



2019 TSAS Summer Academy

Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, ON

University of Waterloo & Wilfred Laurier University

67 Erb St. W, Waterloo, ON

Report on Sessions and Activities

Chatham House Rule

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TSAS Summer Academy Agenda

Day 1 (July 8) – Terrorism and Security in Canada

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| 8:15 | Registration & Breakfast |
| 8:45 | Welcome from the Acting Director |
| 9-10:15am | Session 1: “History of Terrorism in Canada”,
Dr. Shannon Nash , University of Waterloo
Rapporteur: Kayla Preston - TSAS Junior Affiliate |

This presentation by Dr. Nash focused on five main sub-topics about terrorism in Canada: the “The Evolving Definition of Terrorism”, the “History of Terrorism in Canada” in the past century, “The Terrorism Label”, “Lone Wolves and Canadian Law”, and “The Far Right”.

Dr. Nash argued that the evolving definition of terrorism must be put into historical context. During the French revolution, terrorism was linked to the Reign of Terror, while in 1920 the term terrorism was often linked to mobsters.

To this day, the UN still does not have a common definition for terrorism, however the Canadian criminal code defines terrorist activities as “Carried out for political, religious or ideological purpose objective or cause.” Since this definition became salient in 2001, 55 individuals have been charged in Canada with terrorism.

Throughout Canadian history there are many events that could be labeled as terrorist attacks, such as The Bloody Falls Massacre in 1771 or the Cyrus Hills Massacre in 1873, however these attacks all happened before legal definitions of terrorism was put into place. In the 1960-70s there were two groups within Canada which increased the percentage of terrorism attacks in the nation. The first group was the Sons of Freedom, derived from a militant wing of the Doukhobor Christian sect, and the second was the Front De Liberation Du Quebec, which perpetuated 176 attacks. In the 1980s terrorism in Canada can be seen with the Squamish Five anti-capitalism and anti-nuclear group, and the Air India Bombing implemented in Canada which killed 329 people. In the 2000s after 9/11 Canada experienced 62 terrorist incidents, 44% of which involved no fatalities or substantial damage. Although the risk perception of terrorist activity in Canada was high after the attack of the World Trade Center, terrorism in Canada was actually worse in the 70-80s.

Despite incidents of terrorism in Canada and across the world, the terrorism label is still polarizing. Society itself often rightfully or wrongfully labels individuals or groups as terrorists due to influences such as television and social media that reinforces public opinions. As well, the label of terrorist often only gets applied to the ‘Other’ and not to those who look like dominant societal groups, which is harmful as this has the potential of lumping entire groups of individuals under a label that does not represent them. Ultimately, the label of terrorist ought to be decided by the courts.

Another concept that is hard to define within Canadian law is that of the lone wolf or the lone actor. Anti-terrorism laws in Canada have not been created for actors who act alone as they often highlight the idea of a group being involved in the action. How to label and classify lone actors may become an issue that will be prevalent in Canadian society and courts in the years to come.

Another development in field of terrorism in Canada is how to define Far Right groups. Unlike other groups, the Far Right are often not a coherent movement, therefore their attacks are often not seen as terrorism. However on June 26th 2019 the Liberal government added two Far Right groups to their list of terrorist organizations, these being Blood and Honour and Combat 18. By adding these groups to the list, the government is acknowledging that Far Right groups pose a security risk for Canada. However, there is a difference between being a bigot, committing a hate crime, and being a terrorist, therefore a discussion needs to be had about where Far Right groups fall.

A major part of the discussion after this presentation centered around lone actors and incels (Involuntary celibates). An audience member stated that this may be seen as a new tactic for terrorism. The Presenter stated that when the Canadian law governing terrorism was introduced in 2001, the Internet was new, therefore people at that time did not understand how this medium would be used to radicalize people. This was also linked to a question by another audience member about the overlap between incels and right-wing extremism. This audience member stated that far right groups are still connected, however there is not a lot of literature to define them.

10:45-12pm **Session 2: “National Security & Terrorism Institutional Landscape in Canada”,**

Dr. Stephanie Carvin, Carleton University

Rapporteur: Naomi Pearson, Balsillie School of International Affairs

Dr. Carvin’s session was an important crash course in the ‘who’s who’ and ‘what’s happening’ of Canada’s national security environment. She began by discussing the question: “What is significant in recent national security reforms”? Dr. Carvin took an initial deep dive into the particulars of the CSIS Act. She further highlighted that clandestine foreign influence is a pressing concern for Canada and is a primary concern for CSIS. She argued that national security issues are becoming increasingly connected with non-traditional security areas, such as the economics, trade, migration, cyber-attacks etc. These are all areas which could be vulnerable to foreign influence in the coming election.

Dr. Carvin then delved further into the dangers of foreign influence and the government’s responses by discussing Bill C-59. She outlined the differences between metadata and communications intelligence as per what may be used by the CSE. Thus, how legislation has regulated metadata collection so that national security bodies do not collect unnecessary information about Canadians. She also highlighted the creation of NSICOP or the *National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliament* and the NSIRA or the *National Security and Intelligence Review Agency* – two regulatory and

review bodies designed mitigate the 'grey areas' of national security. In closing Dr. Carvin left the audience with a question:

Given the current political climate; is it likely that Canada will be able to rely on foreign intelligence partners, or should Canada begin to rely on itself and develop a domestic capacity?

12-1 pm Lunch, Sandwiches, drinks and squares - catering by Y Café Caterer (CIGI Campus)

1-1:30pm **7 Min Thesis Presentations and Discussions:**

- Jeff Allan
- Nicholas Todd

1:30-4:30pm **Session 3: "ICONS Simulation: Presidential Commission: Policy Responses to Terrorism"**

Locations:

Boardroom 123; Large seminar room 132; Small meeting rooms 127; and 130

START – National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

For more information: <https://www.icons.umd.edu/education/catalog/presidential-commission-policy-responses-to-terrorism>

Rapporteur: Narjes Hashemi

As Summery academy participants, we participated in an ICONS simulation called "Presidential Commission: Policy Responses to Terrorism". There were nine actors in the simulation which consisted the staff of the members of a blue ribbon commission formed in the aftermath of a fictional massive explosion that shook the portico on the west side of Union Station in Washington, United States.

We each represented the staff of the members of the commission: Peterson (Former US senator from Oregon), Kendrake (Vice Chair), Gruberman (Democratic Party Chair), Saunders (Former Senator from Kentucky), Turnstall (Former DC Delegate in Congress, Williams-Ballan (Dean of NYU law, lawyer), Blake (Counsel on Kissinger's National Security) and Harold (Chair of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee). Our roles were to work together to provide a recommendation to the chair, identifying: 1) witnesses to call, and 2) key questions for the commission to investigate.

