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Perceptions of Muslim Faith, Ethno-Cultural Community-based and Student Organizations in Countering Domestic Terrorism in Canada

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The Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society

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Perceptions of Muslim Faith, Ethno-Cultural Community-based and Student Organizations in Countering Domestic Terrorism in Canada

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Executive Summary

The terrorist threat to Canada since 9/11 has evolved from a focus upon foreign-based terrorists infiltrating into the nation and attacking targets to a concern with domestic or home-grown terrorism as a function of a process of radicalization, especially among the youth in Canada. Preventing radicalization is the most useful means to prevent terrorism at home, as well as the export of terrorism overseas in the form of Canadians travelling to terrorist training camps and participating in external conflicts as foreign fighters. Central to preventing terrorism is the role that local faith and ethno-cultural community-based organizations (FEBO) and student organizations (SO) can play.

The elite and leaders of Muslim FEBOs are significant conduits between policy makers and the grass roots level public by virtue of their leadership in particular faith and ethno-cultural communities. They command moral legitimacy within their respective communities. Though most of them work as volunteers, they are thought leaders and their roles in organizing information sessions, seminars, and ethno-religious ceremonies make them a major means to approach their communities. In other words, they can and should play a key role in preventing terrorism, thus supporting Canada's national counter-terrorism (CT) strategy. In addition, several faith-based student organizations are also important gateways to understanding youth radicalization and youth perception on terrorism and CT issues. In order to exploit the value of the leaders of both types of organizations in developing and implementing CT policy, it is essential that their perceptions and beliefs regarding the issues of terrorism are clearly identified and understood as the means to promote their engagement and integration into Canada's CT strategy. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to uncovering such perceptions and beliefs in a systematic manner. Instead, knowledge about the perceptions and beliefs of FEBOs and SOs has been largely anecdotal.

This exploratory research study, funded by the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Society and Security (TSAS), is designed to identify the perceptions of Muslim faith and ethno-cultural community (FEBO) leaders, key personalities, and university students on terrorism, CT and radicalization. A qualitative, ethnographic research methodology is employed, and

additional inferences are drawn from various national and international survey datasets.

Data on these perceptions were gathered from semi-structured and focus group interviews, and analyzed using the qualitative data analysis software QSR nVivo 10. The research was conducted in two phases: a small scale pilot study involving one faith-based and one ethno-cultural community-based organization elite group to refine the research questions, followed by interviews with senior representatives from these organizations and four focus group discussions with students. The results are the product of interviews with twenty-one research participants.

It is important to note that recruiting participants for the study proved difficult due a prevalent environment of fear and mistrust within the Muslim community, especially among Muslim organizational leadership; this was in contrast to students who were quite willing to participate in the study. This reticence to participate, in part, can be linked back to the explicit identification of Muslims in government policy and the media as a significant terrorist threat to Canada. Fear and mistrust also stemmed from many Muslim leaders previous direct experience with government security operatives seeking to gather information on potential terrorists within their communities. This direct experience led some of the individuals approached for this study to believe that the members of the research team were in fact government agents (particularly members of Canadian Security Intelligence Service - CSIS and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police - RCMP). In addition, it became clear early on that there exists a social taboo within the Muslim community regarding discussing the topic of terrorism, at least with outsiders to the community. Developing the means to overcome fear and mistrust, as such, is an important first step in engaging these communities.

Closely related, the research sought to identify the nature of the Muslim community, relative to the concept of community mobilization in the national CT strategy. There is no single community in this regard and results indicate that there is no visible cooperation across the Muslim communities examined. In particular, as a function of the identification of Sunni Muslims in the CT, other Muslim denominations (Shiite, Ahmadya, Ismailiya) did not think, that they needed to participate with a Sunni group in an effort to raise awareness in building community resilience.

Except for one faith-based organization, none of the Muslim organizations either publicly engage or openly collaborate with federal agencies (for example, RCMP) in terrorism related issues. Mosque-based groups carefully avoided taking part either in this research or any social activities relating to domestic terrorism. In addition, ethno-cultural groups rarely discuss issues related to terrorism in a formal setting. Instead, ethno-cultural leaders indicated that discussions about terrorism are discussed informally around their meetings.

Turning to perceptions of the causes of domestic terrorism, several significant explanations emerged: the impact of globalization; the effect of peer networks; a prevailing sense of humiliation and social isolation; the tendency to express ideological/faith solidarity against injustices globally; the presence of Islamophobia within Canadian society, and unfulfilled social-economic expectations. The findings indicate that the Muslim community(ties), to the extent that participants are representative, perceives multiple causes for domestic terrorism. The small sample size did not permit a ranking or prioritization of these causes, nor the ability to identify causal clusters. This should be a priority for future research.

Concerning the relationship between radicalization and religion, all the respondents believed that the radicalization process is not drawn from Islam. But, when asked why all the apprehended terrorists in Canada since 9/11 were Sunni Muslims, the faith and ethno-cultural organization leaders could not provide a plausible explanation. When this area was probed deeper, the respondents felt that radicalization was the function of a lack of a proper Islamic education. This was due to two factors: the nature of Islamic education in the country of birth of immigrant families and refugees, and the problem of accessing Islamic faith-based education in Canada.

Faith-based leaders in particular rejected the existence of radicalization in the Muslim communities, whereas students, female participants and the leaders of the ethno-cultural organizations accepted its existence. Importantly, those who rejected the existence of radicalization saw the issue as a media concoction, corroborated by government reports. Very few respondents perceived domestic radicalization as the function of an identity struggle and the maladjustment of Muslim youths to mainstream society. Even so, the majority of respondents spoke about a host

of social issues that might contribute to radicalization. In particular, radicalization was associated with a failure to meet *a priori* expectations of life in Canada; a variant of the problem associated with rising expectations not being met. Some participants (mostly students in the focus group discussions) also reported how some youth feel themselves as misfits and cannot communicate with their parents and others in their community; this situation is further compounded when they feel responsible to react to injustices (however perceived) making them prone to recruiters. Many of our respondents, however, opined that they prioritize their faith identities more than national identities.

All the research participants were asked about their knowledge of Canada's CT strategy. The majority expressed almost complete ignorance of the strategy. Those who possessed limited knowledge about the CT strategy felt that instead of serving some purpose, the strategy promoted the negative stereotyping of Muslims. This perception was reinforced by their views on the manner in which the discourse on terrorism is framed by the media and powerful anti-Muslim lobby groups (for example, Robert Spencer's Jihad Watch).

Furthermore, with regard to the current CT strategy, all replied that they were only aware of the RCMP's and CSIS's work relating to identifying, monitoring and capturing terrorists. They were unable to identify any local, provincial or federal initiatives, nor were they were well informed about the legal implications of CT initiatives, such as the anti-terrorism bill C-36. They condemned the use of the word Islamism and the phrase "Sunni Muslim extremism" in government communications, and emphasized that the type of language employed in government communications and policy is of paramount importance in building trust and a cooperative environment.

The participants had a long list of suggestions concerning intervention strategies to prevent and deter domestic terrorism and radicalization: acknowledging the existence of Islamophobia; establishing a dialogue with various Muslim groups; educating policy makers; developing university courses on terrorism; forming positive relationships with local and federal agencies; re-invigorating mosque-based programs; utilizing available tools for new immigrant and refugee

integration; devising a multi-party collaborative relationship among local NGO-RCMP-FEBO community-based organizations; deepening the role of immigration and multiculturalism ministries ethno-cultural projects; carrying out transparent, responsible security profiling, and stopping the use of terrorism rhetoric as a political tool by media. Most participants spoke about the importance of opening up opportunities in academia, society, and communities, for dialogue and discussion on terrorism. This would allow terrorism to be liberated from social taboo and enable opportunities to building relationships between and among various communities.

In conclusion, particular attention must also be paid to community fears of surveillance and pressure from government agencies, of their peers and social ostracism, and of the implications of future domestic terrorism incidents and repressive security measures. Importantly, the majority of student respondents in the focus group discussions predicted the emergence of a fresh wave of terrorism in Canada, based upon a sense of "transnational solidarity" composed of religiously motivated individuals, who are radicalized "inside-out". Their prime motivation comes from religiously inspired ideologies, often grounded in fetishizing solidarity with the oppressed, irrespective of geographical constrains.

These findings, of course, are not based upon a representative sample of leaders or students within the broad, diverse Muslim community(ties) in Canada. Nonetheless, the findings strongly suggest that the current CT strategy relative to this community is problematic, and is failing to meet its objectives. It is essential that further studies of this nature be undertaken across Canada in order to develop an effective CT strategy that responds to the perceptions and beliefs of the Muslim community(ties). The involvement of community and student leaders at the grassroots level is the key to any future sustainable and productive CT strategy.

Part I: Contemporary Terrorism and the Role of Community Organizations

Terrorism is an asymmetrical mode of resistance that is focused against ruling regimes, and individuals or organizations in a position of power.[1] Structurally weaker actors seek to compel stronger opponents to acquiesce to their various political or social goals. In effect, non-state actors have adopted terrorism as a means to challenge states. Despite this common understanding of the meaning and nature of terrorism, there is no common definition.[2] The concept of terrorism has multiple meanings and a long history of bundling several concepts together. Its meaning has also shifted throughout history. The origin of the term is most commonly credited to the French Revolution and the origin of the *regime de la terreur* of 1793-4. The term then had positive connotations when used by French revolutionists, as a means "to consolidate the new government's power by intimidating counter-revolutionaries, subversives and all other dissidents whom the new regime regarded as 'enemies of the people'."[3] In the last century terrorism mostly was used by non-state actors as a tool to coerce governments to concede to various terrorist political and/or territorial objectives.

David C. Rapoport argues that terrorism can be grouped into historical waves or cycles characterized by expansion and contraction phases with similar activities occurring internationally.[4] He identifies four terrorist waves: the Anarchist wave that emerged in Russia in the 1880s; the Anti-colonial wave that began in the 1920s; the New Left wave that emerged in the 1970s, and the contemporary Religious wave. The Religious wave, initiated by Islamic terror groups, uses religion as a justification for organizing principles and first emerged during the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the Soviet-Afghan War (1979). However, other religious groups such as Jewish terrorists attempting to strike at Islamic targets in Jerusalem, Sikh terrorists in India, and even Aum Shinrikyo in Japan that merges Buddhist, Hindu and Christian imagery, can be characterized by

1 Ekaterina Stepanova, *Terrorism In Asymmetrical Conflict Ideological And Structural Aspects* SIPRI Research Report No. 23, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)

2 In fact, roughly 109 definitions exist. See Alex P. Schimd, and A. J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*. 2nd Edition (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005)

3 Howard et al, p. 4

4 David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism" in Audrey Kurth Cronin and J. Ludes eds *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004). p. 46-47

the Religious wave. In North America, Christian Identity terrorism has also emerged.[5]

In terms of operational activities and attainable objectives, the phenomenon of terrorism can be grouped into two types: international and domestic. International terrorism involves groups striving to wage terrorist activity across the globe. Their operations involve global networks of recruitment, sympathizers, host actors, and globalized training facilities. International terrorists tend to select high value targets, which, it is expected or hoped will raise the profile of their cause, and facilitate the achievement of their objectives. The intended goal of these attacks is to cause strategic dissuasion, with an emphasis on psychological operations. In contrast, domestic terrorism is localized and domestic terrorists aim to coerce local government or ruling regimes to achieve political objectives. These domestic terror groups maintain international networks for fundraising and recruitment purposes, but they remain focused on their domestic political objectives. The distinction between international and domestic terrorism is based on their stated objectives; often international terrorist organizations have vague and ambiguous objectives, while domestic terrorists tend to have clear political objectives and goals.

While many terrorist groups are confined to a specific geographic location where the terrorists live within the civilian population, other groups have no such restrictions, such as Al Qaeda (AQ).[6] Groups that are able to spread beyond a specific geographic location are able to use global networks for both finance and recruitment. These groups carry out terrorism acts on carefully planned targets in distant locations, which seek to generate immense psychological and passionate responses within the victims and thereby facilitate the achievement of five key sequential objectives: "attention, acknowledgement, recognition, authority, governance."[7] In a way, international terrorism is reminiscent of a classic military strategy called the "indirect approach" where an inferior force seeks to avoid the opposition's strong points by the use of this manoeuver to detect and destroy sensitive objectives at the rear of the enemy forces which will paralyze and

5 Ibid, p. 61-62

6 AQ includes various sub-organizations, such as as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). A complete list is found in *Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, Bureau of Counterterrorism, US Department of State September 28, 2012. For details see http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

7 Hoffman, p. 255

create panic among the enemy.[8] The 9/11 attacks and the events that followed clearly utilize an indirect approach.

