TSAS Spring Workshop 2019
Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario

This Workshop was held at Carleton University as part of the Faculty of Public Affairs' Research Month. The Workshop featured short presentations from recent recipients of TSAS grants, followed by breakout sessions that featured high-level conversations led by a slate of academic experts and policy makers. The day concluded with a session in which each breakout group moderator reported back to the group with a summary of the discussions. The breakout discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule.

Plenary: Recent TSAS-funded Research

Jeffrey Ian Ross, University of Baltimore
"How Terrorists Experience Prison: An Analysis of English Language Memoirs and Autobiographies"

Ross's presentation spoke to the increasing concern about the negative implications of imprisonment for convicted terrorists, including the potential for radicalization amongst prisoners. Security officials are concerned about various ideologies within prisons, ranging from Islamist-inspired radicalism to white supremacy, and how otherwise disinterested individuals come to embrace these belief systems after incarceration.

To understand the role of prison within a terrorist's life, Ross examined 29 autobiographical accounts of convicted terrorists. The 29 texts were all written in English with publication dates ranging from 1960-2017. Of this sample of autobiographies, the majority were written while the terrorists were incarcerated.

The sample of 29 accounts were written by members of terrorist organizations. None were "lone wolves". Of these autobiographical accounts, 50% mention their time they spent incarcerated and 50% do not. The speaker concluded by stating that there was a need for further research examining motives for writing autobiographies in the first place, as well as the impact prison has on individuals susceptible to radicalization.

Michael Nesbitt, University of Calgary
"Prosecuting Terrorism in Canada: Terrorist Group Affiliation and the Use of Social Science Evidence in Courtrooms"

Nesbitt examined the role of expert testimony in terrorism prosecutions. There are 44 resolved terrorism cases in Canada: 11 stays, 15 guilty pleas, 13 guilty verdicts, and 5 acquittals. One thing to note is that when a

charge of terrorism is applied to a case in Canada, there is no incentive to plead guilty as this will not mitigate the sentence.

When dealing with terrorism offences, there are four categories of expert witnesses who may be involved in the prosecutorial process: psychiatric, psychological, technical (electronic and weapons expertise), and social science experts. The levels of experts being introduced to a terrorism court case vary by stages of the trial. During the pre-trial there are relatively few experts that are called on. During the trial, there is the greatest variety of experts that are called on from the four main categories. Finally, the sentencing deals mainly with psychological experts. The prosecution are far more likely to call on experts than the defence, which may shape judicial outcomes.

Nesbitt argues that the field would benefit from analysis that delved further into when and how experts are brought forward by the Crown and the defence. Also, there is a need for further analysis on when judges call on intervenors to assess a situation.

Logan McNair, Simon Fraser University

"Linguistic and Narrative Trends among Islamic State Videos and Magazines"

MacNair spoke about the methods Daesh use to spread their ideology and the content of their messages. The researcher's objective was to understand the content with the aim of trying to reduce its impact.

The Daesh propaganda used in this study included videos, social media posts, and self-published magazines. To analyze this content, sentiment analysis was used to assess the emotions associated with Daesh publications. A key finding from this analysis was that the topics being discussed by Daesh were consistent across their various communication platforms. However, the language used to address these topics varied from one medium to another. The language in propaganda videos, for example, appealed to the audience's emotions, while magazines tended to be neutral.

In this regard, Daesh propaganda tended to use more "positive" language in videos. MacNair explained that the reason for this is to target emotional weaknesses and insecurities within individuals' lives and then provide them with an answer. MacNair concluded by suggesting that we pay closer attention to identity and existential concerns individuals within these movements may have.

Rachel Schmidt, Carleton University

"Duped: Why gender stereotypes are leading to inadequate deradicalization and disengagement strategies"

Schmidt addressed how gender stereotypes have an impact on deradicalization. She began by referencing numerous gendered stereotypes (notably, the monster, mother, whore descriptions theorized by Sjoberg and Gentry) and assumptions that are pervasive in the media, such as stories about women being "tricked" into joining Daesh.

To assess the harm that may come from these stereotypes, this study employed in-depth interviews with UK counter terrorism officials to assess their view of women returnees. What Schmidt discovered is that the language used around women and girls in terrorism is consistent with stereotypes of women in general. This is particularly problematic as women may be able to exploit tropes of being naïve and stupid to avoid prosecutions. Another issue Schmidt notes is the problematic way counter terrorism officials deal with women in general. They are often seen mainly as tools to surveil their own communities and not as contributors to radicalization or extremism themselves.