We pursued our actor's goals through interactions and negotiation with other teams in the online Simulation Community, called ICONSnet. Within this online interface, we used messaging features to communicate with other actors. Each group had an agenda (role sheet) to guide them through their decision making. When each group was developing a strategy, many groups had a hard time navigating their actor's positions, interests, and knowing who their allies were. For me personally, it was hard to distance my personal preferences from the actor or the team I was presenting.

We spent a lot of time discussing the preliminary witness list. Peterson's group, which was chair was overwhelmed with the many tasks that they had to do, since they had to deal with all the proposed witnesses from different groups as well as outside sources such as the Media.

Overall, it was an interesting experience to get a first hand exposure to the responses to a fictional terror attack. It was also very eye-opening to see how the questions that groups came up with were inter-related, and how many sources can affect preventing a terrorist act. For example questions such as "How were prisoners evaluated prior to release? To determine level of risk (e.g., empirically-based risk assessment? psychometric properties of the risk assessment tool used, etc.)" was directed at the Law Enforcement or "What prevention and/or intervention measures were in place in al Nasr and Azani's community? (For example: in school, in religious institutions, public health authority)"

4:30-5:00pm Simulation Debrief

6:15pm **Conference Dinner @ Proof Restaurant and Lounge,**

110 Erb Street West (Delta Hotel, across the street from Balsillie School).

(NOTE: All meal/food costs are covered with registration fee, however ALL beverage costs are the responsibility of the individual.)

Day 2 (July 9) – State of the Art of Research

8:30 Coffee and light Breakfast

9:00-10:30 **Session 1: “Gender & Terrorism”**

Dr. Tanya Narozhna, Political Science, University of Winnipeg.

Rapporteur: Nico Saunders, Balsillie School of International Affairs

The topic of gender and terrorism tends to get overlooked in interdisciplinary conversations. However, discussing terrorism without discussing the many feminist perspectives would be an incomplete discussion.

All feminist approaches agree that sex and gender matter, however they do not agree on which ways it matters. The central categories of sex and gender shape this discussion:

- Sex: biological, men and women
- Gender: set of socially constructed norms, how they should be, and how they should behave (masculine and feminine).

Masculinity is associated with strength, aggression, assertiveness, rationality, whereas femininity is associated with weakness, lack of power, emotional. It is important to note that individual men and women may not embody these characteristics. For example, men can be emotional and not aggressive, and therefore there is more diversity that individuals capture. The feminist perspectives disagree on the nature of the relationship of sex and gender. The three feminist perspectives Narozhna discussed are:

Essentialist perspectives determine that there is a direct relationship between sex and gender. Your body determines significant aspects of your personality. For example, if you are born male, you will be more assertive. Therefore, essentialists determine that these behaviours reside in individual bodies, and characteristics and behavior are essential to the type of the body. This perspective then derives gender from sex.

Feminist Constructivism perspectives view sex as a biological marker of identity, but behavior is socially constructed. Individuals are born male or female, but there is no necessary or essential way that biology determines your behaviour. Instead, society's norms of men and women, are learned behaviours (for example, girls like pink and play with dolls). It is also learned that there are penalties for going against these social norms. Therefore there is no deterministic link between sex and behaviour; female bodies can have 'masculine' behaviours.

Post-Structuralist perspectives do not see the body as having any meaning prior to the discourse of gender (collapse sex into gender). We identify different bodies as males or females, due to being differently shaped. This is done either formally or informally (such as what is worn) to reaffirm the identity.

Where are the women in terrorism?

Women are underrepresented in terrorism studies. When we speak of terrorists, the subjects are usually men. When we talk about female terrorists, we point out to the exceptional status of females in terrorism.

Women's involvement in terrorist activities is not new, however the number involved was smaller and women generally carried out supportive activities such as providing safe houses, cleaning, and nursing. These women's activities varied very little from their daily activities outside of terrorism. These were backstage activities and made invisible.

Left wing organizations are more suited ideologically for feminists, but very little evidence that gender reform has taken place in these left wing organizations. Although women's roles in terrorism have diversified, with more activity involved

in traditional “male” roles, such as serving in combat, and recruiting. Female recruiters are rare, but important, such as ["the black Fatima"](#).

Women’s roles in the second half of the 20th century have expanded to include traditional male roles, such as greater involvement in executing violence. The first female suicide bomber was in 1985, and since then there have been over 300 female suicide bombers. Despite the amount and function of women in terrorism has expanded, the failure to acknowledge women persists. Therefore there is a lack of visibility of women in terrorism, and their involvement within organizations.

Feminist warrior discourses romanticize women to make them misfits in their societies, arguing that women are overburdened by personal problems, sexual violence etc. This is explained in domestic and maternal languages. What this suggests is that terrorism is not an intentional or political goal, and instead they are duped by men.

Gender relations within terrorist organizations

Women are increasingly incorporated into the ranks of terrorist organizations. There are strategic advantages to recruiting women. Terrorist organizations are able to adapt their internal structure, which is essential for the survival of these organizations. These organizations are very aware of the gender stereotypes, and able to exploit these stereotypes.

Human bombs for example are inexpensive, but effective in gaining publicity, and support from sympathetic community. These tactics can inspire new recruits, with greater ‘benefits’ when women are involved. Women can recruit other women, but also shame men into recruitment. Female suicide bombers also attract disproportionate media attention.

These organizations still cultivate deeply gendered environments, which benefit male members more than female members. There is higher status for men, in-group sexism. In jihad, women’s role is to give birth to the next generation. In left wing organizations, there is still maintenance of gender hierarchy through internal structures.

The gender dynamics of terrorist attacks overlooks women as perpetrators. The gendered impact of terrorist attacks disproportionately positions women as victims (such as civilians in markets).

Discussion

Question 1: *Is there a difference in the media reports of suicide bombers vs. other modalities of attack?*

Response:

The difference tends to be political. Western media generally sides with state counter terrorism policies. Some suicide bombers may leave testimonials behind, however these need to be questioned, as they are generally prepared by the organization and not by the bomber.

Question 2: *Do we know the marital status of the suicide bombers?*

Response:

As we don’t have access to ‘successful’ suicide bombers, it is very difficult to determine, as most jihad women remain unidentified. There is a huge variance in the age of bombers (from 8 years to over 70 years old), and vary in their marital status from what we have established. From what we know right now, there is no clear pattern or correlation that can be established, or the impact that may have had on their decision.

Question 3 *“Do we know anything about a trans, non-binary approach to gender and terrorism”?*

Response:

Post structuralists would reject the binary, and instead look at the discourses of gender, our understandings, actions, interactions, responses. However, Dr. Narozhna has not seen any research on non-binary approaches to gender in terrorism studies.

Question 4: Within Canada, how much involvement have women had in suicide bombing?