AQ is the foremost enduring religious-based international terrorist organization and it has five key characteristics. The first is the use of Islam to define its cause; second, the extensive use of information technology for recruitment and funding; third, the use of strategic communication for the transmission of messages; fourth, the successful influence of homegrown actors to wage domestic terrorism, and finally the use of highly de-centralized command and control networks for operations leveraging the prevailing weaknesses in vulnerable government sectors. In a classic sense, it uses manoeuver techniques creating a vector effect to achieve its objectives.[9] Its main successes are the considerable exposure gained by its attacks on symbolic structures of Western imperialism, and the prompting of disproportionate responses from Western nations in the form of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It has forced the West to fight in a geographic location of AQ's choosing. It has catapulted Muslim, in particular Sunnis, to global attention and in some ways has validated Huntington's theory of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West.[10]

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt predicted the rise of "New Terrorism" by international groups such as AQ, when they argued that such organizations would use the appeal of "weapons of the weak" to strike at strong actors and that they would seek to assert their identity and envision an imagined world based on a distant future.[11] In the case of AQ, this imagined world is the Caliphate, and AQ has managed to gain global support while having unclear political motivations.

While the homegrown element of terrorism is largely seen in terms of internal security threats, since the 1980s there has been a growing trend of young Muslim males leaving their homes to fight in foreign conflicts, initially to take part in the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. Upwards of 30,000 individuals have taken up arms in a variety of conflicts such as the fighting in Chechnya, Afghanistan or Iraq. These foreign fighters typically join non-state

8 For the origins of the "indirect approach" see Liddel Hart, *The Strategy of Indirect Approach* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1954)

9 Richard *Simpkin*, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, *1985)*

10 Huntington, Samuel P. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. Penguin Books India, 1996.

11 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt ,et al. eds., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999)

actor groups engaged in insurgent fighting against government security, or foreign military forces. Their actual strategic contributions to the conflicts are often minimal.[12] These young men are not typically ethnic members when they become insurgents or terrorists, and many lack any direct ties to the insurgents beyond a common religious bond. They are mostly unpaid volunteers.

The current academic literature has not developed a cohesive theory for this phenomenon. Typically, the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan is cited as the first occurrence. However, there is a lack of any formal analysis as to why it began in the first place.[13] Thomas Hegghammer suggests that foreign fighters are the product of a populist, fundamentalist pan-Islamic identity movement.[14] Some have also suggested poor socioeconomic conditions such as unemployment or lack of personal freedoms in the fighter's home countries as a contributing factor.[15] Another common argument is that the foreign policy of certain countries, particularly the United States, which has undertaken military interventions in Muslim countries and supports autocratic regimes, is the main contributing factor that drives the young men, including American Muslims, to take up arms.[16]

Canadians have been active participants within these foreign fighter communities. There have been several recent instances of Canadian citizens fighting against Syrian government forces and it is estimated that there are as many as one hundred Canadian citizens fighting in Syria.[17] For example, Mustafa al-Ghrib, born Damian Clairmont, was a Canadian Islamic convert who left his Nova Scotia home to fight with the terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nursa. As a teenager, Clairmont had faced a variety of personal troubles and was initially drawn to Islam as a means to bring stability to his life. Ali Mohamed Dirie, a former member of the Toronto 18, was killed in

12 Barak Mendelsohn, "Foreign Fighters: Recent Trends", *Orbis*, 55:2 (Spring 2011) p. 190

13 Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad", *International Security*, 35:2 (Winter 2010/2011) p. 53-56, 64

14 Ibid, p. 57-58, 89

15 Alberto Abadie, "Poverty, political freedom and roots of terrorism", *National Bureau of Economic Research* Working paper No. 10859, (October, 2004)

16 Christopher Hewitt and Jessica Kelly-Moore, "Foreign Fighters in Iraq; A Cross-National Analysis of Jihadism", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21:2 (2009) p. 213-215

17 Stewart Bell, "As many as 100 Canadians could be fighting in Syria against Assad regime, think tank says", *National Post* December 17, 2013. Accessed June 17, 2014 http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/12/17/as-many-as-100-canadians-could-be-fighting-in-syria-against-assad-regime-think-tank-says/

2012, while fighting in Syria.[18] Another recent death that made national headlines in Canada was that of Andre Poulin, who went by the alias "Uncle Umar". He was another Canadian Islamic convert killed in Syria. Poulin, like Clairmont, experienced a troubled period in his teens where he frequently came into conflict with police. Canadians have also fought in conflicts other than Syria. Hossam Al Hams was killed by an Israeli air strike while fighting with Hamas in Gaza in 2013. His family had immigrated to Canada in the 1990s and he was able to gain his citizenship and attend university.[19]

This foreign fighter phenomenon has attracted the attention of CSIS, who has formally requested the assistance of foreign intelligence agencies to assist them with the monitoring of suspected Canadian foreign fighters overseas.[20] The Department of Public Safety specifically cited Syria as a hot spot for Canadian foreign fighter activity in its 2013 *Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada*.[21]

In light of this phenomenon, one can now possibly consider the emergence of a fifth terrorism wave: Transnational Solidarity. This is composed of religiously motivated individuals, who are radicalized "inside-out" and then form a network. These networks are short lived. Their prime motivation comes from religiously inspired ideologies, often grounded in fetish solidarity with the oppressed without any geographical constrains. By not adhering to the basic tenets of terrorism, such as to attract media attention for a political goal, this wave negates current fixed perceptions of terrorism and terrorists, and thus may confound the effectiveness of current CT policy. Their loose network structure and individual action complicates CT efforts.

More so, this decade has offered some unique opportunities to test this wave theory as the Arab Spring unseated the apparent tranquility of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. This opportunity appears roughly 30 years after the turbulent episodes of the Iranian

18 CBC News, "Damian Clairmont killed fighting with al-Qaeda-linked rebels in Syria", *CBC News* January 15, 2014. Accessed January 10, 2014 http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/damian-clairmont-killed-fighting-with-al-qaeda-linked-rebels-in-syria-1.2497513

19 Stewart Bell, "Hamas praises Canadian who died in Gaza conflict after 'joining the ranks' of the Palestinian terrorist group" *National Post* June 5, 2013. Accessed January 9, 2014 http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/06/05/hamas-praises-canadian-hossam-al-hams-who-died-during-gaza-conflict/

20 Stewart Bell, "Court rebukes CSIS for secretly asking international allies to spy on Canadian terror suspects travelling abroad", *National Post* November 25, 2013. Accessed January 9, 2014 http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/11/25/court-rebukes-csis-for-secretly-asking-international-allies-to-spy-on-canadian-terror-suspects/

21 Department of Public Safety, *Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada: Building a Safe and Resilient Canada*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2013)

Revolution (1979) and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan (Soviet-Afghan War, 1979), which laid the doctrinal and ideological foundation of current terrorism that motivated the 9/11 attacks. The champions of the previous fourth wave era are gone, but the Arab Spring and its aftermath has created an enabling environment for the recruitment and training of an all new generation of terrorists. Here a substantial segment will potentially return to their home countries, provided they have not embraced so called martyrdom (*Shahadat* in Arabic).

The foreign fighter syndrome may become the dominant feature of future terrorism, as more youth become either directly or indirectly involved. The three recent cases of Canadians who fought against the Syrian government, and were eventually killed in Syria, provides some evidence of this trend. Once the Syrian conflict is over, these youth will come back to Canada and a comprehensive strategy to monitor and rehabilitate them into the mainstream society will be a major task. This task cannot be performed by law enforcement agencies alone.

Counter-terrorism (CT)

In response to the threat of AQ, the West and especially the US, have waged their own version of war called "counter-terrorism" (CT).[22] Here, governments and think-tanks have placed terrorism, and by extension Islam, within a security centric framework.[23] The resulting narrative has portrayed Muslims as enemies of the state, and government policies in response have included widespread surveillance and monitoring, as well as the arbitrary curtailing of freedom of movement for many Muslims within North America.[24] Muslims are largely viewed as outsiders or others. This perception has its roots in Huntington's "clash of civilization" thesis and from Bernard Lewis who asserted that "cultural identities, antagonisms and affiliations will not only play a role, but play a major role in relations between states". [25] These attitudes can be found within the broader public, as seen by advertisements placed in subway stations of Washington

22 Richard Jackson, *Writing the War of Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005)

23 Schmid and Jongman, 2005

24 Adele Sammarco, "NYPD's Muslim surveillance leads to N.Y. v. N.J. feud" *New Jersey Newsroom* February 27, 2012. Accessed March 2, 2013. http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/nation/ny-v-nj-battle-escalates-over-nypd-surveillance-of-muslims/all-pages

25 Amina R. Chaudary, "Interview with Sam Huntington" *Islamica Magazine* (2006) available at http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=2949&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0 - Samuel Huntington, Political scientist whose 'Clash of Civilisations' thesis on Islam and the West proved highly controversial. For details see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/3999461/Samuel-Huntington.html

and New York City denouncing Jihad.[26] Western politicians and the media have also come to embrace this perception. In particular, the US and the United Kingdom (UK) have been at the forefront of the GWOT and have enacted several anti-terrorism related laws that curtail domestic civil liberties[27] and directly marginalized particular ethnic groups.[28] Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has stated that, "the major threat is still Islamism... there are other threats out there, but that is the one that I can tell you occupies the security apparatus most regularly in terms of actual terrorist threats".[29] Islamism, apparently, has endangered Canadian national security, but, at the same time, the use of the term has alienated Muslims.[30]

In the Canadian government's counter-terrorism strategy document, *Building Resilience against Terrorism*, the largest terrorist threat is from Islamists, specifically "homegrown Sunni Muslims".[31] To counter this threat, the government has laid out four central counter-terrorist aims. The first is to "prevent", which focuses on identifying the motivations of individuals who engage in, or have the potential to engage in terrorist activity on a domestic or international level. The second is to "detect" which seeks to identify terrorists, terrorist organizations and their supporters, their capabilities and the nature of their plans via investigation, intelligence operations and analysis. The third is to "deny", where intelligence and law enforcement actions seek to deny terrorists the means and opportunities to pursue terrorist activities, which can involve directly intervening in terrorist planning including prosecuting individuals. The final aim is to "respond" which seeks to develop Canadian capacities to respond proportionately, rapidly and

26 Michael Shank, "Boycotting Muslim 'Savages' Ad on DC Metro in Protest of Hate Speech," *Huffington Post* October 7, 2012. Accessed June 3, 2013 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-shank/boycotting-muslim-savages_b_1946573.html and American Freedom Law Centre, "Free Speech Victory: D.C. Federal Judge Halts Transit Authority's Restriction on Anti-Jihad Advertisement" Oct 5, 2012. For details see http://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/home/47/free-speech-victory-d-c-federal-judge-halts-transit-authority-s-restriction-on-anti-jihad-advertisement.html

27 N. Chang, "How Democracy Dies: The War on Our Civil Liberties," in C. Brown (ed.) *Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and the Assault on Personal Freedom*, (New York: The New Press, 2003)

28 Louise Cainkar, "The impact of 9/11 on Muslims and Arabs in the United States", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 24:1 (2004)

29 CBC News, "Harper says 'Islamicism' biggest threat to Canada, Prime minister says Conservatives will bring back controversial anti-terrorism laws" *CBC News* Sep 6, 2011. Accessed March 4, 2013 for details see http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/09/06/harper-911-terrorism-islamic-interview.html

30 While following up, a leading media outlet in Canada offered a less convincing official explanation of these terms. Following the declaration, Office of Religious Freedom (ORF) was established in Canada under the foreign ministry to ensure freedom of religion, and later, the federal government announced Kanishka Project - a five year $10 million investment in terrorism-focused research of which the first round of funding of $1.1 million was awarded on May 30, 2012.

31 Department of Public Safety, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2013) http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/_fl/2012-cts-eng.pdf

in an organized manner to terrorist activities and to mitigate their effects.[32]

The UK's CT strategy is called *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*. Similar to Canada, the UK has laid out four key components. First, it aims to "pursue", which focuses upon preventing terror attacks domestically and internationally by disrupting terrorist activity as early as possible. The second component is to "prevent", which concerns the process of radicalization by challenging extremist ideas that are conducive to terrorism in open debate. Third, is to "protect", which aims to strengthen the UK's CT capabilities and reduce the state's vulnerability. Finally, the UK seeks to "prepare" in order to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack that could not be stopped to save lives, reduce harm and aid in recovery efforts.[33] Closely related, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) views the phenomenon holistically – Violent Extremism and Radicalization that lead to Terrorism (VERLT)[34]; it links three elements: violent extremism (VE), radicalization and terrorism together and asserts that;

> Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process…radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally define in compliance with international human rights law. Radicalization can actually be a force for beneficial change….terrorist radicalization is a process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. This may eventually, but not necessarily, lead this person to advocate, act in support of, or engage in terrorism (Ibid, p 35).

