 13).

Relative Deprivation

Although socio-economic deprivation has been dismissed as a predictor or determinant of extremist radicalization (Klausen 2009; d'Appolonia 2010), the notion of deprivation does hold currency in radicalization discourse. Scholars have suggested what is more likely is a measure of relative deprivation–i.e. social, psychological, moral (Dawson 2009).

Relative moral and psychological deprivation can be understood as a lack of sense of meaning and purpose, and fits with the youth identity struggle narrative. A fundamental part of being young is the often awkward and intense process of defining one's identity. It is a time in which young people begin to establish independent world-views, self-views, and how the two relate to one another (Doosje et al. 2013). For many this process involves a quest for purpose and meaning. Dawson (2009) advises that scholarship around New Religious Movements is helpful in understanding how an individual might become compelled to act on extremist ideology. According to Dawson, youthful questioning is a typical, and youthful idealism and the process of becoming an adult provides fertile ground for recruitment to a radical movement or cause. Following this logic and under these conditions, a young person experiencing personal and political doubt, displacement or dislocation, and exclusion could be open to ideology offering answers, a sense of purpose, and a strategy for empowering action.

Relative deprivation more generally is usually defined in relation to real deprivation. Real deprivation describes the barriers an individual might face, for example, to participation in the labour market and socio-economic advancement. Relative deprivation, on the other hand, refers to the perception of deprivation, which may or may not in fact exist. In terms of socio-economic status, for instance, Dawson (2006, 73) describes relative deprivation by an individual's perception that a discrepancy exists, "between the social rewards they feel entitled to and the rewards they think they are getting or they believe others are getting." Dawson insists, however, that ultimately this notion has little utility in predicting the risk of violent radicalization as it does not differentiate between dissatisfaction that leads to violent rather than non-violent extremism.

In studies of extreme-right terrorism, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, scholars have

observed reactions to relative deprivation experienced alongside deteriorating and globalizing economies. In the US, Crothers (2002) explains that industrial and farming industries were transformed by the corporatization that came with increasing economies of scale and globalization (cited in Vertigans 2007). Alienated by the changes and seeking answers, farmers turned to militia and extremist groups ready to provide answers, in the form of ideology (Vertigans 2007). Vertigans (2007) notes that while various studies have suggested links between extremist radicalization of the far-right and socio-economic deprivation (see Van Dyke and Soule 2002), there is a growing realization that it is not only the impoverished who experience deprivation, but relative deprivation is felt too by the majority middle class.

Many of these people have had different experiences from working class members, but have also been adversely affected by deteriorating income levels and reduced employment opportunities at a time when many have encountered competition for jobs from blacks who had previously been concentrated within working class occupations. The American manufacturing base has also been severely reduced by competition from developing nations at a time when immigration into the United States from many of those countries occurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Immigration from South and South East Asia and Central America has contributed to the resentment held by many white Americans, whose contact with the migrants is often infrequent. (Vertigans 2007, 646)

Accusations of preferential treatment of minorities have ignited resentment and fuelled ideology that declares injustice (Vertigans 2007, 646; see also Goodwin et al. 2010). Rendered as a racialized injustice, Shanks-Meile (2000) posits that it is in this manner that extremist movements cut across classes. Engaging the example of Timothy McVeigh and the 1995 Oklahoma Bombing, Vertigans argues that radicalization begins with a sense of individual or community injustice that is expanded to a higher scale (i.e. racial group, nation), thus justifying and sanctioning criminal behaviour and violence (Vertigans 2007). For instance, “when these messages are allied to interpretations of American history that are also advanced to justify the use of arms when its legacy is under threat, then a climate is being created in which people become radicalised, in some instances unintentionally” (2007, 647).

The concept of relative deprivation has also been useful for researchers trying to understand the specific difficulties faced by second and third generation migrants growing up in multicultural states. Maria Sobolewska (2010), for instance, conducted a study of second and third generation migrant youth in Britain and found that they would sooner compare their social mobility and status to their peers who were part of the majority population, rather than judge their experience against that of their migrant parents. Sobolewska, like Portes (1984), acknowledges that second and third generation migrant youth face more barriers to social mobility and participation than majority youth due to a hierarchical system that privileges Anglo-ethnic or majority populations over ethnicized populations (2010, 40). The result, she argues, is dissatisfaction, frustration at the inequality, and resultant distrust in government. Bartlett and Miller (2012, 6) also make this assertion, reporting that young Muslims in Canada and the UK display significantly lower levels of trust in government and higher levels of cynicism when compared to their parents. By highlighting the perception and experience of injustice by minority youth, a number of scholars attempt to demonstrate the conditions in which a young person might become more susceptible to extreme ideas and groups (Moghaddam 2005; Doosje et al. 2013).

Vicarious Exclusion by Fraternal Deprivation

Related to relative deprivation is the experience of vicarious exclusion–experiencing others' exclusion as if it were one's own. Runciman (1966) distinguishes between "egoistical" deprivation and "fraternal" deprivation–the former being the individual's experience of his or her own position in a group, and the latter as deprivation felt on behalf of a group's status in society relative to other groups. Research has shown that in many instances minorities' feelings of discontent are more likely based on fraternal deprivation than egoistic deprivation (Moghaddam 2005). Moghaddam explains that, in the case of terrorism, "especially important could be a perceived right to independence and the retention of indigenous cultures for a society, a perception that other societies have achieved this goal, and a feeling that under present conditions, the path to this goal has been blocked (e.g., by Americans)" (163).

Vicarious exclusion is also experienced through "humiliation-by-proxy". Brendan O'Duffy

(2008) argues that individuals will look beyond their local borders to experiences of repression elsewhere, particularly in relation to foreign policy. D'Appolonia agrees, and notes that humiliation-by-proxy occurs "when perceptions of injustice at national and international levels mirror local and personal experience, or when local discrimination is consonant with perceptions of liberal imperialist foreign policies, a larger pool of recruits become available for indoctrination" (d'Appolonia 2010, 120). As Schmid (2013, 26) explains, "terrorist groups sometimes adopt somebody else's grievances and become self-appointed champions of a cause other than their own." Farhad Khosrokhavar (2005) in his study of suicide bombers is in agreement, arguing that through identification with victims of repression, individuals are led to believe that ends justify means, and thus violence and ideology merge.

(Political) Disenfranchisement

Caught in a state, described by youth geographers, between "being" and "becoming", young people face barriers to being considered as active agents and as full citizens (Philo and Smith 2003; Worth 2009). On the one hand, growing apathy and political disengagement of youth in political processes has been cause for concern (Gauthier 2003). The extent to which young people should be considered as fully evolved adults with equal political influence as their elders remains contested (Vanderbeck 2008). The fact that their futures are acutely and unevenly affected by social exclusion, however, is unequivocal.

Youth who are members of minority groups experience an amplified sense of social exclusion in terms of political recognition and representation. Research on minority populations' political participation has shown that racism, discrimination, and lack of familiarity with local political culture all contribute to feelings of political exclusion and can lead to a sense of disenfranchisement (Abu-Laban 2002; Henn, Weinstein et al. 2005; Bullock and Nesbitt-Larking 2013). In a study of British Muslims, Sobolewska (2010, 33) defines four factors or dimensions of political exclusion:

- trust in institutions
- political participation

- a sense of belonging to Britain
- feeling of political efficacy (influence)

In her study she found that in general, compared to other religiously defined populations, British-Muslims had high levels of trust in government, were least likely to feel as though they had no influence over state decision-making, and displayed high levels of belonging to Britain (33). However, in terms of political participation, they displayed a higher degree of political alienation via low levels of political (non-electoral) participation. There was nothing particularly alarming for Sobolewska in this set of results. However, isolating for age, she found that young British-born Muslims displayed statistically significant disparities in all indicators, except for a feeling of belonging to Britain (40). In terms of political participation, young British Muslims reported higher levels of political participation, in the form of rallies, protests, and demonstrations (41). However, ultimately Sobolewska finds no grounds on which to conclude that British-born Muslim youth are disproportionately vulnerable to extremism or violent radicalization.

In Canada, youth participation in formal politics (i.e. voting) is generally low, and according to scholars young people increasingly find alternative ways of engaging politically (Adsett 2003; Bullock and Nesbitt-Larking 2011). In Bullock and Nesbitt-Larking's (2011, 13) study exploring young Canadian Muslim's political participation, the most common reasons for non-participation in formal politics were reported as: "lack of interest, lack of time, boredom, the belief that things are smooth in Canada, not like back home, and being under age (with the expectation of becoming interested in politics once reaching the legal age for voting)." In terms of informal political engagement, "while very few were interested in following formal politics, and even less actively involved in traditional parties, at least half of those who said they were not political, or interested in politics, had participated in rallies, protests, petitions, or had conversations with friends about political issues thought directly to affect them, such as lobbying against the niqab ban or Palestinian issues" (18). The researchers draw a direct link between political participation and a fragile sense of belonging for Canadian Muslim youth (47). Like Sobolewska's (2010) study of British-Muslim youth, Bulluck and Nesbitt-Larking (2011) argue that the youth most targeted by counter-terrorism strategies are in fact "amongst the most highly engaged and positive in

their attitudes towards holding Canadian citizenship" (47).