Response:

There have been women from Canada who have attempted to travel to Syria, or who have been intersected. Unless they are unidentified, we haven't had a Canadian woman suicide bomber.

10:30-10:45 Break

10:45-12:00 **Session 2: "Far-Right Extremism",**

Dr. Barbara Perry, Director, Centre on Hate, Bias and Extremism, OntarioTech University

Rapporteur: Sadaf Mirzahi (TSAS Junior Affiliate)

Barbara Perry defines contemporary right-wing extremism as a loose movement, animated by a racially, ethnically, and sexually defined nationalism. Perry suggests that this nationalism is framed in terms of White power, and is grounded in xenophobic and exclusionary understandings of the perceived threats posed by such groups as non-Whites, Jews, homosexuals, feminists, and immigrants. The targets of right-wing extremist violence vary according to their geographic locations, but predominantly include Muslims, Jews, people of colour, feminists, women, and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer communities.

Perry argues that although the media and public prefer to blame Donald Trump, in the Canadian context, there has existed a long history of conflict of religious accommodations. The prevalent anti-Muslim sentiment predates Trump's presidency. Furthermore, throughout the Canadian political history, numerous political candidates have expressed anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and transphobic sentiments.

Moreover, the practices of influential political and public figures, which stigmatize or marginalize traditionally oppressed groups, legitimate parallel sentiments elsewhere, including among right-wing extremist groups. Statistics indicate an increase in hate crimes against minority groups in Canada. Perry reports that 33% of Canadians indicate they feel freer to publicly express their views of other races and ethnicities. Meanwhile 25% of Canadians believe that being prejudiced against Muslims has become more acceptable since 2014 while another 15% feel similarly about anti-Semitism. 46% of Canadians oppose immigration and another 41% believe that there are far too many visible minorities immigrating to Canada. Finally, 37% of Canadians believe that immigration is a threat to "White Canadians".

Perry has gathered data showing that there are at least 100 active right-wing extremist groups in Canada in recent years, and they are responsible for over 120 violent incidents directed at minority groups since the 1980s. These attacks range from homicides to threats to assaults. Right-wing extremists are willing to assume both an offensive and defensive stance, and the purpose of these attacks was, and continues to be, to preserve their heritage and homeland.

The far right is largely composed of: skinheads, Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, lone actors, anti-authority groups and individuals, and the alt-right. Some of the more infamous right-wing groups in Canada include: Proud Boys, Blood and Honour, Wolves/Soldiers of Odin, La Meute, PEGIDA, Yellow Vesters, and Three Percenters. Additionally, Perry notes that there is an increasing tendency to collaborate, decrease the infighting and conflict between groups, and attempt to create solidarity across groups. Along with coalition building, Perry observes three other emerging trends in right-wing extremism, which includes an increase in members (new chapters and new groups), a demographic shift (older, more educated, and well employed members), and firearms and combat training.

Perry provides seven recommendations for countering violent extremism: 1) raising the public's awareness of the issue; 2) identifying and countering extremist content available on the internet; 3) diverting individuals from getting involved; 4) fragmenting the movement; 5) managing threats to public order; 6) compelling public agencies, not only law enforcement, but policy makers, and government officials and employees, to act; and 7) supporting and empowering victims of right-wing extremism.

12:00-1:30

Networking Lunch

Available locations: Multipurpose room 142; Large seminar room 132; Small meeting room 127; and Small meeting room 130; Courtyard (weather permitting);

Lunch: Sandwich & Salads; catered by Fat Sparrow Catering, Waterloo, ON

1:30-2:15pm

7 Min Thesis Presentations and Discussions:

- Helal Dhali
- Naomi Zakimi
- Sara Doering

Rapporteur: Fatih Karakus, Doctoral Student at the UOIT Faculty of Social Science and

Presenter 1: Helal Dhali, Doctoral Student at McGill University Faculty of Education

Helal's presentation is titled "Gender differences in the youth perceptions of extremism in Bangladesh: Exploring the role of education." The main research question of this research is, "how does the secondary level of education shape youth perceptions of extremism in Bangladesh?" Other questions to be answered were, "which ideologies influenced them most in developing their perceptions of extremism, is there a difference in the perceptions of extremism between the genders, and what are the elements in the curriculum, the pedagogy, and the learning environment of the K-12 education in Bangladesh that contribute to their perceptions of extremism? The objective of the research is to create an analytical framework to understand the features of extremism and to provide recommendations for the education sector. Othering, dominance, resistance in the colonial discourses, and post-colonial theories are used as a theoretical framework for this study. As part of the methodology, embedded-exploratory-sequential quasi-mixed methods research framework is adopted. Content analysis of the textbooks will be conducted. The research is trying to answer the question that is there any difference in men and women in perceiving extremism.

Presenter 2: Naomi Zakimi, MA Student at Simon Fraser University School of Criminology

Naomi's Presentation is titled "Right-wing extremism on Reddit: Measuring hate speech in Canadian subreddits." She identified her research objective as identifying hate speech and counter hate speech in Canadian subreddits. To this end, qualitative content analysis is being conducted. The research is measuring hate speech and unfavorable comments against immigrants using stance, target, and severity. It is still in the preliminary stages. Therefore, all the results are not available yet. In terms of stance, three breakdowns are being favorable, unfavorable, and neutral. She also noted that unfavorable posts are not necessarily hate speech at all. She also added that they measure anti-immigrant sentiment at this stage. For "severity," they did not find violent content.

Presenter 3: Sara Doering, MA Student at Simon Fraser University School of Criminology

The title of Sara's research is "Exploring the Covariates of Domestic Terrorism in Canada: A Model of Provincial Variation in Terrorist Incidents." The objective of the study is to understand the structural-level factors associated with terrorism in Canada informed largely by social disorganization theory. For this research, a comprehensive dataset of terrorist incidents occurred in Canada between 1961-2016 was created using secondary sources, including the CIDB, GTD, and online news sources. The unit of analysis is the provinces. Findings suggest that across all models, annual changes in immigration rates were not associated with terrorism. Again, across all models, increases in extremism were associated with a significantly higher likelihood of terrorism occurring. Previous research suggests that measures of population heterogeneity are associated with higher levels of terrorism. However, this research indicates that as far as Canada is concerned, measures of population heterogeneity are likely not relevant to the macro-level study of terrorism in Canada, which constitutes a distinction between Canada and other Western nations. This research also indicates that the social disorganization perspective is useful in understanding the macro-level factors associated with terrorism in Canada.

2:15-3:30

Session 3: "The Toronto 18 & its Legacy",

Dr. Amarnath Amarasingam, Queen's University

Rapporteur: Andrew Jones, University of Toronto

The Toronto 18 was a group of 14 adults and 4 youth who were the first Jihadist terrorist cell to be arrested in Canada in 2006. After being released those who were incarcerated face mixed responses from the Muslim community, some assisting them into being released into the community while others are apprehensive.