The US National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism lays out four core principles that guide its efforts. The first is "Adhering to U.S. Core Values" which seeks to retain the country's values such as human rights, responsive government, privacy and civil rights, civil liberties, security and transparency and upholding the rule of law when engaging in counter-terrorism. Second is "Building Security Partnerships", which reside on the international and domestic levels, and are achieved via the exchange of information between different nations, security services and by pursuing community resilience programs. Third is "Applying CT Tools and Capabilities Appropri-

32 Ibid, p. 10-24

33 Government of the United Kingdom, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, (London: July 2011)

34 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach*, (Vienna, February 2014), pp. 35-39

ately" which approaches counter-terrorism efforts, via a "whole-of-government" approach, and thus seeks to utilize the various tools available to the government. Fourth is "Building a Culture of Resilience", as a form of deterrence where the US and its citizens become reflexive in their reaction to terrorist acts and demonstrate the resolve of the government and people in the fight against terrorism.[35]

Canada, the UK, and the US all face similar terrorist threats (and have longstanding cooperative arrangements, especially in the intelligence fields). Even so, their strategies are a reflection of their different strategic cultures. Canada and the UK's strategies are focused upon prevention and counter-radicalization. The US has shrouded its counter terrorism in the language of American values and seeks to actively thwart terrorist attacks against their country through meeting the threat before it has a chance to materialize on American soil. Nonetheless, the strategies of the countries are very similar in relying upon counter-radicalization programs, as well as the sharing of intelligence between both domestic and international organizations. To understand the challenges facing Canada it is important to understand counter-radicalization efforts in both the UK and the US.

A study undertaken by Reshan Mushtaq from the Naval Postgraduate School in California analyzed radicalization and de-radicalization process and efforts in the UK.[36] Mushtaq identified four stages in the radicalization process: crises, gradual indoctrination, adopting a new role, and radicalization. These four distinct stages represent a gradual progression from a regular citizen to a committed radical.

Despite the government's insistence upon official multiculturalism, defined by tolerance and diversity, the perception of Muslims in crisis is that non-Muslim British citizens view British Muslims as "different". This leads to a "clash of values", whereby British Muslims feel torn between their cultural value system and that of British society in general. This further fuels the feeling that British Muslims do not belong. This is also reflected in the general discrimination of the British Muslim community as a whole. Studies have shown that Muslims are by far the most

35 President of the United States, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 2011)

36 Rehan Mushtaq, *De-radicalization of Muslim communities in the U.K.* (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009)

disadvantaged minority in Britain, with higher rates of unemployment, and poverty, and a lower quality of life. All of these factors provide fertile ground for radicalization.

British Muslims are also influenced by international events as part of the gradual indoctrination process, which they perceive as showing Muslims under attack by western Christian societies and values. Foremost amongst these events are the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the Gulf War (1990), 9/11, the Bosnian War (1992), the war in Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003). All of these events, coupled with the previously mentioned domestic situation, have led many British Muslims to feel alienated from British society in general, and the Western world as a whole. This provides the right breeding ground for the radicalization of British Muslims.

Mushtaq theorizes that de-radicalization is dependent not on recreating an *alternative community* (a different collective identity system with new influential key persons). Instead, by using the existing community framework, de-radicalization can be effective because there is already an available, credible and alternative discourse to counter extremist ideology. This can be achieved when influential/key leaders, including Imams, recognize the validity of moderate Muslim doctrine in light of existing social values. Mushtaq also believes that through strengthening family values, and by extension the family unit, it is possible to counter radicalization by using the family as a de-radicalization tool. Both are possible because the overwhelming majority of Muslims living in Western countries are moderate/liberals. Their mobilization is absolutely essential if they are to be transformed from passive bystanders to active agents of de-radicalization.

Another useful tool in the de-radicalization process is to establish alternative narratives; what Mushtaq refers to as "constructing meta-narratives, which act as over-arching big themes that set the parameters for 'stories' to be told at individual, local, and community levels."[37] Obviously, the onus to create and propagate such meta-narratives lies with the state, and the manner in which it communicates to society. These narratives can be powerful in that they have the ability to challenge the authority of the radical viewpoint and they provide an alternative frame. Finally, it is essential for the de-radicalization process to spread these narratives to the population as a whole, and thus the need for a proper medium becomes paramount.

37 Ibid, p. 96

Closely related, Todd A. Ward et al. contend that the power of individuals using their social networks can transcend national or ethnic, faith boundaries. They used Goltz's general definition of social power as "the potential ability of one individual to influence another individual within a certain system."[38] Todd et al. also illustrated Gladwell's concept of connectors (important leaders in the system), and hub (important gateways in the system), which are both part of the radicalization and de-radicalizations processes.

Building upon the observations of Malcom Gladwell, Mushtaq also contends that there exists "societal links - [where] some people are more influential" and these influential people are described as "mavens, connectors and salesmen" within the context of social mediums.[39] These influential people hold respectable positions in the society either by virtue of their social, political works or by their reputation as educator, such as an Imam. Nevertheless, many of them use various faith and ethnic-based organizations (FEBOs) as suitable platforms to perform their philanthropic, educational or political roles in society. Moreover, various faith-based student organizations in universities also play an effective role by organizing events, and seminars to exchange ideas on social issues.

Samuel Musa and Samuel Bendett, in *Islamic Radicalization in the United States: New Trends and a Proposed Methodology for Disruption* argue that it is necessary to adopt new models, based upon the changing socio-political situation, to understand and detect domestic radicalization. Previous models focused upon personal interactions between the preacher and the recruit. The proliferation of technology has changed the dynamics of this interaction from a personal preacher to an impersonal virtual preacher who is ever present. The recruit can choose the time and place to access sermons by the preacher at his/her will.

Similar to the ideas expressed above, it is those disaffected individuals living in the US who feel disenfranchised and seek a greater purpose in their lives that are susceptible to radicalization, and have access to, education in, and the ability to use information technology to their advantage. Within this milieu, radicalization does not occur in a vacuum; there are a host of

38 Golz, p. 12.

39 Malcolm Gladwell "The tipping point: how little things can make a big difference", cited in Ibid p. 72

social causes that can provide fertile ground for radicalization. But having a ripe situation (based upon the social causes indicated above) does not automatically motivate a certain group of people towards radicalization (here we mean radicalized to commit for action). Radicalization needs an effective propagation medium and actors (i.e. preachers, faith or ethno-cultural leaders). It is needless to say that these actors draw legitimacy either from religious or socio-political platforms. In addition, the power dynamics of a society also need considered as, often time, people feel disempowered, and in some cases, the above mentioned actors tend to amplify such situations so that people feel even more vulnerable from a state apparatus engaged in CT activities.

In this regard, Lederach argues that potential violent conflict cannot be understood in isolation from wider relations of power. Thus, an attempt to resolve or manage conflict while bypassing social and political structures that generate conflict through policies will be counter-productive.[40] This is what Galtung explains as structural violence, where the mere absence of direct violence is not necessarily an indication of a peaceful society. Strategies of structural conflict transformation must therefore include "critical activism and confrontation in order to bring about social and political change through the establishment of relationships and structural conditions supportive of peace and social justice."[41] To this end, understanding social causes, along with the actors, their motivation and interaction within their groups is essential in a CT strategy because these actors, if convinced, can play crucial roles to propagate counter radicalization narrative.

As noted, these actors mostly come from either faith or respective ethno-cultural groups. Faith-based organizations (FBOs) can include a religious congregation, as well as organizational programs or projects sponsored or hosted by a non-profit organization that clearly states religion/faith in the mission statement.[42] FBOs are organized into two broad categories: Religiocen-

40 Stephen Campbell, "Construing Top-down as Bottom Up: The Governmental Co-option of Peacebuilding 'from Below'", *Explorations in Anthropology* 11:1 (2011)

41 Lederach, "Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures", p. 13-15, cited in Campbell 2011, p. 43

42 The 2003 AmeriCorps Guidance, Center for Faith and Service National Crime Prevention Council, USA.

tric[43] and Ecumenical or Interfaith.[44] In contrast, ethno-culturally based organizations (EBOs) are based on core ethnic identities, such as the Somali Canada Organization and the Canada Bangladesh Association. Most of them primarily offer an ethno-cultural platform to celebrate their respective ethnic identities, but some of them also undertake an ecumenical/interfaith approach for social conflict resolution. In Canada, a large number of FBO and EBOs (jointly termed here as FEBOs) are visible in discharging social services to their clients within a framework of a civil society environment and FEBOs operate as a middle-level player with, and between both the state and individual citizens at the grassroots level.

By their nature, FEBOs can theoretically provide effective middle tier leadership in connecting top-level leadership (government elites) with grassroots level actors.[45] They possess significant conflict resolution potential as a function of their authority and legitimacy over a specific population (in the Muslim case largely a diaspora population) based on faith and ethno-cultural identity. Their legitimacy emanates from a concept of moral high ground explained in terms of their involvement in social and humanitarian good.[46] Religious and faith communities, in particular, are "without question, the largest and best-organized civil institutions in the world today, claiming the allegiance of billions of believers and bridging the divides of race, class and nationality."[47] Their roles in either denouncing or supporting extremism, motivate and influence billions of Muslim followers worldwide across the cultural divide.[48] More so, in higher educational institutions, there are volunteer student organizations (SOs), which also play an active role not only within their academic institutions with regard to providing a platform for sharing ideas, but also in terms of social activism. Some of these groups also actively participate with their local FEBOs in raising awareness on social issues.

43 Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Amal Khoury and Emily Welty, Unity in Diversity: Interfaith Dialogue in the Middle East (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007)

44 Mohammad Abu-Nimer and Ayse Kadayifi, "Human rights and building peace: the cast of Pakistani madrasas", *The International Journal of Human Right* 15 (2011)

45 Paul Lederarch, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998)

46 Paul Bloomfield, "Is There Moral High Ground", *Southern Journal of Philosophy* p. 512 - "Understood in these terms, a belief in moral high ground carries with it a commitment to a fairly robust form of moral realism, while the denial of moral high ground implies an insidious form of relativism"

47 Ibid

48 Al Monitor, "Twitter sheikhs of Saudi Arabia", *Al Monitor* (2013) http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/originals/2013/12/twitter-sheikhs-saudi-arabia.html#

In the aftermath of 9/11, the subsequent stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists, especially in the media, led the majority Muslim FEBOs (or more accurately their leadership) to respond in a disjointed fashion, and adopt a passive, rather than a critical engagement role in cooperation with relevant government agencies. The net result has been a disconnected relationship between the state apparatus involved in CT and Muslim communities through their FEBOs and SOs. At the same time, Muslim communities themselves are divided among organizations, and these divisions, no different from divisions within other faith and ethnic communities, are further exacerbated by local, provincial and regional factors in a country like Canada. These divisions generate three effects. First, government agencies, if they lack sensitivity to community divisions, tend to operate on a "one size fits all" policy basis, which may enhance connections with parts of the community, but alienate other parts. Second, these divisions hinder, or limit community mobilization to deter and prevent radicalization, because there are multiple communities to mobilize. Finally, the organizations themselves are likely to be in competition with one another for adherents and funding, which can lead to disconnections.

The relationship of FBOs, EBOs, and SOs with state agencies is also markedly different. In particular, EBOs have direct contacts with immigration and multi-culural agencies, whereas Muslim FBO engagement with government agenices since 9/11 is largely with the security services. Moreover, with the terrorist threat in Canada directly linked to Islamic religon (faith), FBOs as religious organizations naturally attract the attention of security agencies, and thereby generate an environment of suspicion. In contrast, EBOs include organizations that are founded by various immigrant and diaspora groups based on their core cultural identities, and adopt a non-religious approach to conflict resolution by providing a neutral socio-cultural platform. Volunteer university-based SOs largley remain out of contact and consultation with either government agencies (except on a case to case basis when one individual is contacted) or local FEBOs with regard to developing a strategy for community mobilization to deter domestic terrorism.

Regardless, FEBOs and SOs can play instrumental roles in establishing partnerships, and communication not only within their own communities, but also jointly with others. In Canada, Muslim FEBOs and SOs are where Muslims gather to connect, to celebrate, and to resolve con-

flicts. FEBOs and SOs appeal to and emphasize faith and common identity, while also providing potential positive role modelling so that its members can "challenge stereotypes, empirically build trust and restructure relationships around superordinate goals".[49] They tend to work according to a "process comprised of interdependent roles" that facilitate the re-forging of a positive social contract between people and government by resolving the tensions that arise in the interface among identities, the preservation of culture, and adaptation to the host society.[50]

In order to do so, and thus mobilize the Muslim community(ties) in the fight against radicalization and terrorism in Canada, it is vitally important to understand the community(ties) and their beliefs regarding these crucial issues. It is easy to identify the potential significance of this community(ties) in this fight as a key component of the national CT strategy, but it is much more difficult to engage this community(ties), unless their beliefs and values are clearly identified and understood, and serve as the basis for developing and implementing a multi-faceted, flexible and adaptable CT strategy centered upon the community.

A number of studies that looked at community collaboration and government agencies with regard to CT in the UK, US, and Europe emphasize the importance of sustained partnership to induce de-radicalization and disseminate counter-narratives, but coupled with the mistrust generated by the current national CT strategy, it seems to be difficult to motivate community members (especially Muslims) to participate in research or any outreach or academic initiatives related to CT. However, the findings of the OSCE report highlight distinct advantages of engaging with communities by police as stated below:

1. It would enhance their [Police] situational awareness about what is happening in communities and improve their understanding of dynamics, risk perceptions and concerns within communities;
2. It would enable them [Police] to identify critical situation at an early stage in communities and refer them to relevant partners
3. It would enable them [Police] to disseminate information and key messages to public, including dispelling misperceptions and rumours.
4. It would enable them [Police] to build, over time, trusting and mutually respectful relationships as a basis for further co-operation.[51]

49 Sean Byrne, *Economic Assistance and Conflict Transformation: Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland* (London: Routledge, 2010) p. 54

50 Ibid

51 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach*, (Vienna, February 2014) p.127.