Political exclusion also occurs through the framing of informal political participation (i.e. dissent and protest) as legitimate or illegitimate by the State. Loadenthal's (2013, 95) commentary on policy constructions of eco-terrorism argues that "the framing of such socio-political movements within a veneer of terrorism serves a variety of causes for the State in question." He explains that in doing so, individuals and movements are thus legitimated or incriminated. "Not only does it aid in the regulation of dissent through the construction of a 'good protestor/bad protestor', activist/terrorist dichotomy, it also serves to provide an impetus and justification for State manoeuvres which require a constructed enemy" (95). According to Liddick (2006), this can be seen by the criminalization of ecological and animal rights movements from the 1970s. While informal political participation goes some way to compensate for lower levels of formal political engagement by youth, delegitimizing tactics can both de-value alternative viewpoints and participation, as well as reinforce distrust in the formal system and feelings of marginalisation.

Marginalization also occurs by those issues for which participation is invited or allowed. While there have been global moves to include young people more actively in decisions made at local scales (e.g. "UNICEF Child Friendly Cities Charter"), larger issues and macro-scale politics remain less attended to. Particular issues, such as economic and foreign policy, are spaces in which youth voices are not often heard (Skelton 2010). Abbas (2007) and Heath-Kelly (2012) are both critical of the lack of attention to foreign policy and its relationship to counter-radicalization policies in Britain. Both scholars have found that time and time again, youth that identify with marginalized groups express concern over their home country's military presence in foreign lands, yet feel unable to voice or have their concern heard. As Abbas (2007) explains, "Certainly, there is a feeling among many that British and US foreign policy has impacted on the perceptions of already much maligned and disenfranchised young Muslim males who feel they have no voice" (291). This critique could easily be echoed, based on similarities in policies, in both Canada (Bartlett and Miller 2012) and Australia (Spalek and Imtoual 2007).

Although they face multiple barriers to participation, some scholars express positive pos-

sibilities and hope for youth political engagement and recognition. In terms of a distinction between minority and majority youth's political recognition, Sobolewska (2010, 41) reports that minority youth do not necessarily feel at a great disadvantage relative to their majority counterparts, in measuring their influence on British politics. And, in considering the forms of political engagement, although likely to be considered radical, rallies and demonstrations, in fact demonstrate an engagement that diverges from that which is associated with extremist radicalization (Bartlett et al. 2010). According to Bartlett et al., this is a significant point of distinction. "Young people need space to be radical: bold, different, awkward and dissenting. This can be an important antidote to radicalization that leads to violence" (Bartlett et al. 2010, 19). They posit "that civic engagement and political protest distinguishes radicals from terrorists" (19).

In the radicalization literature it seems we are all too often faced with a choice, between community-labelling and individual patholagization. Spalek and Imtoual (2007, 194) remind us of the inadequacy and difficulties faced by current policy directives, based at the neighbourhood, community scale:

> The notion that extremists can be located within any community is problematic…extremists may be pursuing their own individualised quests, which may have little, if any, connection with any wider communities that they may nominally belong to, in terms of family, ethnic grouping or nationality. It seems that militants may join an "imagined community" that works through minds, attitudes and discourses rather than geographical locales or through social and familial ties.

Despite the unresolved linkage issue in the literature, there is evidence that terrorist recruitment often targets disenfranchised youth. There are many ways in which young people are led to feel disenfranchised, distrustful of the State, and as terrorism recruiters become attuned to this, their tactics adapt and target the weak spots. Some scholars have attempted to map out trajectories and profiles that aide risk assessment (Glees and Pope 2005; Horgan 2005; Moghaddam 2005; Silber and Bhatt 2007). However, scepticism over correlations between social exclusion and violent radicalization remind us that there is no singular narrative of violent extremist radicalization (Dawson 2009; d'Appolonia 2010).

While understanding the links between social exclusion and radicalization to violence is still

underdeveloped, the problem of socially excluded youth is surely in need of attention. But there is a risk of stigmatization. Therefore, such attention must be mindful, and executed in a way that does not first render young people as potential terrorists, as suspects, or as a problem in need of solving.

Part Two: Modes of Engagement Around Issues of Security

Since the events of 9/11, counter-terrorism has been a top priority for governments around the world. With the emergence of homegrown or domestic terrorism, many governments have begun to consider community engagement as fundamental to counter-terrorism and security policy and strategy. In the UK, Australia, Canada, the US, and more generally in the EU, preventative frameworks involving soft and localized approaches have been adopted, intent on building resilience against the threat of terrorism. Engaging communities in counter-terrorism is not novel. Soft security measures were first employed in Northern Ireland, in the latter stages of "the troubles" (Spalek and Imtoual 2007). However, immediately following the events of 9/11, local community-based approaches were seen to be ineffective, in the face of a globalized international threat (Briggs 2010, 971). In the years that followed, precipitated by a series of homegrown terror plots in various Western countries, preventative soft security approaches have been adopted once more.

Despite the fact that threats to Canadian national security could emerge from many processes (i.e. by eco-terrorism, transnational political conflicts, First Nations decolonization struggles, anarchist, and right-wing extremists), the international trend toward community engagement as counter-terrorism has developed out of a specific set of circumstances and concerns–namely, so-called "Islamist extremism." That being said, the community-engagement strategies are applicable to the various strands of terrorism, based on a set of principles that emphasize dialogue and negotiation over violence and conflict.

This preventative framework and its soft security community engagements have not been enacted without critique. One of the major concerns with soft security counter-terrorism policy has been levelled at the embedded assumption that poverty, social, and political disenfranchise-

ment are the underlying causes of violent radicalization and terrorism. Additionally, criticism has been voiced over community-targeted interventions that either characterize certain groups as at risk or request that groups self-identify as at risk to violent radicalization (Awan 2012; Choudhury 2010; also see Part Three of this review). Much of the material in this part of the review draws on research based on the UK's Prevent policy (2006; 2009; 2011), and associated reviews, which have protested the conflation of integration, social cohesion, and national security agendas. In response to these assessments, scholars, and practitioners have been trying to come to terms with the productive possibilities of community-based and collaborative resistance to violent-radicalization and terrorism, and the associated risks of exacerbating experiences of marginalization, alienation, and disenfranchisement. We note, however, that the UK and Canadian contexts are very different, and ask readers to keep this in mind. With that said, learnings from the UK provide valuable insights that are useful in flagging issues that are relevant to the local context.

In this part, we recount the emergence of soft security practice, characterized by partnerships between state agencies and community organizations. We explain how preventative frameworks have employed principles and priorities of social cohesion and community resilience to counter violent radicalization. We address some of the concerns and critiques of soft security models, to draw out key learnings that might shed some light on policy development in the Canadian context.

From "Hard" to "Soft" Security Strategies

Soft approaches to counter-terrorism use community-based models in efforts to tackle the underlying causes of violent radicalization and terrorism. Softer approaches are generally focused on economic, political, social, and political reform, development, and equality. At best, such approaches enable citizen influence over the nature of community and security practitioner relations (Myhill 2006).

The shift from hard top-down counterterrorism policing to soft approaches speaks to a shift in how governments understand domestic and homegrown terrorism. Softer approaches empha-

size local concerns, social exclusion, and disenfranchisement based on the assumption that it is through these experiences that risk or possibility of violent radicalization is produced (Pickering et al. 2008; Spalek 2012).

Following the events of 9/11, "hard power" security responses were favoured. Multicultural states prioritized identification and surveillance of high-risk groups, prosecution of individuals, racial profiling and stop-and-search police powers, and targeted pursuit of known threats (Pickering et al. 2008). Critiques of hard policing have been focused on the ways in which securitized landscapes emerge, where public consent is not sought and individuals are cast as informants rather than partners (Innes 2006). The challenge for super-diverse immigrant societies, like Canada, is that under this model that treats individuals with suspicion and distrust, there is an inherent risk of endorsing intolerance, racial profiling, and amplifying differences to the point of alienation and conflict.

Since 9/11, due to a variety of factors, scholars reported that the social organization of terrorism had become more diffuse (Innes 2006; Jones 2006; Gunarartna and Oreg 2010). Innes posits that this diffusion was driven by al Qaida's imperative to capitalize on the increasing tensions in multicultural states, where Muslims often experience acute social exclusion (226). With the realization that hard strategies were increasing experiences of alienation and disenfranchisement (Stasiulis and Ross 2006; Choudhury and Fenwick 2011) and producing a more generalized "atmosphere of fear and a culture of surveillance" (Coaffee and Rogers 2008, 102), both scholars and states came to see a new approach as both urgent and necessary (Innes 2006). Though the shift in security strategy, from hard to soft, has been attributed to the specific threat of al Qaida and its affiliates, this preventative model has been applied, in Canada as elsewhere, to all groups considered to be national security threats (Hanniman 2008).