The speaker then detailed the three dominant narratives used to describe women involved with crime in general. The first is the victim ("stupid woman", easily tricked). Second is the mother (charged with protecting the community, however, if she is seen to have contributed to terrorism or crime she will be punished more harshly). Lastly, is the "monster" (this person must be abhorrent and suffer from an emotional or personal defect). The role of these stereotypes are seen when examining the sentencing patterns of women in general, which is typically more challenging then sentencing men. If there is inscrutable evidence, then these women are treated most harshly.

Schmidt also noted problems with deradicalization programs provided in prisons in the United Kingdom. Even if a woman is convicted of a crime that stems from a terrorism case, unless this individual was convicted for a terrorism charge, they will not be eligible for deradicalization programs from within prison. Programs are almost exclusively designed as 'gender-neutral', or with men in mind, and thus not always suitable for women who are admitted to them.

Schmidt stresses that within terrorist and extremist groups, women typically do not engage in attacks as much as men, but they do intelligence and other support roles. In other words, these groups could not run without women. Going forward, it is important to create and establish CVE initiatives with an exclusive focus on women, as opposed to assuming that a gender-neutral approach will work.

Christian Leuprecht, Royal Military College and Queen's University

Pamela Simpson, MA Queen's University

"Comparing Terrorist Financing and Resourcing: Indicators for Analyzing Value Transferred to Terrorist Organizations"

Leuprecht and Simpson addressed the difficulty of tracing both licit and elicit terrorist finances. As part of their study, the speakers examined 32 cases of terrorist financing. Due to the inchoate nature of the files they received, social network analysis was not possible. What they were able to find was that a lot of what terrorists move is not money, but resources. Learning to track these resources is what matters.

The question then posed was whether money laundering and terrorist financing are part of the same problem. To answer this question, the speakers began their study where Richard Gordon's study left off, which required examining money laundering. What they discovered was that patterns were emerging in Gordon's work that he missed. For instance, $190 million was transferred through 7 specific financial intermediaries.

To extrapolate from Gordon's findings, the researchers parsed his data looking for further information he may have missed. Observing TRMs (terrorism resource model) does extract the nodes the creators hoped it would. However, the TRM reveals that there are a lot more players than otherwise thought. For instance, the TRM does pick up on both licit and elicit funds, which is important because many finances for terrorist purposes start as licit.

The researchers also used Gordon's data set to show that the TRM picked up on traditional money laundering methods. But what was missed was cases like Hawala networks being used to fund materials for a conference centre and water distillers. Although both the conference centre and the water distiller were used for terrorist purposes, these materials were not flagged under Gordon's model because he was not looking for them. The TRM, on the other hand, did pick these up because it was looking for resources.

Going forward, the speakers hope to validate the TRM with future tests. However, this will be difficult because convictions tend to be for domestic offences, whereas transnational financing of terrorism charges are rare, making it difficult to find case studies.

Barbara Perry, University of Ontario Institute of Technology

"Moving to a Hateful Beat White Power Music on YouTube"

Perry's research examined white power music on YouTube. The question the speaker sought to answer was "how does YouTube promote white power?". To answer this question, three key areas were analyzed: Production, Distribution, and Reception.

To do this study, researchers conducted a content analysis on white power videos, including the comments, shares, and likes section of the pages. Secondly, focus groups were conducted on youth and university aged students to assess their reactions, and to find out if there was anything about these songs drawing them in. Finally, they interviewed white power musicians.

Initial findings reveal a vast array of musical genres that promote white power. Not just heavy metal and hard rock, but folk, country, hip hop, punk etc. The speaker argues that these different genres expand the audience and the appeal of white power dramatically. It is no longer just disenfranchised youth, but middle age white-men. Also of note is that these genres help solidify the movement across different age groups.

Perry noted that the problem with YouTube is that it is not bound by federal regulation. This means there is enhanced access to this type of music, which is made widely accessible to local and international communities. As such, the content and the audience are international. Another issue the speaker highlights with YouTube is the algorithmic reproduction of content. When someone listens to a song of a genre, the "recommendations" list will only move deeper and deeper into such content. This is true for white power music as well.