Part II: Research Design

FEBOs and university SOs provide a potentially important platform for preventing individual domestic radicalization before it is manifested in a terrorist threat or act. Current national CT strategies, including Canada's, clearly recognize the potential role of community engagement in this regard. Recognizing the importance is one thing. Engaging the community is another. Responsibility for counter-terrorism, including engaging and fostering a positive role for FEBOs, lies with national security agencies, such as the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the RCMP, CSIS and local police forces. Their very nature works against positive engagement, especially in the wake of 9/11 and the negative images generated by the state and society towards the Muslim community(ties).

The Muslim community in Canada, if not throughout the West, perceives itself as a community under attack. Every Muslim is a potential terrorist, despite the nuances that exist within government policy statements. If not, why is government engagement undertaken by security agencies? This perception is reinforced by the nature of Canada's Islamic population, which is dominated by first and second-generation immigrants. These immigrants possess a collective memory of the threatening and oppressive nature of their former country's security agencies. Indeed, their immigration to Canada was motivated, at least partially, to escape such oppression. In addition, the Islamic community in Canada confronts mixed messages from the government and society. On the one hand, they are told that the nation respects their cultures. On the other, there are subtle, if not obvious, limitations, legal and otherwise, on their ability to practice their cultures. Multiculturalism comes to be perceived as a mask for assimilation, and the death of their culture under the watchful eye of Canada's security agencies.

The net result is an atmosphere of suspicion and fear within Canada's Muslim community(ties), which, naturally, directly affects the engagement process between state agencies and the community. Both sides are distrustful of each other, and their interaction is greatly influenced by an atmosphere of distrust. In effect, an open and honest dialogue becomes extremely difficult on both sides. The community's perception is that the security agencies are asking its members to

identify individuals who pose a potential terrorist threat, and the security agencies perceive the community as hiding individuals who might pose threat.

In this research, we aimed at capturing the perceptions of Muslim elites/key persons of FEBOs and leaders of the university Muslim SOs because we perceive that their beliefs matter in the national CT strategy for three distinct reasons: one, these leaders/key person's perceptions of domestic terrorism vis-a-vis CT positively or negatively affects their communities; two, if they want they can play key roles in community engagement; and three, they can bridge gaps and dispel mistrust between law enforcement agencies and grassroots level people. However, due to prevailing environment of fear most of these leaders do not publicly engage in critiquing current CT policy, but their informal and less public roles within the communities are equally important to consider. In addition, gauging Muslim students' perceptions (i.e. youth perspective) on domestic terrorism and CT is also useful. This research was designed to explore the roles of Muslim FEBOs and university SOs in deterring domestic terrorism in Canada. The research consisted of three phases:

Project Phases

Phase One

A review of the relevant literature, and an analysis of existing CT strategies was undertaken. The analysis draws from federal and provincial agency documents, websites, and electronic and print media in order to measure the current socio-political situation and federal CT efforts. In addition, an analysis of pertinent information from STATSCAN datasets (National household survey-NHS, 2011, Profile of Visible Minority Datasets, General Social Survey) (GSS) were undertaken to draw relevant inferences on social issues relating to domestic terrorism. These together also serve as the basis for the construction of the research questionnaire.

Phase Two

A formal research methodology and questionnaire was generated and tested in a pilot study that involved one FBO and one EBO representative. On the basis of the results, the methodology and questionnaire were revised and fine-tuned for application to the greater sample.

Phase Three

Primary research was conducted with selected FEBOs and SO representatives through in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The interviews consisted of a standardized set of open-ended questions based on a topic guide (see Appendix A). The interviews focused on the participants' perceptions, opinions, beliefs, and overall attitudes towards identities and conflict resolution relative to the issue of terrorism. The interview aimed to identify the respondent's dominant beliefs and perceptions of radicalization and de-radicalization, probe their views on community intervention, and map their analysis of the current social, political and faith/religion related situation.

Access to the participants was made via our research network, personal connections as well as by sending letters, emails, and making telephone calls. Interviews were pre-scheduled, and were conducted over a period of several months. Each person was interviewed twice for approximately eighty minutes at the first interview and thirty minutes at the follow-up interview. The interviews were mostly conducted in English.

After each stage, a triangulation amongst interviews and questionnaires, documents and STATSCAN data was carried out. The QSR nVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software was employed to generate initial categories and themes, and group them into major thematic categories. At the end of this process, the dominant themes (or nodes) and sub-themes relative to the respondents as a whole, and broken down by organizational, age and gender(where applicable) provided aggregate findings for analysis.

The pilot project began by reaching out to one faith-based and one ethno-cultural community-based organization for an initial test of the questionnaire. In this process, it became clear that the potential respondents were hesitant to participate, despite formal assurances of confidentiality, and questioned the real objective of the research. This was replicated when the research process expanded to the larger FEBO sample. It gradually became clear that hesitancy, leading in

many cases to non-participation, originated from an atmosphere of fear and mistrust. Even some of our participants questioned whether we were government agents in disguise.

Recognizing this obstacle, we employed a snowball sampling methodology via participant referrals and community connections within the FBO context. Importantly, identified EBO and SO respondents were much more forthcoming in participating in this research once the context was clearly explained. Regardless, our hope that the sample size would be representative of the targeted Muslim communities was not achieved. As such, although the findings presented below are limited in their generalizability to the communities as a whole, they should be understood as indicative, or of heuristic value for future research.

Table 1: Research Participants Profiles

Number of participants (N=21)	Distribution (ECBOs and student groups)	Age range
Male (n=14)	N=6 EBO N=8 Students	40-60 (FEBO members) 20-25 (Student group members)
Female (n=7)	N= 3 EBO N= 4 Students	40-50 (FEBO members) 20-25 (Student group members)

Note: Among the Muslims, one was from Shiite community, one from the Ahmadiyaa community and the rest were Sunnis.

Table 2: Research Participants - Organizations

Number of Participant Organizations	
Muslim FBO	3
Muslim EBO	3
Student SO	4

Table 3: Research Participants – At a Glance

Participant Profile	N	Age 20-30	Age 40-60
Total	21		
Male	14	8	6
Female	7	4	3
Sunni	19	11	8
Non-Sunni	2		2
FBO	3	1	2
EBO	5	3	2
Student organizations	4	4	

Among the research participants, a limited amount of remuneration was offered to student participants for the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), others participated voluntarily in the research. Finally, this research, as partially noted above, indicates several considerations that must be addressed for future research:

1. Overcoming an atmosphere of fear and mistrust in order to obtain a larger and more representative sample. This research may serve as a springboard for greater access, especially as a function of the response of the participants to this report (all participants will be sent a copy, and offered an opportunity to comment).
2. Future researchers in this area will need significant time to develop a potential network of participants and gain community trust through participation in community events. This research has obviously helped to create a small network in this regard.
3. English was a second language for some of the participants. We recorded the discussion in their primary language to ease discussion and then transcribed them into English. This, of course, introduces the additional possibility of error.
4. Largely with regard to the lack of respondent knowledge about the current national CT policy and strategy, some degree of bias was introduced in explaining the policy and strategy to obtain a response. For example, we observed that the participants reacted differently once we explained the legal procedures dealing with terrorists. There is thus a need, prior to formal interview, to provide direct primary information to participants on the national CT policy and strategy in short forms.

Coding Scheme

Primarily, coding was done by the lead investigator and research assistant (coding was carried out using QSR nVivo10). It was done in three stages: in stage one, we started with open coding to generate initial themes (in nVivo's language it is termed as nodes, details of nodes are in Appendix B). In stage two, after the generation of initial node patterns, we conducted a word frequency test to look at the most used terms and ideas by the participants. We then compared the "most used word" list with the previously generated node list to find yet another common pattern. In stage three, we used axial coding by filtering less important themes. In sum, our final coding list is a result of open coding followed by axial coding in three stages.

Presentation of Findings in the Report

This research is purely qualitative in nature as mentioned above. However, in QSR nVivo 10, data can be visualized in many ways. One of the ways is to generate graphs and charts to generate quantitative results based on demographic information of the participants (for example, gender, age and type of organization). In this research, under the principal categories in the Research Findings section, we laid out our findings with a brief description of quantitative findings (type of organizations) first, followed by the descriptions of qualitative findings based on principal themes (nodes) found in this research. All our discussion in the findings section are drawn from the qualitative data source (one-on-one interview), FGDs and participant observations.

Part III: Research Findings

At the start of each interview, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the causes of domestic terrorism through on an open-ended question format. Not surprisingly, they identified a wide range of inter-related factors: the global nature terrorism; the effect of information technology and peer networks; a sense of humiliation within the Muslim community(ties); a sense of solidarity with other Muslims; a sense of idealism and just cause; Islamophobia within Canadian society; the lack of authentic faith education among Muslims; a youth pre-disposition to violence; and unfulfilled social-economic expectations and culture clashes leading to frustration and social isolation.

Figure 1 shows participant responses on all the factors causing domestic terrorism mentioned by the participants. Three causes appear to dominate: socio-political isolation, Islamophobia and family level conflict. Breaking these results down by organization (Figure 2), 87% of student organizations (SO) respondents identified socio-political isolation, whereas only 6% of faith-based organizations (FBO) respondents did so and EBO respondents did not mention it at all. Moreover, EBO and FBO respondents both identify Islamophobia, and family conflict as near equal causes. There were no significant differences based upon gender, although this finding consistent throughout this research may simply be a function of the small sample size.

Figure 1: Factors Contributing to the Causes of Domestic Terrorism



Figure 2: Organizations Reporting the Factors Contributing to the Causes of Domestic Terrorism



It is not surprising that respondents from the student organizations (87%), when compared to FBO and EBO respondents, see socio-political isolation as the dominant cause of terrorism, and thus by extension, radicalization. At one level, this finding may simply indicate that older generation Muslims are well adjusted in society, which is to be expected across society as a whole regardless of religious identification. Similarly, young Muslims, like youth as a whole, will generally feel less adjusted and thus isolated.

This finding is reflected in the STATSCAN survey data. STATCAN examined perceptions of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity/culture, which is not directly a measure for a sense of socio-political isolation. Nonetheless, feelings of isolation can be attributed to, or be a product of, a belief of discrimination. The STATSCAN 2009 data clearly indicates a significant difference by age, with younger respondents reporting much higher levels of discrimination than older.

Of course, neither a feeling of socio-political isolation nor discrimination should necessarily be understood as a direct cause. Both may create fertile ground for youth radicalization, but they do not explain which factors transform a disenchanted individual into a radical, and then a terrorist. In this research, we also asked for the possible causes for radicalization leading to terrorism behind three specific domestic terrorism incidents but due to the respondents' lack of knowledge and information they could not mention specific reasons for motivation. Nonetheless,

socio-political isolation, if understood as creating fertile ground for radicalization and terrorism, might be considered the key target for developing an effective CT strategy by government. Moreover as fertile ground, dealing with this phenomenon may short circuit the second level of perceived causes. Specifically, the fertile ground created by socio-political isolation may make the youth acquire feelings of solidarity with oppressed Muslims world-wide, leading students to acquire a need to respond to global oppression as a function of a sense of "just cause", and thus become vulnerable to radical messaging through global information networks. In this regard, a 2009 STATSCAN survey reports that, in the 25-34 age category, people experienced discrimination based on their ethnicity or culture in the last five years. [52]

In further discussions with student respondents, a sense of socio-political isolation was implicitly linked to beliefs regarding the current struggle that Muslims face in terms of integration within the broader society and how they have become defensive to protect their faith and values. Feeling isolated from society, in turn, may drive youth to identify with like-minded individuals or minority groups and this, for the Muslim community(ties), will primarily be grounded upon religious identification - what student respondents termed the growth of religious identity consciousness linked to their home countries. According to some respondents, this is reinforced among those Muslims who come from war torn areas, and once they land in Canada, find it difficult not only to integrate but also to maintain their daily livelihood. This sense of isolation and growth of religious consciousness linked to the home country makes them prone to extremism and the use of radical Islamic thought as a channel to express their grievances. In effect, perceiving themselves as minority outsiders, and excluded from Canadian society, they seek social acceptance and this is readily found within the radical Islamic movements in their home countries, who easily communicate acceptance through modern social media and play on their senses of socio-political isolation. Closely related, many participants believe that Muslim youths appear to be withdrawn from their community, as well as society as a whole. Withdrawal, or self-imposed isolation, reflects the theory of social ostracism, where individuals feel themselves outside of socially accepted groups. Social ostracism from society can push the individual, or a small group

52 General Social Survey (STATSCAN), Cycle 23, 2009: "Victimization" category ethnicity/culture.

to be defensive and aggressive:

> Ostracism—being ignored and excluded—is a painful situation…it can lead to self-defeating behavior, impaired self-regulation, and self-perceptions of dehumanization…Williams (2009) argued that behavioral responses to ostracism serve a fortification function for the need satisfaction threatened by ostracism…The ostracism-to-aggression link is not limited to current ostracism experiences—even recalling a previous experience of social pain is enough to increase individual's temptations for aggressive behavior.[53]

The following are some of the responses from our participants to elucidate these phenomena. One respondent mentioned that youth

> seek new environment, new workplace and possibly some bit of recognition back at home with their own people. It's a sad situation but if you do not have the identity, if you don't know who you are if you feel like you are not wanted in this country, and if you see that you are not valued and you don't feel like that you are one of us, and in the reality everything of it is in the opposite - I don't know what options you have.