Many Jihadists who were born or raised in Canada faced an identity conflict between their Islamic cultural background and the secular Canadian society. This identity conflict often leads to trying to prove one's identity, through reading religious texts or volunteering in the community. As a young person, political awareness is valued and praised, but if pushed in a radical direction can become harmful. In the early 2000s, the Muslim community was not aware of the process of radicalization and at times provided ambiguous messaging. By now, this is not the case; most Mosques are aware of this problem and can try to stop radicalization.

The Toronto 18 was prior to the social media radicalization process and therefore, a difficult process. Even though the term Toronto 18 was the name of the group, it was not a uniform or collective group as the press imagined. As with many radicalization projects, they appear to radicalization is simultaneously capitalizing on the alienation/allegiance one feels from the state/community and the emotional appeal to the desire to feel included so that they can make a difference. This is made worse when a young person is surrounded by like-minded people who also feel marginalized or rejected. A lot of the radicalization process is about role-playing; one seeks to personify the role. The reality of the radicalization process is often a shock to those who are unaware of the severity of their actions. Radicalization is not a foreign threat but rather a domestic issue. A Canadian who is arrested for terrorism is often viewed as a foreign fighter even though they are Canadian.

Without deprogramming and deradicalization techniques and programs, individuals risk becoming further radicalized. Deradicalization requires empathy and trust. It also requires an immanent critique of one's radical views. Even after being deradicalized, people are still burdened and aware of their radicalized past. One of the typical pressures for those who were at one time terrorists is to continue studying and working in the field, albeit on the counter-terrorism side.

3:30-4:00 Break

4:00-5:15 **Session 4: "Social Media and Big Data",**

Dr. Benjamin Ducol, Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV)

Rapporteur: Naomi Zakimi, Simon Fraser University (Criminology MA student)

In this session, Dr. Benjamin Ducol presented on the work he does as a research manager at the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) and, specifically, on the role of the Internet on radicalization. The CPRLV was founded in March 2015 by the City of Montreal as a non-profit organization with the objective of preventing radicalization leading to violence. It is comprised by a research team, a partnership and community engagement team, a training and skill development team, and a case management and social reintegration team.

Dr. Ducol proposed that we must go "beyond [the] clichés and misconceptions" that surround radicalization. Mere exposure to extremist content does not necessarily lead to violence; the extremist messages must resonate with the target audience for them to work. As well, the Internet should not be thought of as a dichotomy (the real world vs. the virtual world). It is a constant in our lives, and it cannot be separated.

Dr. Ducol explained that there are two dimensions of violent extremism: the supply of extremist narratives and the demand by individuals who feel that the narratives resonate with them. In terms of supply, the digital era has changed the volume, ubiquity, diversity, and individualization of narratives. Narratives can be promoted across many different types of social media platforms, which make it easier for most people to find a narrative that resonates with them. In terms of demand, people sometimes self-expose to violent extremist content out of curiosity, in search of answers,

seeking validation for their preconceived beliefs, and when looking for alternative sources of information. However, people can also be exposed through friends, family, or trusted “brokers.”

Dr. Ducol highlighted the importance of resonance in violent extremist narratives. Simply having a supply and a demand is not sufficient. Narratives must resonate with a certain audience for them to be effective. Finding confirmation for preconceived ideas leads to cognitive rewards; people feel rewarded by seeing their opinions validated. He explained that it is healthy to be surrounded by competitive narratives, but online spaces often lead to confirmation bias when they only show us content that aligns with our beliefs.

There are a number of measures to prevent and counter violent extremism in the digital era. The government and society use counter-measures such as filtering, censoring, and criminalizing extremist content. Community members also engage in cyber-vigilantism, provide digital literacy education, and create counter-narrative campaigns online. However, implementing countermeasures can be challenging. Censoring content will often not eliminate it; it will simply move platforms. Concerns over freedom of expression can also limit such measures. Counter-narratives must be presented by a credible organization; government campaigns may not be seen as credible by those who are radicalized. Counter-speech can also be simplistic and moralistic, reducing its effectiveness. With these obstacles in mind, counter-measures can be designed to better prevent and counter radicalization in the digital era.

5:15-8pm Dinner break: On your own

8-9:30pm **Movie night “Air India 182” (Dir. Sturla Gunnarsson)**

*****To enter Balsillie School after hours use the front door off of Erb St. W.**

Snacks provided.

Location: Tiered Classroom 1-43

Day 3 (July 10) – Global and Local Community Perspectives

8:30 Coffee and light Breakfast

9-10:15am **Session 1: “Air India Victims Association,”**

Susheel Gupta, LLB. Location: Tiered Classroom 1-42

Rapporteur: Renee Bencic, MSc Forensic Psychology, UOIT

This presentation, “Trust, Confidence and Respect: One Experience of a Victim of Terrorism” solely reflected the opinion and personal experience of the presenter, Susheel Gupta, and not of his current or former employers, the government, or any other agencies to which he is affiliated.

The presenter recounted his personal experience of losing his mother to the Air India Flight 182 bombing on June 23, 1985. The overarching themes of the presentation were to (1) describe the inadequate support that the Canadian families of the Air India victims experienced by the Canadian government in the weeks and decades following the bombing; (2) highlight the invaluable role victims of terrorism can, and should play in helping to prevent, prepare for, and deal with terrorism; (3) the importance of expanding the definition of “victims” within the context of terrorism; (4) provide notable examples of the victim advocacy work performed by the Air India Victims Association and offer additional recommendations.

Following the Air India Flight 182 bombing on June 23, 1985, the presenter felt the Canadian government did an inadequate job of attempting to prevent the attack, properly investigate the attack, and treat the families of the victims with dignity and respect. This resulted in myriad issues for the families of the victims of the bombing (e.g., chronic re-victimization, post-traumatic stress disorder, physical illness).

Invaluable Role of Victims of Terrorism

Victims can provide value to our broader understanding of terrorism in several ways. Three specific benefits were discussed:

- i. Victims can **offer unique, first-hand experience** and expertise that would otherwise be inaccessible and therefore better informs our understanding and efforts to address terrorism
- ii. Victims **share common goals** and mandates with others working to address counter-terrorism and security issues and therefore contribute to a multi-disciplinary approach, which is necessary when addressing the topic of terrorism
- iii. Victims can **reinforce the credibility** of the work done by those working in the counter-terrorism and security realm and can therefore increase the public’s confidence and support for such work

Broadening the Definition of “Victims” of Terrorism

According to the *Circles of Impact model*, the definition of a “victim” should be expanded to include individuals and groups of individuals beyond the immediate victims of a terrorist event:

- i. **Individuals present during the attack** – at a micro level, victims are the individuals that have been directly victimized by an attack
- ii. **Family, peers, and loved ones** – victims are individuals in the immediate social network of individuals that have been directly victimized by an attack
- iii. **First responders** – at a meso level, victims are individuals that have been formally employed as a first responder during or following an attack
- iv. **Local community and wider population** – at a macrolevel, the larger community or societal network in which a direct victim is embedded within is consequently also victimized.