A potential solution is widespread takedowns of such material. However, YouTube relies on people reporting material before any action is taken. More moderators and establishing algorithms to detect such content may be beneficial.

Breakout Group: Law, Prosecution and Prisons

Moderator: Stephanie Carvin, Assistant Professor, NPSIA, Carleton University

Academic Leads:

Jeffrey Ian Ross, Professor, School of Criminal Justice, University of Baltimore

Michael Nesbitt, Assistant Professor, Law, University of Calgary

Policy Lead: Rick McEachran, Senior Project Manager, National Portfolio Manager – Terrorism and Radicalization, Preventive Security & Intelligence Branch, Correctional Service Canada – NHQ

Rapporteur: Shrish Srivastava, Carleton University

The session began with the big question: Do ideologically motivated offenders require individually tailored interventions? One speaker shared data: there are currently 18 individuals convicted of terrorism, who are affiliated to groups such as the FLQ and the Squamish Five. Persons in the prison system who are of national security interest are constantly monitored. The total number of prisoners in the federal custody are 21,000 men and 3000 women. However, Canada at this point is behind in tailored intervention, and individuals with unique needs require their own unique intervention. A question was raised about whether intervention for 35 individuals, who had a relatively low risk of re-engagement in such activities, was really required. Another participant asked whether gang involved prisoners required their own set of interventions? One speaker further that we can address most of prisoners' needs with our corrections program, which is one of the best in the world. Several organizations are working on counter-radicalization programs. Corrections officials are looking for the most positive connection in an offender's life. If they can get in touch with an Imam, grandfather, employer, or other person they relate to, then they do.

Another participant argued that, rather than looking at generic programing, we have to look at the root causes of violent extremism. For someone to come out of jail and still be hold extremist ideas suggests that his or her ideology was not addressed. Generic corrections programming focuses on anger management. In terrorism you have to look at the grievance, you need to address the ideology. You have to look at what can change an offender for the longer period, you want them to disengage, you want them to stop supporting violence. It is a public safety issue, it needs to be addressed. Counselling can work but only sometimes. How do you counsel or address bad ideas? The UK's Channel program was addressed: one participant argued that Channel is consensual and carries out individual risk and vulnerability assessment. Time series data shows that 80% vulnerability is reduced after the right policy intervention through Channel. A similar approach is followed in Australia.

Another speaker argued that there is a need for connection in young men. They require a brotherhood and that is why this program is working, they are not sophisticated young men who read, thus they need a sophisticated approach.

Later, the discussion turned to the matter of peace bonds. One expert explained that peace bonds are 3.3 and 4.10 orders. Even an 8.10 order is a peace bond. A peace bond acts as an extra set of eyes for the authorities, and there is a big difference between a peace bond and parole. One of them is a court order, the provincial government issues it, and a law enforcement agency executes it, like a restraining order. The peace bond issue was further debated by the panel and important questions such as who issues them and monitors them were discussed. One issue is lack of resources to monitor individuals under a peace bond. However, the authorities rely on partners, and there are undercover cops monitoring them from time to time. If the convict is supposed to report to someone, they eventually will find out if they do not. But other conditions within peace bonds such as no usage of computer etc, cannot be monitored. One participant hypothesized that peace bonds will eventually outnumber parole conditions. The police are not the final authority in the case of peace bonds; a judge is. *A peace bond will eventually end at good behaviour.*

The group debated the creation of terrorism database just like the sex offenders list. The panel had divided opinions on this issue. One of the speakers argued that a no social, no healthcare list is already being proposed in Ontario and creating a database will be double penalty. The speaker asserted that such people are already isolated and creating another list will further isolate them. Another speaker argued that rather than having a no healthcare list we should have an offenders list.

One participant raised an important question regarding the inconsistency in terrorism sentencing as well as discrepancies between terrorism sentencing and the sentencing of institutional crimes. One of the speakers laid out some statistics and argued that there have been inconsistencies with terrorism sentencing. For example a person who fails to go to Somalia to join a terrorist group gets 16 years in prison (although he may not have committed a further terrorist offence), but a person who murders 6 people gets only 40 years. During a debate about differences between the US and Canadian system and one speaker informed the group that law enforcement in the US charges them with non-terrorism charges to make sure they are being charged. They are often charged with money laundering, terrorism related activities, bank robbery etc.