Another respondent explained further,

> They [some Muslims] just don't feel they are in their optimal conditions. I find that really interesting as in most of the other communities people aren't complaining about Canada as they enjoy their lives. It is a certain group of Muslims those who are not comfortable; it might be a minority feeling but I feel its people of that type who are more likely to entertain anti-Canadian thoughts and they might be the same kind of people to sympathize extremism. For example, I know an individual who once asked me if I had non-Muslim friends. He told me that he did not like them and he cut his ties with them. But is it not bizarre since once you are living in Canada being a member of a small Muslim population you're obviously going to have non-Muslim friends and that is pretty natural. So I think people who have thoughts like that who would likely to prefer to remain isolated.

Another respondent supported this observation,

> When people have thoughts like this, when they have this mentality then this may be one of the many factors that attributes to terrorist activity in Canada.

Finally a respondent identified an identity crisis creating a sense of isolation in the following quote,

53 Joseph P. Forgas, Arie W. Kruglanski Kipling D. Williams, eds., *The Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression*, (New York: Psychology Press, 2011), p. 37-41

> And what happens to these youth they start suffering from an identity crisis, because they don't know whether they are Canadian or other. Because most of them come here as young at the age of three or four years and when they grow up they think themselves as Canadian but when they reach up to the university level and enter into job market they find themselves discriminated in terms of employment. They start facing problem to relate to the society, the people, their friends, and even with their parents. So that is why you find some youth going to the universities and then they drop out and some of them tend to go back to their homeland and may join extremist groups. It is due to the fact that the government does not do a good job making them feel like they are also Canadian and they are part of the larger Canadian society.

Student respondents also talked about the effect of multiculturalism and how this policy encourages the creation of isolated, ethno-cultural ghettos. They also opined that this policy is counterproductive in promoting social cohesion. Importantly, no respondents mentioned the restoration of the *Caliphate* (Khilafat), or past glory of Islam as a motivation for radicalization or terrorism. Instead, they emphasized the issues they face in their day-to-day lives, social justice and inequalities, problems of social integration of immigrants and refugees, and socio political isolation, as evident, for example, in the case of the two Canadians killed in the Syrian civil war.[54] More so, social isolation and ostracism can create a group of like-minded people subscribing to extremist ideology, who think that their interpretation of Islam is absolute, which, in turn, provides them with the "ground" to defend Islam whenever they feel the "ground" is threatened. [55]

The religious dimension relative to the sense of socio-political isolation is also reflected in STATSCAN data.[56] Experiences of religious discrimination among youth, (ages 15-25), is much greater than among older groups. This, in turn, is also reflected at a general level in perceptions of discrimination against Muslims. In total, 76% of Muslims felt they were discriminated against often (44%) or sometimes (32%); these figures closely match those found amongst Aboriginal Peoples (42% and 32% respectively). [57] An Environics Research study also confirms the mismatch between, "the ideal of equality ... [and] the reality of life in Canada...[and] the group seen as being discriminated against the most frequently are Muslims; over four in ten Canadians (44%)

54 Stéphane Leman-Langlois, Jean-Paul Brodeur, *Terrorism Old and New: Counterterrorism in Canada*, Police Practice and Research, 6: 2, (May 2005) p. 121–140

55 Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts*, (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 1998) p.145-146

56 General Social Survey (STATSCAN), Cycle 23, 2009 "Victimization" category ethnicity/culture.

57 Environics Research Group "Focus Canada, The Pulse of Canadian Public Opinion", Report, *The Environics Institute* (2006), p. 76

believe Muslims are discriminated against".[58]

This sense of religious discrimination was reflected by the respondents. Many spoke about a prevailing misconception about Muslims in general and Sunni Muslims in particular in Canadian society. The common term employed by the respondents was Islamophobia: the second dominant factor identified relative to causes of terrorism. This was most pronounced among FBO respondents (51%), rather than ECBOs and students (Figure 3). This, of course, is not surprising given that these are faith-based organizations and one of their roles in society is to raise awareness about issues directly related to Muslims.

Figure 3: Organizations reporting on Islamophobia



A phobia is "an exaggerated usually inexplicable and illogical fear of a particular object, class of objects, or situation".[59] When such fear is based on the belief that the religion of Islam is the primary faith vehicle to perpetrate mass scale terrorism, it turns into Islamophobia. In 1997, the British Runnymede Trust defined Islamophobia as the "dread or hatred of Islam and therefore, [the] fear and dislike of all Muslims".[60]

58 Ibid.

59 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/phobia

60 Chair of the Commission Gordon Conway, "Islamophobia: a challenge for us all", *The Runnymede Trust* (1997) http://www.runnymede-trust.org/publications/17/32.html

At one level, Islamophobia entails the lumping together of all Muslims into a single entity and referring to them as enemy, outsider and scapegoat. Accordingly, this creates an environment of fear within society, which is reinforced by references to examples of acceptable violence in the Muslim Holy texts. This fear is also a product of Canadians identifying Muslims as prone to violence as a function of the behavior of autocratic Muslim regimes overseas. Some respondents noted that Islamophobia reflected a lack of accurate knowledge about cultural diversity within the Muslim community(ties). Others linked Islamophobia directly to media coverage and showcasing of Muslim terrorist events. Finally, respondents suggested that Islamophobia has created an environment of discrimination, especially in terms of access to federal and provincial jobs on national security grounds.

In this research, the respondents expressed a range of their feelings on Islamophobia in Canada. The following are indicative of the respondents' views:

> A statement [on Islamism and Islamicists] like that clearly shows a lack of understanding towards the faith group and being a leader who's supposed to unite the country a statement like that only breeds hatred towards a specific group. What is the term 'Islamicists' itself about? Is it a person who is practicing Islam, is it a person who just happens to wear a headscarf, is it somebody who prays at a Mosque, is it somebody who commits terrorist acts? Who is that exactly? Basically what happens people take it to heart and they think these Islamicists, these Muslims are our biggest threat to national security and so we should hate them so our kids stay safe this irrational fear of Muslims starts creating Islamophobia.

> I think about the term and the way it has been used and the connotation is just like Islamic fundamentalist, it's just the way it has been used in the media.

> As a consequence of 9/11, a boogey man has been created in part, to use against immigration from certain countries, to increase security fears and for political appeasement towards the Islamophobic voter base.

Like discrimination and its link to socio-political and religious isolation, perceptions of Islamophobia are reflected in other studies. According to a Gallup Poll, 48% of Canadian respondents believe that Western societies do not respect Muslim societies.[61] Moreover, Angus Reid Global,

61 Gallup, "Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West" *Gallup*, (2014) Accessed May 12, 2013 http://www.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx#2

which conducted the last of three comprehensive national surveys about religion, religious freedom and values, found that more than half of the Canadian sample (54%), viewed Islam unfavourably, an increase from 46% in 2009. In addition, 69% of Quebecers held an unfavourable view of the Islamic religion.[62] Of further interest, a 2006 survey (Figure 8) reported a difference between the Canadian population and Canadian Muslims in hostility toward Muslims in Canada. Muslims felt that the Canadian population was somewhat less hostile than the population as a whole. Correspondingly, an Environics study also shows that Canadian hostility to Muslims (comparing between the Canadian Muslims and population at large) is quite large.[63]

The events of 9/11 created a whole set of terms, such as "enemies within", "sleeper cell", "Islamism/Islamist", and "good immigrant vs. bad immigrant". In the aftermath of the Toronto 18 case, the popular media and public discourse held that those youth, mostly immigrants, had not adopted Canadian values, which was confirmed in an Environics poll (65%).[64] Some scholars also posited:

> Adopting 'Canadian values' was touted as the antidote to the threat posed by those who manifest more questionable ties to citizenship and the nation. These irreconcilable citizens were constructed as 'anti-citizens' who threatened to unsettle the narrative of Canada as a peaceful and benevolent nation. Muslims at large were seen as residing outside of the common framework of 'discursive citizenship' based on a set of shared national values and were therefore in need of 'cultural rehabilitation' through the inculcation of Western values. These troubling narratives persist in the ongoing contestations surrounding Muslim cultural politics in Canada...[65]

While not representative, these findings suggest that Islamophobia is perceived by Muslims as a social reality in Canada. If so, such a perception can trigger the very complex psychological phenomenon of self-defence. This phenomenon can be used and abused for any purpose, and is especially attractive to younger people, as evident, for example, with the creation of the English

62 Canadians view non-Christian religions with uncertainty, dislike. Last of three national surveys about values and religion in Canada shows English and French Canadians most favourable towards Christianity, least favourable towards Islam. Favourability of all religions is down since -. Angus Reid Global. "Canadians view non-Christian religions with uncertainty, dislike" (2009) http://www.angusreidglobal.com/polls/48830/canadians-view-non-christian-religions-with-uncertainty-dislike/

63 Environics Research Group, p. 83. QM11/FC34, in your opinion how many Canadians do you think are hostile toward Muslims? Would you say most, many, just some, very few?

64 Q.FC19f, Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements … There are too many immigrants coming into this country who are not adopting Canadian values? Source: Environics Research Group, p. 71.

65 Jasmin Zine, *Islam in the Hinterlands: Muslim Cultural Politics in Canada*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012)

Defence League (EDL) to stop the perceived Islamization of the UK.

Finally, struggle at family level (lack of positive support) was mentioned as the third most important motivating cause for terrorism. This cause, like Islamophobia, is most pronounced among FBO respondents (Figure 4). In terms of family conflict, 50% respondents noted such conflicts as a product of identity related issues with young refugee/immigrants as they settle in society. The respondents noted that some of them come from conflict torn areas around the world and find themselves in the lowest strata of the society due to lack of skills. When they grow up they still face discrimination in the work place or within society and then they tend to look at their identities (either faith or ethnicity) as the source of problem. They come to conclude that they lack(ed) family support, which leads to frustration and the desire to obtain recognition and acceptance from external sources.

Figure 4: Organizations reporting on Family Level Conflict as a cause of radicalization



The followings are some of the observations made by the participants while emphasizing identity struggle and impact of family support on terrorism:

> Sometimes motivations might come from family environment. For example, in much cultural tradition strict adherences to religious beliefs and practices are encouraged. In such cases, parents though innocently might impart teaching of religion but those teachings might be turned into dif-

> ferent ideology later in the life of that child. More so, the environment of the young people is also very important, whether he or she is living with a close relative or friends are important factors since they can influence the youth.
>
> In general, if there are people who have poor family environment single parent families or families who have children who feel insecure ...not having a good family support you find these people try to find drugs and other support in other places and this can be some violent group...think about social factors that breed terrorism...in research you try to fit the profile of terrorist who are accused of being involved in terrorism and many of them will have some problems with their social backgrounds and sometimes you hear in the media that they come from the middle class; well they might come from the middle class or upper class but just because you come from a rich family it does not mean you have a supportive family.

In this regard, a recent RAND reports highlights the dynamics at family level (family support) in the motivation for domestic terrorism in the following way, which also reflects our situation:

> Families can have a key role in preventing radicalisation or de-radicalisation, but the role of the family may differ greatly from case to case. Some families provide protective factors like resourcefulness and close and positive relations to the person in question. Other families may well represent risk factors in the form of poor resources and relationships or even direct negative, ideological influence…encouraging responsible behaviour by family members of (potential) radical young people is a critical success factor in achieving success in both preventive as de-radicalisation work. Both parents have an important role to play, though the role that women play, as mothers, is sometimes underestimated and ignored. Women have a special place in this approach. In short, families can be part of the solution, or they can be part of the problem. In both cases family support is an essential approach to preventing (further) radicalisation.[66]

In addition, Karen Greenberg, director of the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School also contends that,

> Familial indoctrination and recruitment for terrorism emerged as a theme in a study of 50 high-profile terrorist attacks since 2001. In at least eight of those cases, radicalization occurred within families, most often involving an 'elder-younger relationship'…[67]

In Canada, we can relate the above observations to the case of Omar Khadr's family.[68] However,

66 "Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response", *RAND Collection Approaches, lessons learned and practices*, First Edition, 15 January 2014, p. 77.