Despite increasing efforts to improve victim support services and the role of victims in counter-terrorism and security initiatives, more must be done. Below is a list of victim advocacy work that has been performed by the Air India Victims Association or that must be performed:

- Resource portal for best practices for victim support strategies
- Extensive list of country-specific victim support services
- Ensure victim needs are incorporated into emergency response plans
- Comprehensive training for victim support professionals
- More inclusive definitions of “victim”
- “Remember to be human above all else” – Susheel Gupta
- Multidisciplinary agency approach is required (e.g., psychologist, social worker, community worker, physician, government officials)
- Kanishka Project, Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime, INVICTIM (International Network Supporting Victims of Terrorism and Mass Violence)

“I ask you take a moment to remember...the victims... and let them live a bit longer in your hearts.” – Susheel Gupta

10:15-10:30am Morning Break

10:30-12 pm **Session 2: “Toronto Police Service”,**

Sgt Brian Smith, Toronto Police Service

Rapporteur: Nick Todd, Simon Fraser University.

Brian Smith explained the Focus model with Toronto Police. This program takes in clients who have been brought to the FOCUS table by any one of the agencies who are part of the table. The table is a meeting area for partner agencies. The client must have been identified as having an acutely elevated risk of some kind. Once individuals are identified, the group discusses strategy to help the person and connect them with services. This can include approaching in person with members of the partner agencies.

Toronto has four tables that meet regularly. Going forward the new Ontario Police Service Act has identified that every municipality shall have these tables available. The tables look at all risks, this includes Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). On the CVE side, Toronto police has been the lead agency in Toronto since the inception. Unlike other community agencies, police have a statutory duty to act.

The initial FOCUS model was not developed for terrorism or P/CVE. The FOCUS program already had partners at the table and had to be delicate with the agencies and partners at the table who were not accustomed to working in this space. The goal of the police is to bring information forward to the agencies so they know to recognize cases to be brought forward for CVE. They want to make partners comfortable with the CVE topic.

In Prevention and Counter Violent Extremism (P/CVE), the Police are getting calls for help, from parents or other concerned members of the public. When the program needs to be involved is when there is reasonable concern that a person is on a pathway to violence, in order to prevent them from that pathway to violence. The goal when bringing a CVE case to the table is to treat it the same as all other situations, and not to deviate from strategies or protocols. If it becomes a criminal investigation of terrorism, they will engage with RCMP-INSET. If the matter is one of de-escalation can go to the table.

12-1:45pm **Movie Lunch: “White Right” (Dir. Deeyah Khan)**

Location: Tiered Classroom 1-43

Lunch catered by: Arabesque Café, Kitchener

1:45-3pm

Session 3: “Constructing Counter-Narratives”,

Ms. Lilah ElSayed, Hedayah

Rapporteur: Brianna Puigmarti, MA Wilfrid Laurier University

The Hedayah centre is the first international centre for countering violent extremism. ElSayed first joined the centre by doing some translation work, before eventually moving on to work for the research and analysis department. The vision for the Hedayah centre focuses on decreasing the risk of radicalization through evidence-based and effective intervention. It remains strategically significant due to its international approach, its capacity building and apolitical alignment. The work of Lilah ElSayed with Hedayah has been focused on creating counter narratives for media and in person CVE programs. There are 9 major steps Hedayah uses to create and assess a counter narrative strategy.

Step 1 is to understand and assess the push/pull factors to explain why people adopt a pathway towards radicalization. Push factors are the environment conducive to radicalization ie. lacking purpose, belonging and identity. Pull factors are personal incentives that attract someone to radicalization ie. online propaganda and charismatic leadership. Some examples of counter narratives would be to address and reply to narrow interpretations of scriptures by ISIS.

Step 2 is to identify the target audience for the campaign. In other words, who is the material aimed towards? These audiences could include general, key influencers (family, teachers), sympathizers, and justifiers. Steps 3 and 4 identify the narratives for the violent extremists, as well as set goals and objectives for countering said narrative. It was asked whether the centre’s association with countries like the UAE, limit its ability for effective outreach. Hedayah’s goal is to help these individuals develop their own discourse, within the context of their own country.

Step 5 determines the messenger who will be most effective in carrying the counter narrative. In two case study videos of Christianne Boudreau, we saw this counter narrative at work. The deliberate choice to use a mother’s story for outreach appeals to both the general audience and those in an influencing position, like families of those becoming radicalized.

Step 6 is to develop content and a logic for the message. This includes how to create a positive alternative, as well as choices of whether to expose myths and misinformation, use humour or satire, and address the political/ideological underpinnings for the narrative. This step is important because it is the actual method and content that creates the counternarrative.

Step 7 and 8 determine the medium and strategy for dissemination of the message, including t.v, social media, art, and in what language and timing. The logistical decisions could have an influence on the effectiveness of the campaign and how much outreach/ publicity it receives.

The last step is to evaluate the impact of the counternarrative, including how it was received, did it reach the target audience, and are there feedback for more funding opportunities. All of these considerations allow for evaluating the intentional choices made throughout the counternarrative campaign.

3-3:30pm

Break

4-5:15pm

Session 4: “Islamic Information Society of Calgary”,

Navaid Aziz

Rapporteur: Jeff Allan

Imam Navaid Aziz prefaced his talk on radicalization in the post-Toronto 18 era by saying that his experiences with young worshippers at the Eighth & Eighth Mosque in Calgary were the “accumulation of a series of events that went wrong.” Shortly after he moved to Calgary from Montreal in April 2012, Imam Aziz learned that two other imams in the

community had resigned. Acknowledging that there was “bad rhetoric” in the community when he took over in September 2012, the imam expressed regret for failing to determine why his two predecessors had quit.

He described the 8th and 8th mosque in the downtown area. Situated a short distance from the University of Calgary, the Southern Alberta Institute of Technology (SAIT) and Mount Royal University Imam Aziz said that many, English-speaking young worshippers were attracted to the congregation.

During a key segment of his presentation, Imam Aziz focussed on the clusters of young male worshippers at the mosque who had become radicalized. The imam contended that all five of the young men in the first cluster had experienced “push/pull” factors which led to their radicalization. But there were others in the mosque, he cautioned, who were outliers and who did not fit the typical profile of a radicalized individual.