Framing Security Policy with Concepts of Social Cohesion and Community Resilience

Where soft security policies have been adopted, they have been framed by ideas of social cohesion and resilience. Homegrown terrorism and new conceptions of national security threats, in both terrorism and security scholarship, frequently locate current national security concerns

within a context of immigrant, secular societies grappling with changing social landscapes, super-diversity, and questions of citizenship and identity politics.

The term, "homegrown terrorism" is itself implicitly linked to both preventative national security and soft security strategies (Eatwell and Goodwin 2010). It describes terror attacks planned or executed by individuals who live in the countries in which the attacks take place. Increasingly, over the past few years, concern has been raised over the effectiveness of the preventative model and its implementation. Primarily, critiques have been levelled at the associated risks of conflating social cohesion objectives with national security efforts (Aly 2013; Choudhury and Fenwick 2011). Because the soft security, preventative approach has developed in response to a very specific set of events and circumstances, these concerns can only be understood by first outlining how and why this shift occurred.

Five key events occurred between 2004 and 2006 that focused attention specifically on the threat of domestic and homegrown counter-terrorism.

- In March 2004, a train bombing in Madrid killed 191 people and injured 1,800.
- Later that year, Mohammed Bouyeri, member of Islamist terrorist organization, the Hofstad Network, assassinated Dutch film-director Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam.
- In Australia the following year, Operation Pendennis intercepted planned attacks in Sydney and Melbourne and resulted in the arrest of twenty-two men.
- On the 2 June 2006, eighteen men who were planning to attack downtown Toronto, were arrested in a counter-terrorism raid. Those arrested were labeled the "Toronto 18."
- The following month, the London 7/7 attack occurred, killing fifty-two and injuring 700 people. All attacks were either attributed to or reportedly inspired by al Qaida (Gunaratna 2011).

Increasingly, governments have been explicit about the ways in which the threat of terrorism and violent radicalization can be diminished through national solidarity (Aly 2013).

The idea of a Prevent strategy was first introduced in the UK, with CONTEST, a "multi-dimensional counter-terrorism strategy" (2011), and later in revised versions (2006; 2009; 2011). The strategy is composed of four elements: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare. The Prevent strate-

gy, most notably, has provided a model for soft security counter-terrorism elsewhere–in particular, in Australia and Canada. Soft counter-terrorism strategies have been subject to major critique, in particular, in the earlier versions, for effectively securitizing social and integration agendas. Notably, these critiques were outlined in a report commissioned by the UK House of Commons' Communities and Local Government Committee, entitled "Preventing Violent Extremism Report" (2010), and in a report commissioned by the UK's Equality and Human Rights Commission, "Research Report 72: The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities" (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011). Having come under extensive criticism by scholars and activists in the UK, the 2011 version includes the following caveat (CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 2011):

> Having widened the scope of Prevent we also intend to narrow its focus. Prevent depends on a successful integration strategy, which establishes a stronger sense of common ground and shared values, which enables participation and the empowerment of all communities and which also provides social mobility. But integration alone will not deliver Prevent objectives. And Prevent must not – as it has it the past – assume control of funding for integration projects which have a purpose and value far wider than security and counter-terrorism. The Government will not securitise its integration work: that would be neither effective, proportionate nor necessary. (12)

The dynamic nature of Prevent evolution in the UK speaks to the trial and error nature of a strategy developed under tight timelines, and, according to Choudhury and Fenwick (2011, 48), in direct response to terror events:

> The urgent need to develop the strategy following the attacks of 7/7 meant that there was limited time to carry out the research needed to inform policy. As one official noted, research was commissioned but by the time the results came in, spending on projects had already started.

A large body of critique has emerged in the wake of this policy, which has also informed policy and program development in other parts of the world.

Echoes of the UK's policy can be seen the United States, the "National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism" (2011), guided by four core principles: "Adhering to U.S. Core Values", "Building Security Partnerships", "Applying CT Tools and Capabilities Appropriately," and "Building a Culture of Resilience". Again, resilience is employed in a way that aims to develop nation-

al cohesion in the face of a threat. As Aly (2013, 5) points out, this can be seen as a distinctive change from the United States' 2003 counter-terrorism strategy that set out a slightly different set of principles: "Defeating", "Denying", "Diminishing", and "Defending". Aly notes that while the Diminish goal endorses similar community-oriented programming, by replacing it with the principle of resilience, support has focused more on localized, community-level development measures.

In Australia, the counter-terrorism approach, charted in "Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting our Community" (2010) was largely shaped by the UK's Prevent strategy, with four guiding principles: "Analysis", "Protection", "Response", and "Resilience". Using the concept of resilience, the Australian Government described the way the national community would be included in efforts to resist "violent radicalization and terrorism on the home front" (65).

Last year, Canada released "Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy" (2013), based on the principles: Prevent; Detect; Deny; and Respond. Resilience is central to the strategy and is explained as follows (2013, 11):

> Building a resilient Canada involves fostering a society in which individuals and communities are able to withstand violent extremist ideologies and challenge those who espouse them. They support and participate in efforts that seek to protect Canada and Canadian interests from terrorist threats. A resilient Canada is one that is able to mitigate the impacts of a terrorist attack, ensuring a rapid return to ordinary life.

With the prevent component of Canada's counter-terrorism strategy, we again see an emphasis on openness, diversity, and inclusivity–each elements of social cohesion. The policy is explicit in insisting that this strategy does not intend to be divisive or exclusionary, but rather allow for "positive alternative narratives" that will "foster a greater sense of Canadian identity and belonging for all" (16-17).

In recent years, researchers have been busy trying to understand and explain domestic and homegrown terrorism. Because narratives of marginalized and socially excluded youth have formed the basis of policy development, scholarship in critical terrorism studies has been drawn

to debates over multiculturalism, integration, and social cohesion (McGhee 2008). In order to explain the shift from hard to soft security mandates, we must therefore be attentive to the policy landscapes in which this has occurred.

The Quest for Social Cohesion

In Canada, social cohesion was first identified as a crucial policy issue in relation to immigration in the mid-1990s (Spoonley et al. 2005, 89). It focused on shared values and equal opportunities, and it grounded national membership as a relationship based on trust, hope, and reciprocity (see Canadian Council on Social Development 2000). It has been suggested that following 9/11 there was a significant shift in social cohesion discourse, when it became more explicitly linked with social capital and shared citizenship–no longer as a policy lens, but as "a high level policy ambition" (Spoonley et al. 2005, 89). In other words, for some, this shift indicated a re-focusing on a national community defined more structurally by shared citizenship rather than by a culture in which shared values, opportunities, and reciprocity are emphasized.

A social cohesion framework has been adopted elsewhere, and has faced similar iterations, manipulated in the face of economic and social challenges. In the UK, the adoption of social cohesion as the framework for social policy was focused on galvanizing a British community through a dominant set of shared values (Thomas 2011). In a new iteration of what Thomas calls integrationism, commonality was privileged over diversity: "Britishness" was used euphemistically, and expressed with hyphenation, to denote a national community before ethnicity or religion, i.e. British-Muslim, British-Sikh, British-Algerian (3). In Australia, also, there was a return to nationalist conceptions of identity as a strategy for managing emergent social tensions within a super-diverse society (Stratton 2006). In Europe, states moved away from multiculturalism toward a notion of "civic integrationism" (Kymlicka 2010), in what has been criticized as a "rights deficit" approach (Spoonley et al., 2005, 90). With the exception of Canada, in each of these instances, the language of social cohesion was substituted for, and to express "the failure of multiculturalism" (Jupp 2002; Joppke 2004; Phillips 2007).

Under these conditions, a binary discourse has emerged that presents integration as distinct

from multiculturalism, and serves to highlight continuing challenges in immigrant societies. Security strategies based on dialogue and partnerships attempt to address these inherent challenges. Kymlicka's (2003, 3; in Spoonley et al., 2005) list is pertinent here, as the questions he sets out echo those confronted in community-based counter-terrorism:

- How to reconcile the recognition of diversity with building common feelings of membership and solidarity?
- How to understand the links between economic disadvantage and cultural exclusion, since many minority groups suffer from both?
- How to promote genuine mutual understanding rather than simply a tokenistic appreciation of diversity?
- How to enable greater public participation, yet also ensure that participation is conducted responsibly, with a spirit of openness and fairness, and is not simply a way of asserting dogmatic claims or scapegoating unpopular groups?

For policy makers, these questions have become more urgent following a series of urban disturbances (i.e. riots) in the UK in 2001, France in 2005, and Australia in 2005 (Thomas 2011). Laying the groundwork for social cohesion to be adopted more formally as social policy, these disturbances, combined with the domestic terror events already mentioned, provoked concern over a cumulative trajectory of dissent and extremism (Eatwell 2006). In this dark scenario, one extremist event fuels and aggravates another, and so on, in a spiraling of conflict and violence (Eatwell and Goodwin 2010, 7).