Breakout Group: Terrorist Financing

Moderator: Jessica Davis, President, Insight Threat Intelligence

Academic Leads:

Christian Leuprecht, Professor, Queen's University and Royal Military College

Pam Simpson, MA Student in International Relations, Queen's University

Policy Leads:

Ian Wright, Director, Financial Crimes Governance and Operations, Department of Finance Canada

Bruce Wallace, Manager, Strategic Policy and Reviews, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada

Rapporteur: Laura Pottier

The Terrorist Financing breakout session began with an overview of current Canadian and international initiatives to combat terrorist financing (TF). The nature of policy coordination between different Canadian organizations and agencies within the government was outlined. International cooperation and financial information sharing were also touched upon. Terrorist financing challenges faced by policy makers include technological changes, challenges within the Criminal Code of Canada, enforcement and prosecution difficulties, Charter constraints, and balancing the gathering of financial intelligence with concerns about the privacy of individuals.

A discussion on the impact of twitter and other social media sites ensued, as well as a discussion on the future implications of virtual assets and decentralized crypto currencies, such as bitcoin. Enforcement and prosecution were pointed to as a major hurdle within Canada. These impediments for TF-related action largely stem from constraints within the reasonable limits clause of the Charter, the Criminal Code, as well as difficulties in proving intent to finance terrorism. Although enforcement continues to be a hurdle in Canada, the legislative and policy framework surrounding TF is believed to be rigorous. Policy-makers have seen increasing levels of correlation between drug trafficking and TF, and increasingly incorporate the use of geographic indicators to guide policy.

The discussion then turned to academics, who presented a Terrorist Resourcing Model (TRM). The TRM approach is a model used to track resources, instead of focusing solely money-laundering. The model places its focus on the role of financial intermediaries in the terrorist financing process. Arguments were made for the benefits of TRM integration in the policy environment. Much of the discussion centred around the ongoing debate over whether terrorism financing and money laundering should be kept together or separated into two different systems for policy. Possible benefits of a TRM included the ability to better identify patterns, which

could provide potential breakthroughs for policy-makers. The session concluded with a brief Q&A amongst academics and policy leads.

Breakout Group: Gender and Identity

Moderator: Veronica Kitchen, Associate Professor Political Science, UWaterloo & Acting Director of TSAS

Academic Leads:

Logan McNair, PhD Candidate, Criminology, Simon Fraser University

Rachel Schmidt, PhD Candidate, International Conflict and Management, NPSIA

Policy Lead:

Matthew Mayer, Manager, National Security Policy Division, Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, Public Safety Canada

Rapporteur: Jeyashri Pakeerathan

The group began by discussing the Canadian state's Gender-based Analysis Plus. Deputy Ministers have been meeting to consolidate what the GBA+ would constitute. GBA+ is important to driving debate around key questions revolving around security, gender, and identity. It is driven towards making this policy dream a reality. Currently, there is a meeting with government partners to understand how to improve policy to be 'bias free' and coordinated. The group then dove into conversation about whether 'bias free' can ever possibly be achieved and whether the term should be altered. Individuals in the group were divided about whether the term should be replaced or not. Some individuals suggested bias-conscious, bias-aware or bias-transparent as possible alternatives. Other members of the group discussed the public perceptions that are associated with 'bias-free' and how semantics are important for gaining public support. Another topic of conservation was the term "gender neutral". Members of the group pointed out that many policies should not be gender neutral. An example that was suggested was the problem of trying to push gender neutral health systems. Gender neutral health systems would have a negative effect to women because they inherently use health systems differently. The group then raised the question of how gender is approached and whether a gender neutral approach is inherently positive, or negative. The importance of language and vocabulary was a common theme within the group. Another example of this discussion was the use of the term foreign fighter. Individuals in the group pointed out that foreign terrorist fighter is a problematic term because it eliminates a lot of roles outside of direct military activity. It also eliminates women in the normal conception of what roles they play in these organizations.