Aziz claimed that there were young men in this cluster who never travelled abroad. He maintained that one particularly charismatic person had acted as a catalyst for the five others but had been prevented from flying overseas. Another had flown as far as Turkey before he was stopped by local authorities and returned to Canada.

Imam Aziz then described a second cluster of young men in Calgary which included Tamim Chowdhury, a young man who was later implicated in a terrorist attack that killed more than twenty people at a cafe in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The imam said that he had observed a drastic change in Chowdhury’s behaviour from the time when he had first met him in Windsor.

At this point the imam recounted his initial associations with law enforcement. When CSIS first began showing up at his door, Aziz admitted that he was probably “in denial”, believing that if he ignored the problem of the young men that it would likely go away. This was not the case and was due partly to the fact that he experienced yet another case of radicalization while serving as the Muslim chaplain at SAIT, the Southern Alberta Institute of Technology. While at the college, Imam Aziz met Somali-Canadian Farah Mohammed Sheridan, a young delinquent and self-confessed petty-thief who came to him for help. When the imam returned from a three-week trip to Malaysia the imam found that Sheridan had become a totally different person. The young man began making references to “jihad”. Fearing a backlash from the Muslim community for talking about jihad with the young man, the imam decided to “leave the matter alone”, but Sheridan became further radicalized, and left Canada for overseas in spring 2013, eventually joining ISIS.

Highlighting the impact of the “Sheridon case” on his personal life, the imam detailed his subsequent experiences with law enforcement, the media and the Muslim community in Calgary. Confirming that members of Sheridan’s family had erroneously accused him of radicalizing the young man, Imam Aziz averred reluctantly that when people like Sheridan do not want to help themselves, nothing can be done for them.

He recounted how his connection to the Sheridan case complicated his travels at the time and cited several incidents with border officials both in Canada and abroad. Angered and frustrated, he began to meet weekly with members of CSIS, the RCMP and the Calgary police and these encounters had a “positive effect.” In time, all three services attested to his good character and eventually, he became the RCMP’s first Muslim chaplain.

Remarking on the intrusiveness of the media, the imam recounted how one reporter had actually staked out the 8th & 8th mosque. Noting that a number of media reports on the mosque’s closure were sensationalist, Imam Aziz added that law enforcement had given incorrect information to the press in some instances. He praised journalists Dylan Robertson of the Calgary Herald and Nadim Roberts of the Walrus whose fair reporting, he maintained, helped the community to bounce back from the controversy.

Still, in light of the sensationalist allegations circulated by some media outlets, many congregants demanded that Imam Aziz respond. With attendance at the 8th & 8th mosque dwindling and donations from congregants falling, Imam Aziz feared for his job. In spite of the relocation challenges that congregants faced when the lease for the 8th & 8th mosque expired, the imam stressed that within six months they had managed to raise nearly two million dollars for the new location. In the end, the congregation’s example helped to rebuild trust in the Muslim community.

As time passed, the imam grew increasingly aware of hate speech in the community and discovered other clusters of young men who were vulnerable to radicalization. Setting up a mentoring group, he concluded, would not only help him to connect with these young men, but also allay their fears of being targeted. Imam Aziz devised a list of life coaching activities for them based on the following themes: certainty, adventure, love, recognition, continuity and growth. The list of activities, all of which were life-changing, included: volunteer opportunities at a drop-in centre and a senior citizens home, organizing blood drives at the mosque, public speaking engagements, creating educational opportunities and organizing social activities to raise their awareness.

Since Farah Mohammed Sheridan had shown a strong interest for public speaking, he believed the others would too. One strategy for connecting with the young men, the imam believed, was to have discussions with them that were “not out of the ordinary.” The volunteering taught them lessons about gratitude, unconditional love, recognition and helped them with bonding. Infused with the biographies of prophetic figures such as Nelson Mandela, Malcolm X, Muhammad Ali, the public speaking engagements gave them ideas for themes in sermons and familiarized them with spirituality and contemporary issues.

During the educational segment of the group’s activities the young men explored theological concepts from the Koran. To develop their critical thinking and moral compasses, they studied the hadiths based on the “attainment of the objective” as cited in the “Bulugh al-Maram”. To promote “spiritual engagement” they read Islamic scholars’ works on morals and manners, studied the concept of jihad and looked at the khalifa which deals with dignity and justice.

With respect to their religious counselling, the imam had a single rule: never attempt to convert. Rather, he posed simple questions to them instead of confronting their beliefs directly. He helped the young men to improve their understanding of Islam by reviewing prophetic traditions. On the question of “jihad”, which is often distorted by extremists who quote inaccurately from the Koran, he showed them verses which stress the intellectual and spiritual aspects of jihad rather than the physical. He questioned the extremists’ contention that Muslims must “live as heroes and die as martyrs”. Imam Aziz suggested other, more personal ways for the young men to practice jihad. One of its highest forms, they later learned, was speaking simple truths in the face of tyrannical leaders. They discovered that serving their parents and sharing the word of God who is superior, were also examples of jihad.

Similarly, the imam advised the young men to read theological texts which cast doubt on extremists’ claims that as Muslims, they had a duty to “strive diligently in order to avoid yielding to the disbelievers”. More importantly, the imam called into question the extremists’ interpretation of “takfir” which allows a Muslim to excommunicate another and declare that individual a non-believer. The imam also felt that addressing the idea of loyalty or “al wala al bara” was key for the young men because in his view, extremists misrepresent this concept deliberately in order to maintain group loyalty. Aziz stressed that building trust with the young men was a key objective. He emphasized that the process had to be a natural progression. In order to achieve this, he had to “break through a layer of thinking in their heads.” In conclusion, the imam observed that some activities that he had scheduled for the young men worked while others did not. Successful counselling in his mind, meant that he had: 1) gained their trust, 2) looked at troubling behaviours, 3) addressed numerous topics for discussion, 4) made them realize they were making progress in life, 5) encouraged them to feel that they were part of a greater community and 6) made them understand that they were making a contribution.

According to the imam, one of the greatest challenges was keeping his commitment to the young men. This meant that he had to make himself available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Imam Aziz continues to believe that no single program is perfect for everyone and that each program must be tailored to the needs of the group’s members. As of mid-2018, he felt that none of the young men had exhibited troubling behaviours since his original intervention with them.

Evening: Free



Day 4 (July 11) – Government Perspectives

8:30 am Coffee and light Breakfast

9:00-10 am **Session 1: “Royal Canadian Mounted Police, (RCMP)”**

Location: Tiered Classroom 1-42

Session 1: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Brittany McBain and Christina Galecki

Rapporteur: Simon Gonsalves, TSAS Junior Affiliate

As Canada’s Federal policing service and domestic investigative service, part of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) organizational mandate is to prevent, detect, and investigate some of the most serious criminal activity undertaken within the borders of Canada. As the primary investigative agency for “criminal offences arising out of conduct that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada,” crimes with national security implications are taken with extreme seriousness. Accordingly, the RCMP devotes significant resources and personnel to this important portfolio.