Building Resilience: Local Solutions to Local Problems

Implicitly referencing local conditions as central to the radicalization process, prevention strategies have tended to focus on "local solutions to local problems" (Lowndes et al. 2010, 123). Authorities are therefore required to reconcile locally-led security initiatives with a national security agenda–no simple task. The necessity for a localized, context-specific policing strategy has been seen as vital, given the continuous risk of "distant and global concerns can [gain] currency only when they are able to feed off local, everyday, personal grievances" (Briggs et al. 2006, 13).

The concept of community resilience is fundamental to the sustainability of soft security

strategies. Under the paradigm of resilience, empowerment is privileged over coercion; individuals and communities are rendered as vulnerable rather than victims; and the focus is on bottom-up rather than top-down tactics (Chandler 2012, 223). In other words, community resilience can be thought of as communities that self-manage risk.

Operationalized, soft strategies go beyond traditional public participatory policing methods, such as Crimestoppers, to include policing more broadly, with consent, the communities perceived to be vulnerable to violent radicalization (Briggs 2010, 973). Programs look more like community development or outreach, and would not normally be perceived as policing by the public. In the European Union, programs have included (Schmid 2013, 51):

- interfaith meetings
- support for Muslim magazines and TV
- government-sponsored lectures from moderate Muslim clerics
- field trips to Auschwitz
- professional development seminars
- soccer matches with police officers
- development of tools/measures to better enable teachers and public authorities to address radical and negative opinions
- establishment of a national idea catalogue of counter measures, including preventative measures (jointly produced by different actors)
- establishment of a helpdesk to which public authorities and public actors can turn for information on radicalization and effective methods
- creation of a mentoring system for young people to establish face-to-face dialogue and the existence of resource individuals and role models
- counteract distribution of radical material via TV, CD-ROM, books and the Internet
- dialogue forums aimed at disseminating information on foreign policy in the Muslim world
- courses for citizens on rights and duties of citizenship and democratic principles
- education programmes on extremism for correctional treatment staff

- development of awareness training for individuals who work with young people to enable easier identification of radicalization indicators

In Canada, the two primary examples of community-based counter-terrorism include (Public Safety Canada 2013, 14):

- the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, jointly supported by Public Safety Canada and the Department of Justice, which brings together leading citizens from their respective communities with extensive experience in social and cultural issues to engage with the Government on national security issues (Keeble 2005; Hanniman 2007); and
- the RCMP's National Security Community Outreach, which responds directly to the threat of radicalization leading to violent extremism through local initiatives intended to address potential political violence and to identify and address the concerns of minority communities (Hanniman 2008).

Major Critiques of Soft Security Policy

Summarizing the points raised in this discussion, critics of prevention and soft security measures have highlighted that community outreach and community-based counterterrorism is never neutral, and partnerships cannot necessarily be balanced (Spalek and Lambert 2010, 105). The major concerns expressed in the counterterrorism literature include:

- disputes over funding allocation (Richards 2011; O'Toole et al. 2012)
- rendering of legitimate and illegitimate partners (Spalek and Imtoual 2007)
- making of suspect communities (Choudhury 2010; Awan 2012; Hickman, Thomas et al. 2012)
- community engagement privileging community "centres" over "peripheries" (Klausen 2009; Bartlett et al. 2010; O'Toole et al. 2012)
- questions of effectiveness, in light of the difficulties associated with evaluation (Lum et al., 2008; Lindekilde 2012c)
- accusations of intel-gathering in disguise (Innes 2006; Awan 2012; Spalek and O"Rawe 2014)
- lack of police competencies (interpersonal, social, political) and cultural sensitivity (d"Appolonia 2010)
- failure to engage with concerns over foreign policy (Abbas 2007; d'Appolonia 2010)

- difficulties associated with trust-building–which takes time and openness, that cannot always be fulfilled (Innes 2006; Spalek and Lambert 2010)

In the next section, we outline the three key components of enacting soft security policy, highlighting challenges and concerns, and draw out some important lessons from critical terrorism scholarship.

Supporting Dialogue & Establishing Partnerships

> The "Prevent" element of the strategy focuses primarily on building partnerships with groups and individuals in Canadian communities. Working closely with local-level partners will help foster a better understanding of preventative and intervention methods to stop the process of radicalization leading to violence. (Public Safety Canada 2013, 14)

The central remit of terrorism prevention strategies has been building partnerships between state and non-state actors and agencies. Primarily this has meant developing connections between selected community organizations and either funding agencies or national security police agents. Objectives of these collaborations are, generally, to foster openness and counter-narratives to those expressed by extremist ideologies; to encourage information-sharing that is mutually beneficial; to repair community and police relations where they have been tarnished; and to create a forum in which community concerns can be voiced and heard.

Underlying the partnership model of counter-terrorism policing is the assumption that terrorists and potential terrorists are social actors embedded in networks, or rather, communities of some kind (Sageman 2004). Therefore partnerships between state organizations and community organizations can produce avenues for intervening and averting ideological and social processes that can lead to radicalization and violent mobilization (Briggs et al. 2006). One way in which this is achieved is by helping or supporting community leaders to present alternative, and what are deemed to be more moderate, narratives to those offered by extremist ideologues (Schmid 2013).

Leaving aside the question of who decides what narratives are considered too radical, and what a moderate narrative should look like, criticism over the partnership model, has predominantly been concerned with the selection of partners, and its consequences. Klausen (2009)

describes the unavoidable socio-political complexities of choosing community partners, and excluding others. Referencing the British Prevent program, Klausen describes the implicit risk of community-based partnerships (415):

> One is political. Governments worry about becoming "entrapped" by Muslim groups and the political consequences of embracing Muslims as "partners". Muslim groups have the same worry about the authorities. The need to build partnerships with representatives has put the police in the unenviable position of having to pick partners and, while Muslim groups have been receptive to the challenge, working with one group often excludes working with another.

In his paper, Klausen explains the tension that developed as a result of a partnership between Metropolitan Police with a particular Muslim community group. In this instance, Muhammed Abdul Bari, Secretary of the General Muslim Council of Britain, was angered by what he saw as a move that sidelined his organization. In effect, the *Prevent* program circumvented umbrella organizations, like the General Muslim Council of Britain, in favour of a more localized and neighbourhood-level approach. This move also frustrated others, including high-ranking members of the Church of England, who accused the British Government of showing "favouritism to Muslims" (415). Government funding is always controversial. Nevertheless, the conflict presented by Klausen highlights how adversarial inter-community relations are easily enflamed by affronts to institutional order and perceptions of inequitable distribution of funds.

Understanding Community Complexity

Recognizing diversity within religious, ethnic, or political communities is important in avoiding further distress and antagonism within and between community groups and/or state agencies in efforts to prevent violent radicalization. As has been well established, community is a contestable term and is regularly enlisted in government policy and strategies to organize collections of individuals sharing some particular quality–be it religion, politics, or ethnicity (Spalek 2012). While used positively to designate a national community, under the banner of social cohesion, for many individuals, the designation of, for instance, "the Muslim community" or "the Sikh Community" is alienating and misleading (Nagra 2011). Innes (2006, 231) shares an interview with a British police officer, apparently frustrated at the rendering of a monolithic Muslim

community: "There is no such thing as THE Muslim community. There is a hugely complex set of people making up different sub-sections of a community who have different divisions, rivalries and factions."

Policing through community partnership is shown here to be a highly sensitive and nuanced project. Attempts to sweep multiple stakeholders into a homogenous community that is expected to speak with a single voice, Innes suggests, will inevitably inflame tensions, and be counterproductive in state-efforts to foster trusting and meaningful partnerships. Innes warns (231): "First, as peoples' conception of belonging become more tightly defined, and they no longer feel that who they are is sufficiently represented by broader classifications of identity, the potential for intergroup tensions is increased."

Community intelligence, it is suggested by Spalek (2012), provides police with avenues for understanding the complexities of inter-community relations (Hanniman 2008). Similarly, Innes posits that this is precisely the kind of intelligence authorities need to "circumvent the intelligence gaps and blind spots that seemingly inhere in their established methods" (2006, 230). Different organizations will, after all, have "different sets of priorities" (Spalek and Lambert 2010, 105), and to undertake comprehensive engagement, these different sets of priorities need to first be acknowledged and understood.

When identifying partners, Bartlett et al., (2010, 29) argue that community-engagement should focus not just on the centre–the most visible sites of religious, ethnic or political communities–but equally, if not more importantly, include and be responsive to diversity by engaging the periphery. Indeed, O'Toole et al., (2012) reflect on Britain's Prevent program and argue that to counter violent radicalization, outreach must engage non-violent extremists. They posit that some of these organizations are, in fact, key (i.e. embedded in local governance structures) to effectively diffusing trajectories of radicalization to violent extremism, to avoid amplifying local antagonisms, and to foster more collaborative or cohesive inter-community relations (see also Lindekilde 2012d). As the number of groups that fall under anti-terror legislation rises, Spalek and Imatoual (2009) have surmised that in the coming years, more and more individuals will

be excluded from engagement mechanisms. This outlook would appear to be antithetical to the inclusive intentions of soft security policy and programming.