67 Ties that blind? Family connections can be key in journey down terrorism path, Karen Greenberg in *MSNBC News*, April 25, 2013, Source: http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/29733.htm

68 Profiles of the controversial Khadr family, Omar Khadr repatriated to Canada, CBC News, Last Updated: Oct 1, 2012, Source: http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/khadr/

a danger lies in generalizing the factor of "family struggle (lack of support)" as a cause of domestic terrorism since a youth might adopt radicalization without giving out any indications to the rest of the family members (as seen in numerous recent cases in Manitoba, Calgary, British Columbia, and Ontario). Nevertheless, prior to the Phase two of the research (before conducting participant interviews), we participated in a seminar organized by a local Muslim FBO on terrorism and its response, where members from the law enforcement agencies discussed the influence of internet in online recruitment and extremism. They specifically mentioned the role of parents in monitoring online activities of youth as they are the most vulnerable groups subjected to online motivation and recruitment. Further, positive role play by parents in interacting with youth at that family level had also been mentioned as an important aspect in the CT, followed by sending youth to camps or periodic seminar/study period/awareness session (preferably organized by local FBO or EBOs) to educate and also answer their questions with regard to international affairs, foreign policy matters, and social responsibilities as a citizen.

Relative to the issues raised above, the respondents were also directly asked whether faith/religion is a motivating factor for terrorism. Here, a significant difference emerged between SO and FBO respondents, and EBO respondents (Figure 5). Ninety-seven percent of SO and 81% of FBO respondents believe that the Islamic faith is not a motivator of terrorism, whereas 83% of EBO respondents believe the opposite. This difference may be attributed to the likely presence of, or more direct contact with, first generation immigrants from war-torn countries, like Somalia, in EBOs, in comparison with SO and FBOs. As such wars contain a significant Islamic radical presence, it would not be surprising that such immigrants would be more likely to believe that Islam plays a significant role in radicalization and terrorism.

Figure 5: Community Views on the Role of Faith/religion in Terrorism Motivation



In terms of an indicative respondent observation:

> What triggers them in there? I don't know, it does not involve faith, not at all. . If you think somebody is there to say to them 'you know what's happening' and 'you should go to Jihad', I don't see that teaching is available …this [Islam] is the religion about peace and in this religion there is no place for extremism and terrorism.

Finally, respondents were also asked whether radicalization exists (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Organizations Reporting on the Existence of Radicalization



Interestingly, SO respondents report the highest level (82%), followed by EBO respondents (47%) and FBO (26%). (Of note, several of the respondents referred to radicalization as a media and/or government concoction). Here, the views of the respondents on the term "radicalization" need to be further elucidated. During the interview sessions, the respondents were not cued by a formal definition of radicalization; not least of all because the interpretation of the term is highly contested among the Muslims, and there were concerns providing a formal definition might alienate the respondents. Instead, the respondents were allowed to clarify on their own, the meaning of the concept. In so doing, two distinct understandings of the concept emerged.

One reflected the official government definition of "radicalization as the process by which individuals - usually young people - are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views. While radical thinking is by no means problematic in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism." [69] This was the view largely held by participants from EBO and FBOs.

The second related the meaning of radicalization to people seeking answers for social issues such as terrorism by going back to their faith/religion. These respondents believe that having a strong conviction about Islam and adhering to its core principles does not necessarily condition oneself to become an extremist. Rather it gives meaning to life in a chaotic world and provides psycho-social support to a person. Correspondingly, the SO participants' responses echoed this meaning: "radicalization is the development of beliefs, feelings and actions in support of any groups or cause in conflict…it is a psychological trajectory that, given the right circumstances, can happen to any person, group or nation. The trajectory is not right or wrong: it is amoral in the sense that radicalization can occur for causes for both good and bad".[70] They further explained that the current frame of radicalization is loaded with assumptions that are generated through a CT lens only (i.e. violent extremism, terrorism). However, "the notion that "radicaliza-

69 "Radicalization- A Guide for the Perplexed - June 2009", Source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/nsci-ecrsn/radical-eng.htm#a. Accessed June 9, 2014

70 "Friction, How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us", Clark Mc Cauley and Sophia Moskalenko, p. 4.

tion" [according to these respondents] refers to something universally agreed to fails to take into account that much of what people believe is good or bad, right or wrong—and, yes, moderate or extreme—is a product of their culturally-induced worldview or epistemology".[71]

Our research findings regarding radicalization are also congruent with the report of OSCE where it was mentioned that "conditions conducive to terrorist radicalization in an individual case depends upon three inter-related factors"[72]: one, social interactions and interpersonal relationships (in our research this can be related to family level conflict – lack of family support and socio-political isolation); two, psychological and cognitive factors (this can be linked to idealization, expressing transnational solidarity, integration problem of youths in society, humiliation and taking personal responsibility reported in our research), and three, exposure to ideas and narratives that legitimizes terrorism (this can be linked to globalization and access to information – online motivation). Moreover, the OSCE report also shows that "there is no single profile of a terrorist, no clear-cut pathway towards terrorism. Possible drivers of terrorist radicalization varies and complex and combine in a unique way in each case".[73] Nevertheless, the participants unanimously reject the notion of radicalization that leads to violent extremism and terrorism from faith perspective.

Among participant responses were:

> I can tell you, I haven't seen it [religion based radicalization] … I go to all mosques and know who speaks here and who speaks there, and I've never seen something of this nature.
>
> Radicalization is okay – we are all radicals in our own way. But radicalization that leads to violence is not.
>
> First, we need to define what radicalization is, who is a radical and how do you define it. It is important because in some silly way, simply going to the mosque may be viewed by some as radical... but if we are talking about radicalism meaning having views and beliefs that are not acceptable to others views and beliefs; not accepting other peoples choices in terms of their faiths, beliefs; if that is how radicalism is understood, unfortunately it cannot be accepted. However, it is

71 "Muslim Radicalization": In the Eyes of the Beholder", September 2, 2011, by Raymond Ibrahim, Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/2011/raymond-ibrahim/%E2%80%9Cmuslim-radicalization%E2%80%9D-in-the-eyes-of-the-beholder/, accessed 17 June 2014.

72 "Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach", published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, February 2014, p, 38.

73 Ibid , p 35

> a reality now. But we have to be able to look not only within the Muslim community, but in other communities as well where people have extremist views where they think that the world is only for them.
>
> So, there are two thoughts among the community people: is the issue of radicalization too much exaggerated due to the focus on Muslims? Another school of thought is about religious radicals who are promoting extremism has got nothing to do with true religion.
>
> I need to ask you who and what activities are promoting extremism? Is it the Muslim activity, the faith group activity or is it a kind of self- radicalization? When it comes to radicalization, people might adopt extremism in various forms: political, ideological, social as well as religious faith.
>
> It is here but it is silent and because it is silent it does not mean it won't show itself up some day. Now we know the US has been targeted but maybe Canada will be next it can happen to anyone; I think it exists very well.

The findings above (and indeed evident below as well), are illustrative of the fact that consensus building on issues likes terrorism and radicalization is an uphill but crucial task. For example, the recent trend of Muslim youth volunteering as foreign fighters is Syria and Iraq. They are being radicalized on home soil and this type of radicalization definitely leads to extremism and terrorism – a phenomenon widely accepted and shared by the Muslims in Calgary.[74] However, as found in this research, unless there are some cases of terrorism reported people are usually reluctant to accept the government espoused definition of radicalization (if we compare the cases of Calgary and others, nevertheless, further research is needed to prove this assumption) likely because the notion of acknowledging the term itself demeans a community (in this case the Muslim community(ties)). Nevertheless, unless community members come to some agreement about basic parameters on terrorism and radicalization, no CT strategy will be successful. Indeed, one of the missing parameters within the CT strategy itself is the recognition of this key problem.

Relative to respondent beliefs about the causes of terrorism and radicalization, participants were asked about the framing of terrorism in contemporary Canadian society. Their responses

74 "Muslim Council of Calgary chairman Mohammed Sabbah said imams at several of the group's centres have fielded questions from young men about joining rebel forces, many linked to terrorist group al-Qaeda, fighting the Syrian government. "To my understanding it did happen and imams did act right on the spot," said Sabbah. "Usually the question is … 'What about if I go and fight in Syria? What do you think?' They talk with the individual and explain (to) him this is not the right thing to do." Source: "Police chief warns of rise in homegrown Jihadists" By Michael Wright, *Calgary Herald* June 16, 2014. http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/calgary/Police+chief+warns+rise+homegrown+Jihadists/9941821/story.html

occurred within four categories: the impact of globalized information in framing terrorism; the impact of the media in framing; the employment of Islam and Jihad as the main components of framing; and scapegoating, stereotyping and propaganda (Figure 7). As evident in previous findings, significant differences exist among the three groups. Ninety percent of EBO respondents emphasized the primary role of the media in framing terrorism (in this category, respondents also mentioned how the framing of the current terrorism discourse occur by powerful lobby groups, such as Jihad Watch). In contrast, SO respondents emphasized the effect of framing in scapegoating, and stereotyping the Muslim community(ties). Finally, only a small proportion of respondents identified the employment of Islam and Jihad in the framing of terrorist discourse (14% SO, 11% FBO, and 0% EBO). This represents an interesting anomaly for further research, especially given the wide-scale employment of Jihad in contemporary media discourse.

Figure 7: Respondents' Perceptions on the Framing of Terrorism



Respondents' perceptions on framing include:

> They understand Muslims are not bad people; we are not terrorists, we are not out to kill people

and you know they have to understand we are human like any other human. The propaganda is being put on by other people, other religions other whatever and it's wrong. It's easy to destroy something give be a bulldozer and I can take this house down in two hours it took me nine months to build this house and in two hours I can take it apart. The word 'destroy' is more powerful than 'build' unfortunately.

I don't blame people for associating Islam with terrorism. I think our brains are tuned to look for patterns and correlations. A lot of men who are being apprehended in Guantanamo Bay keep beards, they all pray to the same god and here I see a pattern forging and I completely sympathize with that Idea. I really do think that people need to see that correlations are not always causation.

It is really misunderstood. Like you look at the news and you see as soon as something that can be labeled as terrorism ended up being focused generally on Islam. It's just sad because I think that the religion doesn't condone half the stuffs that these suicide bombers or terrorist do. It's sad that so many people think of it that way and they're also kind of blinded to the idea that extremists are everywhere.

Let us be serious how many youths have gone abroad, really? People are not traveling abroad for the sole purpose of getting recruited. The important question here is to ask ourselves what is happening in Canada that is motivating these people to commit such acts. The solution lies within and we need to see the whole social discourse on our messaging that we are giving... What has changed since 9/11, what view we had about Muslim community prevailing on 10th September 2001 and then what changed after the 11th? I was a Canadian on 10th and suddenly I became the 'other' on 11th? Why?

9/11 and its aftermath has stopped free and open discourse on these issues that is stifling healthy discourse and responses to concerns and fears. We need to create trust.

The media can cook anything and they can mix anything up. The Jihad is a word they start using and they kept saying that Jihad against the West. But they never say that in Islam the Jihad starts against one's own self within the soul of a human being and that is all about Jihad.

They see the news and they hear of terrorism and they hear about Islamic terrorism; that creates a sense of fear and suspicion towards the Muslim community here... maybe that statement came from the fact of those young people who were accused of planning terrorism were Sunnis so when you read that kind of statement in the media it right away comes to your mind that the Sunni Muslims commits terrorism only.

Intervention, Community Mobilization and Community Views of Existing Government CT Initiatives

Respondents identified a long list of intervention methods to deter domestic terrorism in Canada. These included the need to acknowledge the existence of radicalization and religious-based extremism in society; the need to provide opportunities to discuss terrorism and counter-terrorism (CT) issues through dialogue and information sharing events; the need to build trust and form positive relationships among three principal actors in CT efforts – policy makers, law enforcement agencies, and communities; the need to offer more terrorism and CT related academic courses in universities; the need to raise awareness among the policy makers so that they become better informed about the religio-cultural differences within the Muslim community; the need to facilitate mosque-based CT awareness programs by FBOs; the need to develop and apply multicultural programs to deal with socio-political isolation; the need to give a visible and credible face to CT efforts beyond the RCMP; the need to provide a transparent approach to profiling, and the need to discourage the media from using terrorism as a political rhetoric.

Among this list of intervention methods, three appear to dominate (Figure 8): opportunities to discuss terrorism and CT through dialogue and information sharing events; building trust and forming relationships among three principal actors in CT, and discouraging the media from using terrorism as political rhetoric. The need for dialogue and information sharing events was most pronounced among FBO respondents, followed by EBOs and then students. Of relevance here, a few respondents also spoke about the absence of proper knowledge of Islam and Muslims in Canadian society and the media, which leads to both generalizing all Muslims as the representatives of those fringe fanatics who espouse violence in the name of Islam. In effect, it appears that intervention in the form of dialogue and information-sharing events needs to be a two-way street: one that focuses upon the Muslim community and its organizations, and the other on society and the media. Both, of course, speak to the importance of productive dialogue and discussion on terrorism within Canada.

Figure 8: Perceptions on Intervention Methods Reported by Organizations



Figure 9: Need for Dialogue as a CT tool - Reported by Organizations



Further, with regard to the need for dialogue and information sharing, respondents were asked

about their knowledge of such efforts within the community, and at the provincial and federal level (Figure 9). Of initial note, the FBO (54%) and ECBO (48%) respondents identified the need of dialogue as an important role in domestic terrorism intervention and in understanding the phenomenon of radicalization. However, the respondents also reported that currently there is an absence of any effective dialogue/collaboration on CT efforts among community organizations, provincial and/or federal agencies.