Criminal intelligence analysts for the RCMP work to provide actionable evidence for RCMP investigations paramount to the safety of the Canadian public. Embedded into active RCMP led teams in major urban centres, local police services, and other government branches, criminal analysts work to counter principal threats to Canada and Canadian interests. This mandate poses unique challenges. The dynamic nature of the contemporary threat environment, high level of commitment among perpetrators, the international nature of activities/targets, limits to the release and dissemination of sensitive information, as well as high media and political scrutiny, can severely complicate the work of investigators working on national security cases.

The RCMP’s governance model was discussed in depth. This approach, functioning as intended, ensures that relevant information is shared internally, big picture trends are identified, top officials are properly informed, and individual liberties are respected. RCMP headquarters, in Ottawa, is critical in ensuring the organization works effectively and ethically. Besides monitoring RCMP national security investigations, leadership disseminates guidance, taskings, and directions to investigative teams. Alongside the directive role, verifying units are compliant with ministerial directives and policies is another central role played by Ottawa.

National security files vary greatly, ranging from terrorism (defined as the threat/use of serious violence for political/religious/ideological reasons), all the way to foreign espionage investigations. Counter terrorism remains the top priority, as individuals/groups inspired by violent ideology (such as Al-Qaida and ISIS) are still exceptionally dangerous. Terrorism is not territorially limited. Cases often involve High Risk travelers (HRT), High Risk Returnees (HRR), as well as homegrown violent extremist plots. The nature of the threat is in flux, and will remain so, as the collapse of the caliphate will have significant repercussions. While the estimated number of total citizens abroad is less than two hundred, sixty have returned. However, only a few are from core ISIS operational areas in Iraq and Syria. While the number of HRTs has gone down since its peak in 2013-2015, Canadian citizens continue to be involved in major attacks overseas. While the involvement of Canadians in international terrorism is not new, Canada has an obligation to work to mitigate the threat of terrorism.

Threats abroad can quickly become attacks at home. The current threat environment worldwide, affects Canadians as well as the national interests. Canadians can be killed abroad in acts of terrorist violence, and domestic attacks remain very possible. Many domestic terrorist threats are basic missions by lone actors. However, major public safety incidents are not necessarily terrorism (aka Danforth/Yonge St. Van attack) but can still be assessed for terrorism nexus. Significant technological developments and trends are making investigations increasingly difficult, as new communication apps increasingly allow suspects to “going dark” and avoid government monitoring. The session

concluded with the presenters noting that the department is now more actively recruiting analysts from outside of government – a salient change for any recent public policy graduate.

10:00-10:45am **7 Min Thesis Presentations and Discussions:**

- Goksel Demir
- Andrew Jones
- Simon Gonsalves

11:00-12pm **Session 2: “Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, (CSIS)”**

Dawn Parks, Deputy Director, Counter-Terrorism

Rapporteur: Sara Doering, M.A. Student, Simon Fraser University

The primary focus of the session was to address some of the national security issues and challenges in operating an intelligence organization. Specifically, Dawn Parks outlined the role of the Canadian Security intelligence Service (CSIS), the terrorist landscape in Canada, as well as current issues and themes in countering extremism. Under the CSIS act, the primary function of the organization is to “collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the *extent that it is strictly necessary*, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on *reasonable grounds* be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and, in relation thereto, shall report to and advise the Government of Canada” (italics emphasized by presenter). What constitutes a “threat to the security of Canada” is outlined under sections 2 A-C of the CSIS Act and includes actions that are against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada including (a) espionage or sabotage, (b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada (ex: illegal funding, coercion, using social media to shape a false narrative) and (c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state.

The primary threat to the safety of Canada is terrorism, and resources are being directed towards countering espionage and cyber attacks. The objectives of countering extremism by CSIS include: detecting and countering extremism, preventing the export of terrorism from Canada to other countries, and contributing to broader global efforts to counter extremism of all ideological types, yet the majority of resources are being utilized to address the threat of jihadi extremism.

Albeit small in comparison to other countries, a current issue being faced by CSIS is that of **returnees, detainees and families**. Despite many Canadian travellers having no desire to return to Canada, challenges emerge when needing to gather evidence that is admissible within Canadian courts regarding returnees. Additionally, around 25% of Canadian travellers are women, who often become extremely effective recruiters. Child returnees are also a potential threat if indoctrinated.

Additionally, **technology** is a prevalent security issue, namely the speed of production and professionalism of extremist propaganda. The sheer volume of content produced (ex: Daesh published 40,000 tweets in one day) makes this content easily accessible over the internet. Additionally, the use of cryptocurrency by extremists is a current issue.

The emerging prevalence of **inspired and enabled attacks** is another concern presently being faced by CSIS. Specifically, many individuals are becoming radicalized that have no connections to a formal group, and often perpetrate low-tech attacks involving knives and vehicles which make detection and prevention extremely challenging and requires significant resources.

The **rise in non-jihadist extremism** is also a prevalent security issue. The issues of gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, immigration have been the motivation behind many terrorist incidents within Canada (ex: the actions of both Alexandre Bissonnette and Alek Minassian). As holding these views and engaging in peaceful advocacy is not illegal, not all individuals holding the above views constitute a threat to security. Additionally, many individuals holding these viewpoints online often do not engage in any real-world action. Additionally, the issue of susceptibility to radicalization

due to mental illness and other vulnerabilities was discussed, but it was emphasized that the prevalence of mental illness does not diminish the threat of right-wing violence.

Last, the implementation of **Bill C59** seeks to modernize the CSIS act and take into account technology and modern threats. Amendments were made regarding accountability, transparency, and data analysis ensuring that all actions are consistent with Charter. The discussion of threat reduction has been refined and clarified (such as which measures can be taken using warrants) which aid in enhancing transparency.

12:00-2pm

Keynote Lunch:

“Journalism about Terrorism” Stewart Bell, Global News

(Session open to BSIA community)

Location: CIGI • Room A120

Lunch: Warm buffet lunch; catered by Fat Sparrow Catering, Waterloo, ON

2:00-3pm

Session 3: ‘Finance/ Fintrac’

Sadaf Kachalia, Strategic Intelligence Analyst, Strategic Intelligence & Data Exploitation Lab, FINTRAC

Location: Balsillie • 142

Rapporteur: Kyra Winer, PhD Candidate, University of Waterloo

The presentation on the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), by Sadaf Kachalia, focused on money laundering and terrorism financing. Specifically, she discussed how FINTRAC processes and analyzes risk levels of larger financial transactions suspected to be money laundering or terrorism funding and reports findings to the appropriate agency. As defined by FINTRAC:

1. Money laundering is the legitimatization of criminal financial proceeds. This process begins with the **placement** of ‘dirty’ money into a legitimate business. The ‘dirty’ money and legitimate revenue are **integrated**, resulting in a **legitimate** and legally taxable income.
2. Terrorist financing is the providing, collecting, processing, and making available or use of property or services to fund terrorist activities. These financial sources need not be criminal; legitimate income can qualify under these terms.