The group then began to discuss the role of women in terrorism and how this role has been undermined in the media. An individual in the group pointed out the disproportionate amount of media coverage for female suicide bombers in comparison of what percentage of suicide bombers are actually female. This is due to

sensationalism and shock at the fact that a woman is being outwardly violent. The group goes on to discuss why women may be attracted to joining terrorist groups, and many suggestions are made to agency, status, power, and sisterhood as reasons women might have to joining these groups. Individuals in the group point out that although these terrorist groups tend to be male dominated, there are ways and examples of women who have played important roles within the structure of the organization. One individual pointed out that the public perceives women as always being weak sex slaves in these organizations, but this perception is actually different from the important roles women can play in logistics and other important matters of the organization. The discussion of femininity was also accompanied by discussions of perceptions of masculinity. An individual from the group pointed out the propaganda and media put out by terrorist organizations also display a certain type of masculinity to attract new members. These pieces of propaganda display assertive men and implies what masculinity means. However, there are also images in these media pieces that display different aspects of manhood such as brotherhood, and scenes of intense emotions such as crying. The individuals in the group discussed how these pieces of media would be appealing to disenfranchised men who feel a lack of belonging and identity in the current world order. An individual in the group also pointed joining a terrorist organization also provides religious men with a way to access and have sexual activity, without repercussions. These groups usually provide them with a wife along with a selection of sex slaves which makes joining a terrorist organization very appealing for young, confused men who feel repressed. This idea of a lack of identity and belonging in the dominant world order was also a reason that women would join terrorist organizations, according to individuals in the group. They speculated that many of the women that would be attracted to these organizations feel a desire to go back allegedly traditional female roles, and feel like the dominant social order is going in the wrong direction.

The group also discussed the issues that pertain to returning foreign fighters trying to return to their country of origin. The group discussed the issue about minors leaving to join terrorist organizations and whether it factors into legal proceedings. The group speculates that minors should be held to a different standard since they are less likely to understand what they are signing up for when joining a terrorist organization. There is also the issue of memory gaps and trauma's impact on memory. It is difficult to gauge what these minors even remember since trauma has an impact on what is remembered.

The final theme of the discussion is what approach is taken to prevent radicalization. The debate was between a public health approach and a security approach. An individual in the group provides the irony of complaining about terrorism and cutting social programs that keep contact with vulnerable groups. The individual points out that this phenomenon is occurring in the UK. Ironically, the state is placing large budgets in security but cutting social services that are preventative to radicalization. This discussion raises

many questions about how preventative measures should be approached in policy. Overall, the group was able to discuss many relevant questions about gender, and identity in terms of terrorism.

Breakout Group: Right-Wing Extremism (RWE)

Moderator:

Alex Wilner, Assistant Professor of International Affairs, NPSIA

Academic Leads:

Barbara Perry, Professor University of Ontario Institute of Technology.

Policy Leads:

Steven Strang, Director, Research and Innovation, Federal Policing Strategic Direction, RCMP

Brett Kubicek, PhD, Manager – Research, Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, Public Safety Canada / Government of Canada

Rapporteur: Brandon Rigato

The group began by reflecting on three key concerns that arise for academics, practitioners, and policy makers when examining RWE. Firstly, what is it that we mean by far-right? Secondly, what are right-wing ideas that lead to violence and extremism? Lastly, what can be done from both a practical and policy standpoint to address the confusion of terms? The conversation began by addressing the "amorphous" nature of what is included when discussing RWE. Skinheads, neo-Nazis, white-nationalists, anti-abortionists, freemen on the land, anti-immigrant, anti-Islam, etc, are all meant to fit into the classification of RWE. All in attendance agree this is too broad a net being cast over various and at times divergent ideologies.

The group discussed the difference between how police, intelligence agencies, and policy makers use the term "extremism", versus how academics use the term. There was broad consensus that "extremism" specifically to police signifies a threat, and that a criminal charge is possible. Many of the groups in question that are described as "extremist", are not always behaving illegally. However, the group agreed that there is no clear term to replace the wide and all-encompassing label of RWE, and there needs to be awareness that umbrella terms like RWE are not beneficial in narrowing our scope and/or understanding. To provide a clearer distinction between the various ideologies being brought under the heading of "RWE", we all argue there needs to be more nuance in understanding groups that call for *less-immigration* as opposed to those that are *anti-immigration*. Drawing a distinction between offensive rhetoric and hate speech may help clarify such definitional confusion. Also agreed was the need to define the difference between hate crimes versus terrorism. One potential solution put forward was to think of hate crime and terrorism as being on a continuum. It was also argued that we need clearer understanding of how we define membership of RWE groups. Is it simply Facebook followers? Like counts? Attendance at specific rallies? Although no clear

definition came out of the discussion there was consensus that governments and academics should not embrace self-monikers that groups or collectives themselves provide. For instance, the "alt-right" and the "alt-lite" are self-monikers and often within these collectives were harmful practices and ideologies associated with white nationalism.