One reflective participant response was:

> The one most important reason I feel is that this kind of seminar and community discussion is important as it involves various communities and RCMP and other organizations. It is a starting point of a dialogue…we have all the youth in our community attending different programs (for example the Quran learning program in mosque); although, the majority of them are Muslim but there are some from Hindu religion. We did not organize any Halakah or any discussion but we run several cultural programs a year. Our aim is to enhance integration by promoting our culture so that the youth don't feel any sorts of cultural discrimination. We are trying to actually reduce the gap among the generations.

At the same time, other respondents were unaware of any CT policies but emphasized that two-way collaboration (from grassroots level and as well as policy/law enforcement level) is much needed,

> I feel these types of programs should come from both sides; if you are looking for us to move forward then there should be a mutual relationship basing on mutual efforts on both sides. We should both be trying to develop this positive relationship. If it's only one side and some organization like the Institute Y organizing conversation cafes, it sort of sends a bad message to the Muslim community about a one sided effort.

Respondents also mentioned about the lack of understanding at the federal level on CT matters,

> Any level of government is better at understanding Muslim issues… but definitely not the federal government.

> There is a barrier to educate political elites in the federal government. They have chosen not to engage to mainstream Muslims and or their leadership. They seem to be talking and consulting with groups like the Canadian Muslim Congress who are a fringe group and are self-proclaimed voice of 'moderation'. The government does not listen to mainstream Muslim groups, generally

speaking point in case the Burka (face veil) issue.

Other respondents identified the need in acquiring sufficient knowledge on Muslim issues to formulate a balanced CT strategy:

> The current government needs to be educated, and then need open platforms and venues to discuss with its Muslim citizens on how they can help. Our politicians must know that there are one million Muslims in Canada who are coming from diverse socio-political and cultural backgrounds and so how can we paint Muslims in one broad brush? It is troubling and counter-productive. It is not helpful in marginalizing and stigmatizing a community.

> Federal government tends to talk to groups who they deem 'liberal Muslims'. They don't want to talk to groups that may challenge assumptions and or have dissenting views. If you want to be surrounded by appeasing views then you get stereotypical narrative.

> If the government feels that the Sunni Muslim is a threat to the community and what should be the community response? Then the government should identify different community organizations that has Sunni Muslims, and then discuss with them that 'okay, to our opinion this is the threat and this is the reason and now what do you feel?', So there is a dialogue and there is a discussion and thereby majority Sunni Muslims will not be frustrated. There should be transparent reasons to identify some community as a national security threat and then through community involvement and through dialogue and through discussion this should be negotiated... so the consultative and more communication with the community group are important. But it is difficult from the state level.

In light of this finding, respondents were asked whether communities (such as Muslim FBOs, EBOs, SOs) and the provincial agencies have any role to play in the development and implementation of an effective national CT strategy (Figure 10).

According to some participants

> I think these groups [FBO, EBO] can contribute immensely in creating awareness and arranging sessions to propagate non-violent dimension of Islam. Raising awareness and educating young people are the most important endeavours that these groups can undertake. However, we do not find much interaction among the groups in universities undertaking such matters in collaboration with the faith groups.

Figure 10: Do Organizations have a Role in Domestic Terrorism Intervention?



> Particularly for Muslim community I don't know about any programs. I know about the department of multiculturalism, they are very much involved but not in religious gathering but in cultural gathering only.

Interestingly, respondents from the SO (community roles-53%, provincial roles-60%) and FBO (community roles-28%, provincial roles-40%) recognized the importance of communities as well as provincial agencies in developing/implementing an effective national CT strategy, while the respondents from the EBO reported that they think only communities have important roles (20%) and the province has no role to play in national CT strategy. Of course, one must be careful in drawing inferences from this finding. It is possible that responses may reflect the current lack of a role, rather than the idea that they should play a role. Regardless, the evidence suggests that engagement of community-based organizations, whether faith or ethnically based is not occurring. Thus, the current top-down CT approach to engage communities, whether faith or ethnically based, appears to be failing, or is at least ineffective in engaging community-based grassroots level organizations in a leadership role relative to dialogue and information-sharing.

With regard to the importance of community efforts relative to their significance identified

in the national CT strategy, only a minority of FBO (28%) and EBO (19%) respondents reported a role for community organizations, in contrast to a slight majority of SO respondents. This suggests that neither FBOs nor EBOs are taking a leadership role with regard to promoting dialogue on terrorism and CT. These findings suggest that terrorism and CT may have acquired the status of a social taboo in these organizations (notwithstanding the possibility that their meetings provide space for private discussions among individuals). In probing the respondents, it also appears that the various Muslim denominations do not meet together to talk about these issues, although this inference is limited given the over-representation of Sunni Muslims in the sample.

Domestic terrorism is one kind of social conflict, with a host of underlying psychological, social and political causes. It can only be deterred when there is a long term, inclusive and sustainable CT strategy. The *Framework of Canada's Counter Terrorism Strategy* emphasizes the need to build social resilience.[75] But building such resilience is extremely difficult in the face of a trust deficit among the stakeholders. Our research identifies this as a major challenge since the current situation, reflected, for example, by respondent recognition of Islamophobia in society, has alienated the majority of Muslims. Indeed, some government officials in informal discussions reported that the Muslim community is the most difficult to reach out to when compared to other communities in Canada. In addition, the Muslim community(ties) is divided, and many perceive that terrorism in Canada is a Sunni problem. Non-Sunni groups appear to seek a safe distance from the Sunni community.

Muslim FBOs are organized along denominational lines (Sunni, Shiite, Ahmadya, and Ismailiya, among others). Even though 98% of this small sample was Sunni, it was evident that subtle tension prevails between these groups, which are partially a function of doctrinal differences. Of course, tensions are not simply a function of denominations. The members of some FBOs are social activists, whereas others are not. There are also a secular-liberal and a conservative faith divided.

With regard to respondent views about government initiatives to deter terrorism, 47% re-

75 Department of Public Safety, *2013 Public report on the terrorist threat to Canada, building a safe and resilient Canada,* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2013)

spondents from FBOs (the majority Sunni) viewed these as exclusionary or non-inclusive, whereas only 41% of EBO and 12% of SO respondents agreed (Figure 11). Moreover, respondents believing that government initiatives are non-inclusive also tended to believe that the initiatives are biased towards secularist/liberal Islamic groups. They also felt that government agencies, at the federal and provincial levels, tend to fund "like-minded" secular/ liberal Muslim organizations in order to "hear what they want to hear", even though the secularists/liberals do not represent the majority of the Sunni population in Canada.

Figure 11: Exclusionary Approach of the National CT Strategy Reported by Organizations



In this regard, one participant thought:

> I think the government has reached out to Muslim communities who are more than willing to help in an effort to try and shed stereotypes that have been placed upon them. I think with Toronto 18 it was the Muslim community who helped out the law enforcement agencies, and I think by reaching out to communities who are also concerned about terrorism and negative stereotypes it helps to foster bonds. I think that the government needs to promote better integration, advocate measures to lessen intra-group conflicts between communities and foster greater sense of unity therefore limiting the marginalization of perceived oppression that could lead to terrorist activities.

In contrast, others felt:

> At the very least they [the government] could stop breeding hatred because a lot of times a lot of people act out of hatred. It is an open society and people view certain cultural groups in a better way than others and treat it accordingly. So, if the general view on Islam, for example, was better in a society and there was less hatred maybe it would be better.

> With this situation of fear and mistrust people will go underground and would not likely talk about issues for the fear or profiling, so there need to be a genuine 'trust-building exercise' within and beyond the community while remaining within the democratic environment. But if you muzzle the voice, dissent or discussion then you will have issues.

With regard to perceptions of the effectiveness of the current federal government's CT strategy (Figure 12), FBO respondents perceived it to be largely ineffective (77%), whereas the majority of EBO respondents saw it as effective (85%), and the majority of SO respondents had no knowledge about the strategy (60%). This result may in part reflect a greater focus, on the part of the government agencies, on interacting with FBOs in comparison to EBO and SOs. Further, it should be noted relative to the reliability of these assessments of effectiveness, that slightly over 30% of FBO respondents had no knowledge about the national CT strategy, even though all FBO respondents had an opinion on effectiveness.

Figure 12: Effectiveness of National CT Strategy Reported by Organizations



It is also worthwhile to mention that when the respondents talked about effectiveness of the national CT strategy, they mostly referred to media reports of the apprehension of terrorists by RCMP and fewer terrorism related incidences that took place in Canada in comparison to other countries (e.g. the US). Further, the respondents who commented about some degree of effectiveness, also commented that these are inadequate. In addition, they were aware of only the efforts of CSIS and the RCMP relating to the monitoring and apprehending of terrorists. However, all the respondents were aware to some degree of the language used (for example, Islamism and Sunni Muslim extremism, and Bill C-36) in government communications (public safety website and media). A few respondents commented that Bill C-36 would be counter to Canadian charters of rights and freedoms, and it might be abused. They were also skeptical about the renewal of this bill in December 2012. SO respondents reported that although they are not aware of any provincial level initiatives, but felt that such initiatives would helpful to deter extremism. The responses from the participants are highlighted below:

> I have no idea about all the federal initiative or the provincial initiative to prevent this kind of radicalization in different ethnic group.

> Definitely at the municipal and provincial level it [anti-terrorism initiatives] is not even visible; I don't know anything.

> I'm not really familiar with any Canadian programs or policies. Honestly I didn't look into this stuff; I didn't feel they were relevant to me and most Canadian Muslims probably feel that way too. They feel as long as they are living their lives normally and not getting involved in these sketchy things they will be fine. But one thing I think should happen in order to moving forward with regards to the Canadian government is that they should be forming relations with diverse Muslim communities in Canada.

> I see politicians in the mosque one time and only during election time other than that they never come and visit.

> If a politician comes to the conversation I feel it is important to break down these barriers that show you are more than a politician, or the RCMP, that you are a real human being forming these human relationships between the community and between these different leaders and Canadian figures.

Our respondents also reported an overwhelming fear with regard to the overall terrorism situation in society, mainly emanating from leading government agencies on CT matters. Three distinct types of fear emerged: a general sense of fear regarding CT, a specific fear as targets of government agencies, and peer fear (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Fear Reported by Organizations



FBO respondents, in particular, overwhelmingly feared government agencies, whereas EBO respondents feared peer pressure. A general sense of fear, with regard to terrorism was shared by EBO (54%) and SO (46%) of respondents. Responses from the participants on fear included:

> Everybody doesn't know how to deal with CSIS. Once CSIS contacts them they shiver because they think it as a terrible thing. What is happening in our society is that the people are scared. For example, if you want to know whether Muslims will go against this bill [C -36] of course everybody is against this bill but are they going to go in the open to protest? I don't think so because due to lack of information they think if they protest against this bill and they think CSIS will say 'you know what lets watch this guy, let's put him on the watch'. It's a horrible thing it's a terrible situation and it is really sad.

> I wish they would come and do something like that in the open and talk about it; ask questions in there you know who is willing to answer but everything is hush hush with them and they catch whoever they want; they lock up whoever they want no questions to be asked and to come out and defend yourself it is hell. So what do you expect?

> I think it [research on terrorism] would be very hard because most of them will think that you [the researchers] are from CSIS. Everyone will think you're from that organization because you want to know who all are thinking about terrorism. This is what the situation is now. They are scared enough to talk to you and to take part in research. As far as CSIS is concerned they are not going to come to you and ask you that they want to talk to you about. What they prefer is to talk to you in private.
>
> The CSIS has been talking to the Muslim communities directly and this is problematic for many people. I mean CSIS calls to a Canadian doesn't mean a lot, they would just tell them I'm not going to talk to you without the presence of a lawyer but if the CSIS approaches to Afghanistan to Egyptian people it frightens them to death. It means your future is being challenged. People really get scared and that is many Muslims think that they are being monitored and are being watched despite many people may say 'why do they phone me I'm just a regular guy and I have nothing to do with these things'.
>
> These phone calls they are making are not doing them any favors. I do not think they are promoting any positive relationship. It is unfortunate that by adopting this approach a sense of mistrust is created and at the same time it says that the government has got no trust in us.

This environment of fear, which creates mistrust in relation to government agencies, can be also conceptualized by a fear matrix. The three main actors in this matrix are government agencies (A), which are entrusted with security and protection; Muslim FEBOs (B), which represent Muslim communities; and individual Muslim citizens (C). These actors interact with each other as depicted in a schematic model below.

Respondents described a number of such situations. Often times, A contacts B with regard to information relating to terrorism and radicalization within the Muslim communities. B recognizes the importance of security and protection, but also feels an obligation to defend the community. As a result often B declines, but promises to share information upon availability. However, A only contacts B when A has sufficient information on potential terrorist cases requiring investigation based upon information, which A cannot share for security reasons. B's defensive response, based upon a lack of trust creates a situation where A tends to misunderstand B's position, which is only compounded by A's explicit or implicit proposition to B to act as an informer. Due to A's powerful status, B does not resist openly and promises cooperation. The net result is a one way communication process.