Although community-based policing sometimes attempts to recognize diversity and difference between different community groups, community structures can obscure the diversity within them. For instance, Spalek and Lambert (2010, 105) argue that in the rollout of Britain's Prevent strategy, community representatives were generally middle-aged and older men, disconnected from the experiences and immediate concerns of youth and females. While multiple communities were engaged under the partnership model, the effectiveness of this strategy was compromised by intra-community dynamics, which were more difficult to regulate. Being attentive to diversity within communities, and to who does and doesn't have voice within those groups, is an important aspect of comprehensive community engagement.

Soft Security and "Moderation": The Limits of Inclusion

Another cautionary warning, through critique of the selection of community-partners, is the possibility of rendering some community groups as legitimate and others as illegitimate (Spalek and Imtoual 2007). This critique is raised repeatedly in scholarly research over how citizenship is defined, particularly for young people (Anwar 1998; Dillabough and Kennelly 2010; Kennelly 2011; Nayak 2003). In the counter-terrorism literature it becomes a matter of good citizens being defined by their selection and participation in community engagement programs. For instance, commenting on community engagement strategies involving Muslim communities in Australia, Spalek and Imtoual describe a "tenuous path between being a 'good' Muslim community member and/or being a 'good' citizen" (185). Just like with the multiculturalism and integration debates, aspects of an individual's identity are divided and set in a state of opposition and competition (Spalek and Lambert 2008; Dillabough and Kennelly 2010). Perceived through the lens of radicalization and terrorism, non-participation (whether self-elected, or by exclusion) essentially pits individuals or communities in an adversarial relationship to the State.

Similarly, the Danish government's action plan for preventing violent radicalization, "A Common and Safe Future", has been criticized for narrowing conceptions of citizenship, ruling

out non-violent radicalization, and imposing subsequent limitations on free speech (Lindekilde 2012d). Lindekilde writes of the Danish action plan (111):

> The action plan to prevent radicalization is, in short, all about formation of responsible, liberal citizens at the expense of "radical" identities, and the two fundamental subject positions are understood in terms of either-or. Either you take on the liberal identity, or you take on a radical identity and become the target of corrective policies of intervention. This perception leaves little room for, for example, verbally supporting violent groups like Hamas or al-Shabaab and at the same time being a responsible, liberal citizen.

The result, Lindekilde (2012d) warns, is that key community leaders withdraw from public debate in fear of being labeled radical and thus delegitimized. He argues that in Denmark, while these individuals at risk of being labeled radical might not be the most integrated or assimilated liberal citizens, but rendering them a security threat is counterproductive and unjust.

> Such Muslim actors, be they local imams, community leaders, or influential sheiks, may very well be the best suited to reach young Muslims flirting with violent jihadism. But […] they would lose their legitimacy if they first had to comply with the premises of the radicalization discourse by confirming democratic ideals and dismissing principles of sharia. So if the authorities were to make use of such actors in the battle against radicalization it would mean overlooking intolerant and non-integrationist perspectives for the sake of addressing security concerns. So far the Danish authorities have been very reluctant to do this. (Lindekilde 2012d, 30)

This challenge speaks to the question previously raised: what and whose message is considered to be moderate? And further, it highlights an unresolved and important question: when community leaders are selected, how are their rights and autonomy to be protected, within a state-community partnership model?

Location Matters in Community Partnerships

Another consideration, in thinking about how partnerships are devised between state actors and community agents, is the location in which they are enacted. For instance, a number of youth-targeted soft security programs have been proposed for schools. Imran Awan (2009) is explicit in his argument that schools and universities should not be a site for programs that aim to counter violent-radicalization. He argues that teachers and professors should not be respon-

sible for monitoring their students; that this undermines the productive and necessarily trusting relationships that can exist between teachers and students (1173). Nevertheless, universities and schools are sited as key arenas for soft security counter-terrorism programming, in part based on the unsubstantiated profile of the university-educated terrorist. In the UK, Simcox, Stuart, and Ahmed (2010) report that only one-third of terrorist offences, as of 2010, have been committed by university-educated individuals. Awan (2011, 1174) explains that this number is not revealing when compared with Britain's national university educated average, with 40 percent of British young people attending university.

Under Danish counter-radicalization policy, schools were also identified as key sites for soft security interventions. Under the "School–Social Services–Police" (SSP) partnership, school-teachers were trained to specifically identify radicalization predictors, to recognise trajectories of extremist radicalization toward violence, and to instigate pre-emptive interventions (Lindekilde 2012d). In their study of young Muslims impacted by counter-terrorism policies in the Danish city of Aarhus, Küle and Lindekilde (2010, 130) report that schools programs were met with resistance by some teachers, who felt their responsibility to and relationships with their students would be compromised by the task to "spot signs of radicalization."

Particularly challenging in these soft security partnerships is the need to balance autonomy, empowerment, and support of local actors, engaged in what are ultimately state-initiated programs. While communities might share the concerns expressed in preventative policies, the ways in which they are enacted, through partnerships, inevitably requires negotiation. Further, the sites in which these partnerships unfold can never be neutral. And, just as there are challenges inherent in conflating integration and security agendas, so too are there conflicts of interest in conflating community, education, and other kinds of social spaces with security agendas.

Rehabilitating Community Relations & Trust-Building

Partnerships between state-agents and community organizations require levels of trust and commitment that are unlikely to be even. Because partnerships are developed, based on state-level policy directives, communities are engaged through this frame, and thus, through an already

established set of objectives. As such, trust is a key element of an effective partnership (Hanniman 2008; McDonald 2012). Many partnership models involve the participation of state-agents, like police. Initiating state-community partnerships based on openness between parties (likely more one way than the other) is made particularly tenuous if there has been a history of targeted and/or over-policing (Innes 2006). With trust writ as a key element of soft security policy–trust in the state, that is–state agents must be particularly attentive to their contextual histories in particular locations and with particular communities.

Minority communities have been disproportionately impacted by the use of stop-and-search police tactics. Bowling and Philips (2003) report that as well as being subject to greater levels of surveillance and repeatedly rendered as suspect, minority communities are simultaneously under-policed as victims. This situation makes for shaky ground on which to enact soft security strategies, with police as community-partners talking about trust and information-sharing (Innes 2006). In studies conducted by Spalek and Lambert (2010, 107; see also Lambert 2008), they found that individuals who had first-hand experience of anti-terror measures "were less likely to engage with state authorities in the future." In this context, community partnerships cannot be meaningful without first acknowledging their antagonistic history, rehabilitating, recovering, and then redefining the role of police, and their community relationships–a kind of law enforcement reset.

Part of this process, moving toward a soft security community policing strategy necessarily involves state agents seeking consent from community partners. Reflecting on the UK's Prevent strategy Briggs argues that without consent counter-terrorism operations become unsustainable and at constant risk of causing the very effects they aim to curb (973).

> The police and Security Service cannot act without the consent of the communities they are there to protect, because they need communities to extend to them the benefit of the doubt when they make mistakes, and forgive them infringements of civil liberties that might happen in the heat of the moment (although civil liberties should be fiercely guarded at all times). The nature of the threat from Al-Qaeda, which is determined to cause maximum damage without warning, compels the police to intervene much earlier than they would in other circumstances, which increases the likelihood of mistakes.

The sustainability of this model, according to Briggs, is made possible by strong resilient relationships that can withstand the sometimes-contradictory stressors imposed by trying to blend top-down and bottom-up policing strategies.

Building resilient relationships, however, is made difficult by high police officer turnover. As Spalek, McDonald, and El Alwa (2011, 20) state: “it is personal relationships that matter.” They argue that with a strong brand name or reputation based on consistency, mutual understanding, and predictability, the barrier presented by high police officer turnover rates may be mitigated. Failing this, in moments in which civil liberties are infringed upon, unsuccessful trust-building projects and community engagement can undermine all previous efforts to foster security (Sheptycki 2007; Lindekilde 2012a; Lindekilde 2012b).

Scholars critical of what are seen to be imbalanced soft security partnerships, cite a lack of sincerity, transparency, and visibility on the part of state agents. Following concerns over staff turnover (seen as a lack of commitment), tall orders of understanding (for when civil liberties are infringed upon and mistakes made), and in light of histories of over-policing and racial profiling, Spalek and Lambert (2010) call for sensitivity and reflexivity in the relationships between state agents and community members. Highlighting the very complex conditions under which these partnerships are engaged, Spalek and Lambert cite examples of reciprocal information sharing and dialogue between community members and police, in which counter-terrorism, community issues, and policing strategies and impacts could be discussed. Other scholars have raised similar arguments for more open and reciprocal dialogue between marginalized communities and police, as a way of developing police competencies around cultural sensitivity, ethnic, religious and cultural heterogeneity, foreign policy, and transnational politics (d’Appolonia 2010; Berns-McGown 2013).