Later, the discussion addressing three further questions: what is the relationship between RWE, hate crimes, and terrorism? What happens when extremist language is used within politics? And, what polices can we put forward to counter RWE?

The first question "what is the relationship between RWE, hate crimes, and terrorism?" led to further questions and hypothetical scenarios being posed, such as: Does hateful rhetoric only become violence/terrorism when actual violence is used? Or, can embodying an ideology that is inherently violent, such as Nazism, lead to the conclusion that an individual is violent? The scenario posed then was if a neo-Nazi were to attack someone in a bar, due to their clear embrace of a violent ideology, are they committing a terrorist offence? No answer was provided but led to some nuance in how we classified both terrorism and extremism.

We collectively agreed that extremism was the milieu in which individuals express their extremist politics, hateful rhetoric, and motivate themselves. Terrorism is a tactic an extremist milieu can use to further their ideological ambitions. We also agreed that hate speech and hate crimes were also potentially an extremist tactic used to crowdsource extremism.

In response to this distinction between extremism and terrorism was an attempt to further understand the difference between behavioural and cognitive radicalization. Many argued that we must focus on the ideologues that are cognitively radicalized and encourage behavioural radicalization in others. The example brought up was Bin Laden who did not actually commit violence himself against the US, but encouraged and radicalized others to do violence on his behalf.

The second question, "what happens when extremist language is used within politics?" was then put forward. The discussion turned to a recent VoxPol piece that demonstrated political rhetoric is far more permeable across borders than any RWE group currently is. Emphasizing the importance of social media in spreading narratives that are potentially hateful even if they are coming from an official political office. The discussion of social media persisted toward online "echo-chambers" and how algorithms may feed into extremist content being mainlined to individuals. Whereas in the past white supremacists had to seek out other white

supremacists, today, they can google and find someone to affirm their beliefs. It is therefore easier to embrace an extremist ideology today as it requires far less effort to join.

In response to the online extremist milieu was an examination of how right-wing populist rhetoric positions itself in relation to oppositional ideologies. Many on the panel argue that there is a relationship between the rise in right-wing populism and the rise in liberalism (intersectional feminism and other forms of identity politics). Meaning that if historically disenfranchised groups experience a gain in social circumstances, others "must have" lost some social standing. Some on the panel argue this is evident in the attack on Trudeau by the populist right within Canada as he is the antithesis of Trump. This led to the discussion of potentially viewing these often-termed "populist right-wing" political endeavours as a form of "backlash politics", where mobilization is directly related to the success of other causes and/or groups.

Lastly, the panel sought to answer the question of "what polices can we put forward to counter RWE?". To begin, the discussion centred on understanding how preventing violent extremism (PVE) was used to counter Islamist terrorism to see if any practical measures could be adopted for RWE. The main differences between the ideologies were assessed. The most notable is that within Western countries the extreme-right is far closer to mainstream politics than Islamist extremism. It is difficult to label all aspects of the populist right as being problematic, or extreme when it is dominant in many parts of the Western world. Another distinction put forward was the average age difference between Western variants of Islamist-inspired extremists and right-wing extremists. It appears that younger individuals are drawn to Islamist extremism, whereas the typical demographic of RWE is middle-age men. This age differential poses significant barriers to PVE as teachers often play a role in identifying problematic behaviours and notifying officials. However, with an older population embracing right-wing populist movements like the Yellow Vests in Canada, it means signs of radicalization amongst individuals within this demographic will have to be spotted from family members and/or co-workers.

Another issue with identification comes from assessing "vulnerable populations". For instance, when dealing with gangs there are clearer social factors at work motivating people to join. With extremism it is not clear what the socio-economic signs may be, or if there are any at all. This has implications in aiming preventative measures on the individual, their relational environment or society. The main takeaway from this session was in addressing different forms of extremism, there needs to be clear demarcations between police and social workers for instance with the roles of each clearly defined. For outreach and preventive strategies to have credibility, individuals being brought into PVE initiatives must be able to trust the process.