Diagram 1: Actor Fear Matrix



When A contacts C to collect information relating to terrorism, C becomes scared and fearful. C's initial reaction is: how does A know my name and location? Am I on A's radar? What did I do? In this situation, C reacts either one of two ways: shows exaggerated cooperation and fabricate facts, or refuses cooperation and goes into hiding. The ultimate result is having wrong/fabricated information.

The third element of this fear matrix is the interaction of B and C. If C as a member of the community organization led by B, and becomes aware of A's contact with B, then this may sow distrust and suspicion within the organization. It can undermine B's legitimacy within the organization. Conversely, B may exploit its relationship with A to ensure C's acceptance of B's authority. C may implicitly fear that challenging B may lead to B communicating to A that C is a potential terrorist threat. Overall, the net result of this fear matrix, evident through discussions with several respondents, is the creation of not only mistrust among A, B, and C, but also among Muslims at large. This, in turn, is the direct product of a community, as indicated by the respondents, who are only aware of CSIS and RCMP efforts in the national CT strategy.

Findings indicate that respondents perceive current CT initiatives as having a top-down approach, which employs only two types of actors: law enforcement and intelligence gathering

agencies. Although the RCMP recently began some outreach activities, these are again viewed as government's fake sincerity to reach out to the communities, with such perceptions reinforced by the language employed in CT documents. Unintentionally, current CT policy and its implementation relative to the community actors has created, or perhaps more accurately, increased the level of mistrust within the Muslim community(ties).

Part IV: Conclusion and Recommendations

This research project explores the perceptions of Muslim faith, ethnic-based and student leaders' perceptions of domestic terrorism in Canada and federal CT efforts. The research findings point to a multi-causal explanation for domestic terrorism in Canada dominated by social causes. None of the respondents saw the causes of terrorism as a function of political motives. Rather they related terrorism primarily to social causes. A host of social causes appears responsible for frustration among Muslims in Canada, and thus as the potential driver of individual radicalization linked to extremist Islamic movements overseas. In addition, perceptions of Islamophobia in Canadian society has created a sense of Muslim isolation and generated an "us vs. them" environment, with significant implications for radicalization itself and the effectiveness of the national CT strategy. Specifically, it is difficult to engage effectively the key community actors or organizations in developing and implementing counter-terrorism initiatives if the community perceives itself under siege and threat from society as a whole.

This is even more problematic given the significant perceptual differences, which exist among the various community organizations themselves. In other words, different perceptions suggest that a "one size fits all" policy approach is unlikely to be successful. Finally, and arguably most important, the prevailing sense of fear and mistrust within the Muslim community(ties), reinforced by the government's near exclusive employment of police and security agents in terms of engaging this community, is itself problematic relative to the goal of community mobilization and collaboration.

Importantly, the findings presented above are limited and not representative per se of the Muslim community or communities, and its organizations within Canada as whole, regionally or provincially. Even so, the evidence presented is much more than anecdotal, and should be understood as indicative of dominant beliefs and perceptions within the community (if one should truly speak in single community terms) with significant heuristic value. Indeed, it is hoped that the publication of this study and its distribution within the Muslim community(ties) may facilitate a greater level of trust enabling future expanded research. Above all else, this study should

provide the foundation for future expanded studies of its nature in order to develop a better picture of Muslim beliefs and perceptions, and a more effective, and more flexible national CT strategy to engage these community organizations in the fight against radicalization and terrorism. In this regard, the following initial recommendations should be considered:

1. Similar qualitative studies should be undertaken with larger samples drawn from across Canada, especially those areas where the largest concentration of Muslims are found. Specifically, qualitative studies should be conducted in areas of foreign fighter cases to explore the causes and patterns of radicalization.
2. The national CT strategy needs to be closely re-examined especially in light of significant perceptual differences among the three types of organizations examined here. The effectiveness of a "one size fits all" strategy needs to be carefully considered relative to these differences. Further, the community component of intervention in the national CT is absent. In this regard, a community-based collaborative model of terrorism intervention should be researched and developed (useful examples can be taken from the research done in Europe, the UK, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh)[76]. Here, the community-based model should include five principal stakeholders: the local EBO and FBO; academia; local law enforcement agencies (i.e. RCMP and other community police forces); provincial government's ministry of labour, immigration, and multiculturism; and the media. Further, a few undergraduate level courses on terrorism and CT should also be offered in collaboration with Canadian universities and community colleges to present the history, effect and current trends of terrorism and CT (such courses might include presentations/participation of law enforcement agency members). These courses would not only help in opening up much needed opportunity for dialogue and discussion on terrorism eventually freeing up terrorism discourse from taboo, but also would ease peer-fear and peer-pressure leading to isolation.
3. Significant efforts must be made to reduce the level of fear, suspicion and mistrust held within the Muslim community(ties) in order to make their engagement a positive one in terms of combating radicalization and terrorism. In this regard, expanding the government approach beyond security agencies should be considered, including the engagement of relevant non-security provincial agencies. Correspondingly, the language used in the government's official publications and strategies must take into account the religious sensitivities of a particular group of people. More so, the national CT strategy mentioned in the Public

76 a. "Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach", published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, February 2014, p, 94, 112, 126.

b. "Bringing it Home Community-based approaches to counter-terrorism", by Rachel Briggs, Catherine Fieschi and Hannah Lownsbrough, Demos, www.demos.co.uk

c. "A Community Based Approach to Countering Radicalization: A Partnership for America", by Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi With Mehreen Farooq, December 2010, WORDE

Safety website should omit specific reference to a particular Muslim community and instead mention the national security threat in generic terms. Further, sporadic engagement of law enforcement agencies with FBOs and EBOs does not yield the desired result with regard to effective CT efforts; therefore, a strategy of engagement based on the inclusion of maximum stakeholders (especially different Muslims groups) in the society should be further researched and developed. Academia should be involved as a neutral entity in planning and organizing seminars, dialogues on terrorism and clarifying current national policies on CT.

4. Perceptions on surveillance and monitoring suspicious terrorist cases based on profiling should be clarified to communities by the law enforcement agencies (as much as possible). In this regard, law enforcement agencies might assist the local FBOs and EBOs in organizing youth summer camps so that more youths can take part in such camps. This effort would greatly reduce peer-fear, a pressure factor causing isolation.

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Appendix A

Interview Questionnaires

1. What do you think about domestic or homegrown terrorism in Canada?
    a. University of Manitoba students (Ferid Imam, biochemistry student, Maiwand Yar, mechanical engineering) allegedly participated in the Al Qaeda movement in Pakistan and Hiva Alizadeh, who studied in Red River College had been alleged as homegrown terrorist? What do you think about the reasons of their involvement in terrorism?

    b. What are the causes of domestic terrorism?

    c. What are the factors contributing to it? What are the macro- and micro-level factors do you think contributes to the motivation towards extremism?

2. Can you talk about the state of Muslim radicalization reported by the print and electronic media in Canada?
    a. How do you define radicalization? Do you think radicalization exists? What are the causes of radicalization?

    b. What kinds of people are prone to radicalization and why?

    c. Do you think faith has any role in motivation towards extremism?

    d. How do you view media's role in reporting terrorism related news?

3. How do you think to intervene in domestic terrorism, extremism related issues in society?

    a. Name few tools, means for effective intervention.

    b. Who all could be the important stakeholder in intervention?

4. Are you aware of national Counter Terrorism (CT) strategy? Do you know who the lead agency is in the national CT initiative?
    a. Do you think federal CT initiatives are effective, not effective? If not why?

    b. Do you have any recommendations for federal authorities for an effective CT strategy?

5. What do you think about the role of your organization in CT implementation?
    a. Do you think community-based organizations such as yours have an important role to play? If yes, explain how?

    b. Do you feel any obstacle in role playing in the current situation?

Appendix B

Nodes generated after coding – QSR nVivo 10

Name	Sources	References	Modified On
Environment of Fear and mistrust	11	29	3/20/2014 3:27 PM
Fear from government machineries	7	9	12/31/2013 2:37 AM
Foreign Fighters	1	1	3/20/2014 3:26 PM
Participants general fear	5	11	3/20/2014 3:26 PM
Peer pressure through isolation	4	8	3/20/2014 3:27 PM
Factors contributing to the causes of terrorism	10	58	3/17/2014 10:28 AM
Faith knowledge	2	2	3/17/2014 10:31 AM
Family level conflict	6	8	4/1/2014 11:01 AM
Globalization and internet	3	5	1/12/2014 3:52 PM
Humiliation(taking personal responsibility)	1	5	1/12/2014 3:52 PM
Idealization, solidarity	2	4	3/17/2014 10:30 AM
Integration problem	1	1	3/17/2014 10:30 AM
Islamophobia	5	10	1/8/2014 11:41 AM
Pre disposition to violence	2	2	3/17/2014 10:31 AM
Reality vs. expectation	2	5	3/17/2014 10:31 AM
Social justice and equality	2	4	3/17/2014 10:31 AM
Socio-political isolation	5	11	3/17/2014 10:31 AM
Trust deficit	1	1	3/17/2014 10:31 AM
Framing of terrorism-terrorists	11	48	3/16/2014 6:26 PM
Globalized information and its effect	6	10	12/29/2013 12:30 AM
Impact of media	6	13	3/20/2014 2:23 PM
Jihad and terrorism	4	6	3/20/2014 2:24 PM
Scapegoating, stereotyping, propaganda	6	18	3/20/2014 2:25 PM
Why stereotyping does not go	5	8	3/20/2014 2:24 PM
Terrorism - cliché word	1	1	1/8/2014 11:40 AM
Hopes and dreams	6	15	3/16/2014 6:26 PM
Impact of foreign policy	8	24	3/20/2014 12:20 PM
western intervention and effect	2	4	12/29/2013 12:46 AM
Intervention method	11	41	3/16/2014 6:26 PM
Academic course on Terrorism	1	1	3/25/2014 10:06 PM
Acknowledgement	2	2	3/25/2014 10:05 PM
Awareness of policy maker	1	2	3/25/2014 10:06 PM
Dialogue	7	14	3/25/2014 10:05 PM
Mosque based programs	1	1	3/25/2014 10:07 PM
Multiculturism	2	3	12/30/2013 4:15 PM
NGO-RCMP intervention	1	1	1/8/2014 11:46 AM
Profiling	3	4	3/25/2014 10:07 PM
Relationship forming	2	8	3/25/2014 10:07 PM
Stop using terrorism rhetoric	2	5	3/25/2014 10:07 PM
Muslim weakness(intra-group and inter-group)	5	13	3/16/2014 6:26 PM

Defensiveness	3	3	1/12/2014 4:05 PM
Perceptions on national CT efforts	8	47	3/25/2014 10:33 PM
Community effort	6	9	3/20/2014 3:00 PM
Effectiveness of CT policies	7	30	3/20/2014 3:00 PM
Federal effort(inclusion, exclusion)	5	8	3/20/2014 3:00 PM
Provincial effort	4	8	3/20/2014 3:01 PM
Radicalization and extremism	11	45	3/16/2014 6:26 PM
causes of radicalisation	5	8	12/29/2013 12:42 AM
define radicalism	2	3	12/24/2013 10:50 AM
discrimination basing on faith	1	2	12/28/2013 4:09 PM
indifferent	5	7	1/8/2014 9:52 AM
No-it does not exist	4	4	1/8/2014 11:36 AM
path to radicalization	3	8	1/8/2014 10:14 AM
radicalization is rising	1	1	12/24/2013 10:16 AM
Yes-it exists	5	12	1/8/2014 11:10 AM
Role of ethno-cultural groups	3	4	3/16/2014 6:26 PM
Role of Identity	10	39	3/16/2014 6:26 PM
Culture	2	8	3/20/2014 1:27 PM
Faith	6	11	3/20/2014 1:31 PM
Faith or culture, which comes first	3	11	3/20/2014 1:35 PM
Culture comes first	1	5	3/20/2014 1:35 PM
Does not matter	1	1	3/20/2014 1:30 PM
Religion comes first	2	5	3/20/2014 1:35 PM
Generational effect	2	2	3/20/2014 1:34 PM
Struggle to keep group identity	2	4	3/20/2014 1:34 PM
Struggle to keep individual identity	2	3	3/20/2014 1:34 PM
Role of Muslim organizations	1	3	3/16/2014 6:26 PM
Surveys	2	2	3/16/2014 6:26 PM
Angus Reid	1	1	1/7/2014 1:23 AM
Gallup	1	1	1/7/2014 1:21 AM
Pew	0	0	1/7/2014 1:20 AM
STATSCAN	0	0	1/8/2014 10:19 AM
Types of people vulnerable to terrorism	8	17	3/16/2014 6:26 PM
individual vs. group phenomenon	6	7	12/31/2013 2:33 AM
Muslim brotherhood	1	1	1/8/2014 10:17 AM
people's pattern(convert)	3	6	12/29/2013 12:47 AM
Youth	2	3	12/27/2013 12:57 PM