Repeatedly in the literature, community distress is expressed with instances of disingenuous community-based policing, particularly in relation to counter-terrorism policing. Basia Spalek (2012, 76), voicing the concern of many (i.e. Baker 2012; Spalek and O’Rawe 2014), asks whether state engagements and partnerships with community groups are merely intelligence-gathering in

disguise? Awan's (2011) use of the term "community surveillance" expresses the deep scepticism felt by critics of the present state of preventative soft security. In the UK, Innes (2006) found that relations between British Muslims and policing agencies have, in many cases, been damaged by Prevent policing, and that reception of the community-outreach model has been mixed. More recently, Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2011, 19) reported that generally British Muslims responses to "Prevent" policing had been positive, however a greater "level of concern and dissatisfaction among younger British Muslim men" was expressed, paired with the suggestion that "counterterrorism policing was being abused by the police."

Ultimately, many critical scholars are calling attention to the–perceived and real–lack of accountability of counter-terrorism agents to community partners. In practice, accountability and transparency requires responding to community demands, including those that may not fall under the direct remit of counter-terrorism teams (Spalek et al. 2011, 17). Spalek et al. are explicit in their insistence upon open and candid identification of officers as members of counter-terrorism units, at the outset of any program. Further, they make a strong case for the upfront negotiation of information sharing as a two-way relationship. In addition to the reinvention, or policing reset, noted previously, these tactics are proposed in response to the exclusive and secretive culture of hard counter-terrorism security practice (Spalek, McDonald et al. 2011, 18). With a culture of openness, clarity, and transparency, Choudhury and Fenwick (2011) claim that opportunities can be created in which rumours, media reportage, and stereotypes relating to policing operations can be dispelled or elucidated. Further, these kinds of community contracts set out clear expectations and lines of communication, important in the process of developing trust between partners.

However, calls for a more open culture in policing have are not always met with warm reception, despite a significant body of research stating its value. Briggs (2010) explains that these kinds of open channels of communication go against the grain of traditional policing, with discretionary power shaping a need-to-know culture. As such, Briggs argues that a structural shift is required, to legislate transparent decision-making around funding allocation, reporting, and program delivery (980).

Commitment to an overarching policy of accountability is expressed internationally, in various soft counter-terrorism strategies, but not in the far-reaching way proposed by Briggs. For instance, this priority is made explicitly in Canada's counter-terrorism strategy (Public Safety Canada 2013): "To effectively counter violent extremism, a culture of openness must exist between citizens and government. This will require the Government to share knowledge with Canadians about the nature of the terrorist threat in order to foster a deeper understanding of the need for particular actions."

While many engaged communities have been receptive to this directive, it is likely that–as was found by the Home Office RICU–it is not always clear what this should look like in practice (Turnstone 2010). Further, criticisms of partnerships that end up looking more like public relations exercises (Innes 2006) or market-research consultations, are understood to cause disenfranchisement, leaving communities feeling patronized (Cook 2006, 105). Choudhury and Fenwick (2011) in the UK, and Hanniman (2008) in Canada, make clear that failing to ensure that community partnerships are based on sincerity, consistency, and longer-term community investment, risks undermining established relationships and the possibility of collaborative efforts to counter violent extremism.

Although drawn from a variety of sites, embedded in the critical terrorism scholarship are both cautionary warnings and advice relatable to the Canadian context. Scholars generally agree that policing and security agents need to be reflexive (attentive to the nature of community and state relations), to be culturally, politically, and socially sensitive to local, transnational, and foreign policy issues, to be aware of and prepared to address and work on troubled histories of over-policing and targeting, to see soft security as a long-term process, rather than an immediate and linear intervention, and to begin any partnership with an effort to establish and define terms of community consent and expectations.

Part Three: Impacts of "Soft" Security Policies and Programs on Minority Communities

In this part we consider research on the impacts of soft security counter-extremist radicalization policies and interventions (the term Countering Violent Extremism, or CVE, is generally used in the literature), in three parts. First we discuss some of the challenges and constraints in evaluating soft security policies and interventions. Second, we review the literature that explores the negative unintended effects that may be generated by soft security interventions, concentrating on the criticism that these activities may inadvertently cast individuals and groups as legitimate/illegitimate. Third, we return to elaborate on the problem of community targeting, and the designation of "suspect communities", which feeds back into our earlier part on community outreach, and the questions we raised there about CVE programs possibly reinforcing experiences of social exclusion, alienation and disenfranchisement associated with the radicalization process.

Recently there been a great deal of material published in critical terrorism journals (i.e. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, and the *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*). However, much of this emerging literature remains theoretical, lacking grounding in empirical data. The relative lack of empirical studies of the consequences of CVE programs has presented us with a difficult task in undertaking this review, and we regrettably have to rely upon a literature that is built on logical arguments (i.e., if security agencies do X, it is logical to expect that the community would respond with Y), media analysis, expert interviews, anecdotes about particular incidents, and small-sample studies, rather than rigorous, rich empirical work.

There is actually a notable body of literature, developed over decades, on community policing strategies and their effects, but few of these publications speak directly to the issue of terrorism, new modes of communication (i.e., the internet and social media), current dynamics of social inclusion/exclusion, and the uncertain processes and trajectories of radicalization. At a recent presentation (held during the 2013 TSAS Summer Academy), Lorne Dawson pointed to Lum and Kennedy's (2006) study, to highlight state of critical scholarship and the many unknowns. With-

out a solid empirical base from which to understand the complexity and inconsistencies involved in the process of radicalization to violent extremism, our review is inevitably tentative and raises almost as many questions are we are able to answer.

The Problem of Evaluation

All over the world, governments are allocating substantial funds to their counter-terrorism and national security budgets (Lum, W Kennedy et al. 2008). At the same time, governments have increasingly been drawn to the idea of evidence-based policy, which has emerged in the field of clinical health sciences (Young 2011). However, according to Lum and Kennedy (2012, 3), increased counter-terrorism funding "has not been matched by evaluation and assessment regarding the cost-effectiveness of these expenditures."

According to Young (2011, 20), evidence-based approaches to policy were instigated by the clinical health sciences and based on "the belief that 'science' and 'evidence' are inextricably interconnected." In other words, the idea of evidence-based policy is based on the conviction that a scientific approach to policy evaluation can produce unbiased information, providing grounds for rational, accountable, ethical, and fiscally responsible decision-making by government (Chalmers 2003; Lum et al. 2008). As such, these evaluations and assessments are often outsourced to private consultancies or public-private partnerships (Lindekilde 2012c, 387).

Various scholars have pointed to the complexities associated with the labelling of certain kinds of knowledge as "evidence" (Marston and Watts 2003; Glasby et al. 2007; Sempik et al. 2007). In particular, they emphasize the subjective and contextual nature of what becomes considered evidence (Nutley et al. 2007).

- It relatively quickly became apparent that, once one broadens the scope of application beyond the realm of clinical medical practice, there are various potential difficulties associated with relying upon "evidence" to justify the adoption of a particular policy position. Among the more prominent challenges is the lack of consensus regarding the precise character of what can legitimately be labeled "evidence" (Young 2011, 21).

Despite this cautionary warning, many researchers remain adamant that this approach is essen-

tial to promoting accountable, responsible, and transparent policy-making (Chalmers 2003), and specifically in order to moderate the moral panic that is often associated with counter-terrorism policy development (Lum et al. 2008; Lum and Kennedy 2012); for example, when there is a terrorist incident, the public may expect immediate action and resolution of the issues involved, even though they may not be fully understood (Brannan et al. 2001).

In their assessment of the literature, Lum and Kennedy (2012) assert there is an astounding deficiency of empirical analysis and evaluation of counter-terrorism policies and programs. In 2006, Lum et al. reported that only 3-4 percent of terrorism publications included some kind of analysis based on empirical information (892). Four years later, Lum (2012) again expresses surprise at the lack of empirical assessment and evaluation. Putting this scarcity into perspective, she reports that "evaluations of police interventions outnumber those on security and counterterrorism more than tenfold" (National Research Council 2010, cited in Lum and Kennedy 2012, 4). This paucity of empirical research, assessment and evaluation is attributed, in large part to "definitional struggles" (see Jenkins 1990; Ganor 2002; Schmid 2004; Norricks 2009). Specifically, it is attributed to methodological limitations that emerge through a lack of clarity over foundational definitions of many of the terms we have been using throughout this literature review.

Before tackling this issue it is instructive to outline some of the most common challenges in conducting research on radicalization toward violence and, particularly, evaluation of programs designed to prevent it:

- The radicalization process unfolds over time and understanding it requires painstaking, longitudinal analysis, which is difficult to reconcile with the government's desire for immediate information.
- Researchers need to gain the trust of individuals and/or groups to conduct their investigation—the very same individuals and groups that feel threatened by the securitization of society.
- Researchers face the same challenge as officials working for security agencies, in identifying radicalized individuals who are willing to take part in studies (the "needle in a haystack" problem).
- Any attempt to validate CVE strategies must face the crucial question of causality. It is

> exceedingly difficult to know when specific policies are or are not responsible for specific events or outcomes. For example, if a state spends money on CVE and there are fewer incidents, was it the CVE measures that led to this outcome, or some other factors? More precisely, how much of that outcome can be attributed to CVE measures vs. other factors? Answering this question requires many assumptions, each of which is subject to critical debate.

In order to undertake research that is meaningful to policy/practice, and capable of evaluating CVE programs, definitional consensus is required. Can researchers and government officials agree, for example on such basic questions as: what constitutes success of a policy or program; and who is included in the research target group (see Lum and Kennedy 2010; Lindekilde 2012c). These definitions are fundamental and without consensus, differing views are associated with unresolved understandings of radicalization, de-radicalization, what constitutes an extremist view, classifications of terrorist profiles, and designations of at risk populations. As Lindekilde (2012c), Horgan and Braddock (2010), and others have pointed out, each of these definitions is contingent on the political and social context in which empirical work takes place. Furthermore, without definitional consensus and understanding of radicalization trajectories, it is impossible to both show causality and provide policy objectives that are focused enough to produce reasonable and measurable indicators of success that can effectively isolate or eliminate "rival explanations" (Lindekilde 2012c, 389).

With so many knowledge gaps, and combined with a lack of clear and specific directives, security and law enforcement agencies tend to introduce ad-hoc programs and discretionary interventions. Horgan and Braddock's (2010) survey of de-radicalization programs and rates of recidivism in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Northern Ireland, and Columbia attests to this problem that inhibits co-operative learning. The array of programs, from behavioural and pyscho-therapy, to welfare support and re-incorporation, to religious dialogue, certainly cannot be compared in a quantitative way and qualitative comparison also proves messy. In their review of evaluations and claims of success in each of the case studies they found an absence of measurable criteria of success, data that could be corroborated by independent study, and no effort to develop programs that could provide grounds for comparison. These, they argue, are common conditions and the ad-hoc nature thus contributes to the series of constraints in de-radicalization

and counter-terrorism evaluation and research.

Further, Horgan and Braddock (2010) question the nature of de-radicalization and ask: can an individual disengage with extremism, but remain safely radical? And how might this degree of threat be measured and articulated? "Many of those who disengage (or desist) from terrorist activity are not necessarily de-radicalized (as primarily conceived via a change in thinking or beliefs), and that such de-radicalization is not necessarily a prerequisite for ensuring low risk of recidivism" (Horgan and Braddock 2010, 268).

Addressing national security interventions through a preventative framework begs the question of who is at risk? Who are the young people who have been prevented from engaging with terrorist activity? Identifying "end target" (Lindekilde 2012b, 340) or at risk (Heath-Kelly 2013) populations requires that national security policy must become localized, with policy objectives scaled down and specifically targeted. According to many scholars (see Choudhury and Fenwick 2011; Spalek 2012; Heath-Kelly 2013), it is in this process that, at the moment of scaling down–where indicators can become more specific and contained or measurable–that programs may produce and perpetuate a terrorist profile. Despite the lack of consensus over a terrorist profile in the academic literature, profiles and suspect communities emerge through the policy, interventions, and actions of governments (Heath-Kelly 2012).

We turn now to elaborate further on the methodological challenges associated with CVE programs and their evaluation. Generally, policy assessment or evaluation involves qualitative and/or quantitative techniques. Quantitative approaches require precise definitions with quantifiable impact or output measures. In order to measure impacts, a control group is generally required, potentially some kind of baseline descriptor, and some way of assessing before-and-after differences (Chalmers 2003). But, as Lindekilde (2012c, 388) points out, in evaluations and assessment of counter-terrorism policies and programs, access to unclassified data is routinely restricted. Therefore the number of research subjects in these studies is typically low, the quality of data is unreliable or inconsistent, and establishing a baseline is difficult. In the face of these problems, qualitative approaches are often used instead. In these instances, a more narrative approach is

taken, in which correlations are sketched out through use of interview and focus group data with subjects or key informants and observations.

With small data samples, data shortages, narrative-based correlations, a lack of longitudinal studies, and limited understanding of what constitutes a person "at risk of extremist radicalisation," the generation of false positives becomes a serious problem (Heath-Kelly 2012). Under a security model based on prevention, "the intended impact is that nothing happens, e.g. no radicalisation…proving the negative" (Lindekilde 2012c, 398). Given these problems of evaluation, and a strategy of prevention, Heath-Kelly (2012, 70) warns of the likelihood of false positives: "We might see more mistakes, more 'false positives,' now that the policy is explicitly concerned with the lives of those 'vulnerable' to extremism, because terrorism knowledge can never encompass the 'tipping point' between the suspect subjectivities it produces and the figure of the terrorist."

Lindekilde (2012c) and Heath-Kelly (2013) describe subjective policies and interventions, that allow for discretionary policing, and what Butler (2006) and Heath-Kelly refer to as "petty sovereignties," whereby "persons are exposed to the force of sovereign power–and yet later proven innocent" (Heath-Kelly 2013, 79). The implications of false positives has been raised by various scholars in relation to the formation of suspect communities and attributed to amplified experiences of marginalization and disenfranchisement.

Reinforcing the difficulties associated with the absence of foundational clarity, Horgan and Braddock (2010, 286) remind us that trying to develop a set of best practice recommendations at this stage, either through policy and program evaluation, or even in this literature review, is a somewhat naïve task. With a diversity of terrorism "types," related to the interrelation of multiple scales (i.e. local networks, national or global concerns), "what works in one region could not necessarily be expected to work in another and the internal expectations of the initiatives vary considerably" (286). For Horgan and Braddock, the uncritical use of the concept of "best practice" obscures the complexities associated with the phenomenon of violent extremism and terrorism, and they argue that this approach will inevitably result in more limited, rather than

expansive, knowledge and learning.

Concerns over evaluation and unintended impacts were corroborated by participants at the TSAS workshop on "National Security and Community Relationships" held in Ottawa in November 2013. Security officials, community practitioners, and scholars alike commented on the difficulties they faced in planning, performing, and seeking out guidance on how to best judge the quality of CVE evaluations and assessments. Given that these questions are unresolved in the academic literature, rather than guidance, we offer an articulation and description of research gaps and the attendant research challenges and imperatives. In the following section we highlight a fast-growing body of literature that speaks specifically to the negative effects of the efforts of security and law enforcement personnel to engage with Muslim communities that have been cast as suspect by a combination of media discourse, legislation, and targeted interventions.

Suspect Communities

The term suspect community has been used in the past to describe the treatment of the People's Republican Independence Army (Hillyard 1993). The term is now seeing revival by scholars describing the treatment and impact of community-targeted counter-terrorism in the UK (see Choudhury 2010; Awan 2012; Heath-Kelly 2013; Hickman 2012; Nickels 2012). According to Pantzis and Pemberton (2009, 649), a suspect community is a sub-group of the population that has been identified and labelled problematic, and specifically recognized as a threat to the State. They encourage us to think of a pyramid, in which the media sits at the bottom, and policy at the pinnacle. In this structure language, media, and policy interrelate in particular ways, and in the case of terrorism, policy can easily become united with a media discourse of moral panic (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; see also Dillabough and Kennelly 2010), Islamaphobia (Frost 2008; Kaya 2011), and the resulting public discourse ultimately shapes who the public imagines as suspect (Miller and Sack 2010; Nickels et al. 2012). The suspect label often results in delineation of the sub-group by "race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, language, accent, dress, political ideology or any combination of these factors" (Awan 2012, 1167), and in doing so, marginalizes, aggravates social tensions, and de-legitimizes individuals' stake in both public space and public fora.

Critical terrorism scholars who take this position generally describe communities rendered suspect through CVE policies and programs in two key ways: through policy frameworks that conflate vulnerability and a need for support with the prospect of threat and violence, and in a related processes of self-identification that occurs when marginalized communities adopt the language of vulnerability to radicalization to access state-sponsored resources. This critical discourse around suspect communities and the impact of prevention policies is primarily associated with the UK, and with some similar accounts in Australia (Spalek and Imatoual 2009; McCulloch and Pickering 2012).

Researchers in the UK have concluded that CVE programs are based on a logic that depicts some individuals as more vulnerable than others. This expectation of vulnerability authorizes a politics and practice of pre-emption (Heath-Kelly 2013), as well as of pre-criminalization (McCulloch and Pickering 2009; 2012). Further, it has legitimated the adoption of intrusive measures, including the alleged embedding of under-cover officers in community spaces (Spalek and O'Rawe 2014) and, in a number of places, increased stop-and-search powers and pre-detention charges (Pickering et al. 2008; McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Choudhury 2010). In the UK and Australia, these practices are seen as undermining social cohesion and multiculturalism standards with interventions targeted at particular sub-populations (i.e., radical profiling, see Spalek and Imtoual 2007; Awan 2012). In the Netherlands and Denmark the logic of vulnerability has also amplified pressure to follow more prescriptive immigration and integration policies (Lindekilde 2012a).

Funding that requires community organizations to frame themselves as vulnerable and thus deserving of additional attention from the State, including funds for community development, does those communities a disservice, by requiring them to self-identify as suspect (Spalek and Imtoual 2007; Kundnani 2009; Choudhury and Fenwick 2011). Choudhury and Fenwick (2011, ix), in their report for the Equality and Human Rights Commission, described concern over the way the Prevent program both targeted British Muslim communities, and put them in a compromising position–in desperate need of financial support, yet requiring negative social identifications in order to access it.

> Muslims working on Prevent often referred to the process of having to rationalise and justify participation, in light of their concerns about its nature and impact. For some, their concerns were countered by realism and pragmatism about the opportunity that PVE created for making a difference in their communities (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011, 51).

Choudhury and Fenwick also cite interviews in which community leaders expressed frustration at having to "misrepresent their activities and to exaggerate the threat in order to secure funding" (51).

Each of these problems speak to the way in the UK, as in Australia, Canada, and elsewhere, there may be an awkward tension between social cohesion agendas and national security goals (Husband and Alam 2011; Richards 2011; Hickman et al. 2012). While there is well-intentioned reasoning behind CVE programs, the discourse around suspect communities highlights some of the associated problems and unintended consequences.

Unintended Impacts & Negative Effects

Although, as already noted, evaluations are difficult and few representative enough for us to really refine our understandings of the process of radicalization toward violent extremism, a number of scholars demonstrate grounds for serious concern. Lindekilde's (2012a, 111) question is pertinent: "More precisely, the question investigated is if the neo-liberal intention of preventing radicalization by shaping and creating liberal-democratic citizens may be counter-productive, and in the worst-case scenario contribute to the creation of oppositional, illiberal identities?"

In other words, while evaluations are unable to demonstrate, or even define, what success would look like, equally they are also unable to communicate, for certain, failure. That said, it seems far easier to demonstrate failure than success, and perhaps for this reason, scholarship reporting the failure of prevention campaigns has been relatively robust. The worry though, is that policies and programs intended to foster social cohesion and prevent violent radicalization could instead serve to amplify inequality, social exclusion (Kundnani 2009; Spalek & Imatoual 2007), disenfranchisement, negative relationships with the State and state agents (Eijkman 2011), and potentially contribute to violent radicalization and extremism (Lindekilde 2012a).

Assessing the Prevent policy post-2011, Awan (2012) suggests that the policy may further alienate and stigmatize Muslim communities in Britain, and instead contribute to an environment in which extremist ideologies could gain more traction. In explaining his critique, Awan highlights the tendency of police officers and security agents to profile potential extremists without an evidence base, and to conflate religious participation with vulnerability to extremism, such as envisaging Mosques as "breeding grounds" for extremism (1178).

In the UK and in Europe, Awan (2012) and Eijkman (2011) respectively make the argument that governments needs to better understand the causes of extremism if they are to develop strategies that work to prevent extremism, rather than feed it. Outlining his recommendations for the future of the UK's Prevent strategy, Awan states (1177): "The Prevent 2011 strategy should do more to challenge and understand what makes someone become an extremist, and begin a process of engagement that can help remove the 'suspect' community label that has been associated with the Muslim community."

Reiterating this warning, Kundani (2009) asserts that bad CVE partnerships do more than hurt relationships between those involved; they also shape future possibilities of partnerships, trust more broadly, and influence feelings of communities and individuals toward the state in which they live (also see Eijkman 2011).

Identity politics are stressed and loyalties divided when communities are labelled as suspect and vulnerable to extremism. For diaspora and ethno-culturally defined communities, Hickman et al. (2012) describe the pressure to pick a side–the national community (i.e. the state) or the local community (i.e. sub-population). Hickman and colleagues' qualitative study focused on the experiences of Irish and Muslim communities in the UK, and involved discussion groups where individuals were invited to share their experiences of and concerns over community-oriented counter-terrorism strategies. One key informant, a British Muslim, explained the experience of feeling divided (Hickman et al., 2012: 98): "The experience is very alienating. And I think, is alienating and creating, is promoting the concept of 'us and them' and dividing communities [....] There is huge problems with the psychological impact of all this demonisation which it has

never been measured and I think that needs to be measured, what psychological impact it has got and how that is going to affect the whole community–people have got a lot of psychosis that is connected to police and security and so forth."

Hickman et al. (2012), posit that this kind of alienation can pave pathways toward reactive identity formation, highlighting gang participation and the development of more radical politicization (not necessarily extremist). Similarities are drawn out in the Australian context, where Spalek and Imtoual (2007) confirm this binary of "us" and "them," explaining that those who seek to avoid being branded suspects are forced to choose between identities–those that are deemed legitimate by the State, and those that are not. Ultimately, this choice rules out the possibility of productive and resistant politics of participation, and limits legitimate or transparent spaces in which individuals and communities are able to enact their democratic rights to express dissent and protest (197).

While there are instances in which more positive stories of community engagement and counter-radicalization are surfacing, the general lack of a solid body of evaluative scholarship means that there still remain a lot of unknowns. Choudhury and Fenwick (2011) are pragmatic in their assessment of counter-radicalization policy and programming in the UK, noting that this strategy has ultimately been an experiment, from which policy makers have been learning as they go. What this tells us is that there is a great need for evaluation, for challenge and critique, and for lessons to be shared across contexts–all with the knowledge that these policies exist in different socio-cultural and political climates and in which there will be no generic best fit or best practice that can be lifted from one place to another.

Conclusion

A common criticism of academics is that they are adept at producing critique, but rarely able to frame improvements to policy and practice. The literature gathered here presents a variety of positions and accounts of national security concerns, experienced at the community or neighbourhood level. We could have compiled a list of purported best practices from the experiences of Europe, Australia, the US, the UK and elsewhere. However, such a list would not be

based on contextually appropriate strategies attendant to the specific social, cultural, economic, and political dynamics present in Canadian cities and towns today. Further, this list would likely include recommendations that are primarily supported by theoretical or logical reasoning, rather than empirical research. That is not to say that there is nothing to be learnt from this collection of scholarship on violent extremism prevention. Rather it is intended to clarify our purpose in this review, which has been to assemble a diverse set of experiences, issues, opportunities, and concerns associated with the domestic security strategies recently adopted by governments attempting to deal with the threat of homegrown terrorism. We hope that in so doing, we might support a more nuanced, anticipatory, and thoughtful discussion of the possibilities for productive, respectful counter-terrorism research and practice, here in Canada.

Ultimately, as we have explained, there are many unknowns associated with the trajectories of radicalization to violent extremism, violent extremism prevention, and how assessment and evaluation of such programs might work. A lack of evidence-based research means that a great deal of the literature simply draws upon existing publications. Additionally, even if some programmatic success is measured or perceived, it is always difficult to draw causal correlations with a particular intervention. Therefore, making a case for any particular strategy can be contested.

What we can learn, more generally, from the literature, is that openness and transparency are important to all interactions between communities and state agents, and in partnerships between state and non-state institutions. Openness, transparency, dialogue, and reflexivity are all particularly crucial for government officials or law enforcement officers dealing with communities who already feel targeted, suspected, and marginalized in society. Homogenizing language that conflates ethnic, religious, political, and minoritized communities into singular groups alienates, and makes individuals feel unseen, unheard, and misread. It too easily contributes to designations of liberal/illiberal, legitimate/illegitimate, and threat/victim binaries. European scholars have also drawn our attention to the fact that conflating policies dealing with social integration and those dealing with national security leads to the securitization of social relations, and attendant mistrust among minority groups.

This is particularly important for minority young people, who are marginalized both by virtue of their age, as well as by their status as members of minority groups. Young people are generally omitted from discussions of what Tracey Skelton calls "big P" politics. This issue can become an acute concern for those who espouse radical ideas, which may be seen as a prelude ("the first step") toward extremism and violence. We must remember that radicalization is not, in itself, dangerous, and that it can indeed be positive. The distinction between radicalization vs. radicalization toward violence is therefore crucial when government officials and law enforcement officers attempt to engage young people experiencing various social exclusions.

The literature described as "critical terrorism studies" has been growing, leading to a somewhat better understanding of the factors that lead young people to transition from non-violent to violent forms of radicalization. Hopefully interventions to prevent this from happening will be better able to anticipate their impacts and effects. Choudhury and Fenwick's (2011) conclusion bears repeating: community-based CVE strategies are, in most cases, experiments through which policy makers are learning. This is not an accusation, but rather a reminder that there are individuals and communities whose lives are affected by these experiments. For their sake, and for the sake of the safety of all, there is a pressing need for evaluation of CVE programs and the ideas behind them, for challenge and critique, and for lessons to be attentively shared across contexts–while acknowledging that these studies draw on different socio-cultural and political climates and from which there can be no simplistic answers or universally applicable best practices. We also hope that academic work will evolve to take a greater interest in the day-to-day operational practices of community engagement; this would require a commitment to time consuming ethnographic research, research that would not be capable of answering questions of the moment, but would lead to deeper understanding.

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