The main purpose of FINTRAC is to monitor and analyze all of Canada’s financial transactions to enable the detection, prevention and deterrence of money laundering and terrorism financing activities. FINTRAC’s strategic intelligence (1) analyzes data provided by external financial business, (2) develops strategic-level reports on the trends and patterns of threat actors and Canadian financial vulnerabilities and (3) discloses these to the appropriate agencies.

At FINTRAC, the day-to-day environment is independent and not investigative. Law enforcement investigates and collects data on suspicious money transfers and activities. Simultaneously, FINTRAC analyzes data provided by external financial bodies and discloses the data and information obtained to law enforcement, in order to enhance on-going investigations.

Financial businesses are required to report stipulated transactions to FINTRAC. After, FINTRAC discloses *only* pertinent findings to the necessary agencies, in order to protect Canadians’ financial privacy. FINTRAC cooperates with nine financial bodies. These include: accountants, real estate agencies, life insurance companies, BC notaries, casinos, dealers in precious metals and stones, financial entities (banks), security dealers, and other money services and businesses. Reports produced by external bodies for FINTRAC include:

- **Suspicious transaction reports (STR):** electronic fund transfers in and or out of Canada for \$10,000 or more or multiple transaction within a 24 hr. period totaling to \$10,000 or more (domestic transaction are not included).

- **Large cash transactions reports:** cash placed into the financial system amounting to \$10,000 or more or multiple transaction within a 24 hr. period totaling to \$10,000 or more (checks not included)
- **Cross-border (electronic) currency seizure reports:** currency or monetary instruments equaling more than \$10,000 that enter or leave Canada
- **Casino disbursement reports:** funds over \$10,000 paid out to a single individual by a casino

Important Note: It is not illegal to send or receive financial transactions that exceed \$10,000. However, these transactions may be reported and filed into the database. No investigation will occur, unless said transactions are tied to an ongoing investigation. FINTRAC has checks and balances in place to protect the financial privacy of Canadians and to insure no over sharing of financial transaction information occurs. Only necessary and complete financial transfers are shared. The sharing of such information with external agencies must be in compliance with the existing legislations to guarantee proper practices, in accordance with the regulations.

FINTRAC, though based and operated in Canada, is invested in the global fight against money laundering and terrorism financing. FINTRAC's strategic intelligence department determines the nature, capabilities and intentions of entities and countries of high concern by assessing their financial behaviour and advising on risks and threats that may undermine Canadian national security.

The following are six factors the shape the terrorism funding environment:

1. Motivated to materially support political violence undertaken at home or abroad
2. Conflict abroad that resonates with vulnerable Canadian sub-populations where that conflict involves an important non-state actor
3. Availability of skilled people to access revenue sources, networks and revenue generating endeavors that can be used to generate funds
4. Availability of suitable financial mechanisms for storing and moving funds to terrorist organizations
5. Perceptions of effectiveness
6. Capability and intentions of foreign terrorists/ extremists

Additional influences regarding how, where and from whom terrorists obtain financing considered by FINTRAC include: the quantity of money, reliability of revenue sources, operational security, control and ease of the acquirement of funds (minimized cost and increase efficiency), legitimacy (from the perspective of terrorists) of fund sources and methods.

FINTRAC's first terrorism funding threat assessment/ risk level model was implemented in 2018. This implementation was intended to help reporting entities enhance how they determine the risk of financial transactions and report suspicious transactions. FINTRAC's 2018 terrorism funding threat assessment baseline for terrorist financing risks is determined by geography and terrorist organizations. Geography is measured by the location's exposure to terrorism, role in the global financial system, anti-terrorist financing regulatory and enforcement regime, and Canada's financial exposure to the country. Terrorist organizations threat levels are measured by their lethality and activity and context of the country in which they reside.

To date, FINTRAC has determined that the countries that pose the greatest threat are located in the Middle East and South Asia. The countries in the Middle East include: Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. These countries were flagged do to the presence and high-risk activity of the following terrorist groups: Daesh, al Qaeda, Hizballah.

In South Asia, Afghanistan & Pakistan have been flagged due the high activity and presence of the Taliban, Lashkar-e-taiba, and Haqqani networks. Money, provided to these terrorist organizations, is most commonly moved through charitable donations, humanitarian aids and cash couriers. Extremist travellers are the greatest risk for such money transfers associated with terrorism funding.

FINTRAC has identified several emerging issues and trends including the role of small cells or lone actors, low value attacks, new payment methods (Bitcoin), shifting geographic risk for decentralized networks, and quasi-control of territory/ legitimate businesses and has begun to work towards developing and implementing strategies to address these.

Chris Beall, Director, Strategic Policy, Broadcasting and Digital Communication Branch,
Department of Canadian Heritage, Government of Canada

Rapporteur: Shayna Perry: MA Sociology Candidate, UNB Fredericton

Chris Beall is the director of the Digital Citizen Initiative (DCI) at Canadian Heritage. The focus of the DCI is to inform Canadian citizens of online disinformation and how to counter it. According to Beall, disinformation came to the forefront during the 2016 American presidential election. Disinformation is an issue in politics and democracy because spreading such information leads to an increase in the reach and impact of false, misleading and inflammatory content that has the potential to undermine democratic processes and decrease social cohesion. An example of disinformation may include the use of the media to change a message or to change the public's view on a particular issue. In addition, disinformation can also create false relationships between people.

According to Beall, disinformation is spread primarily for political, ideological, and economic reasons. For example, domestic political actors may spread political disinformation in order to maintain a reputation or stay in favour of the public. Furthermore, extremist groups or individuals may spread disinformation to gain support for their ideologies. Finally, economically driven enterprises or individuals may spread economic disinformation to achieve economic gain.

There are certain risks associated with the spread of disinformation. Disinformation poses a threat to democracy and social cohesion because it can negatively impact citizens' ability to form an opinion on which to base their vote and hold government/individuals in power accountable, their ability to participate in public discourse, and their ability to trust democratic processes and institutions. In addition, the inflammatory nature of disinformation can exacerbate underlying social divisions. Lastly, disinformation can reduce Canadians' exposure to differing views and increase polarization.

There are three key explanations for how disinformation became an issue. First, the increased reach of online platforms and social media are to blame; online platforms have drastically expanded their reach. The second explanation refers to the decline in civic journalism; there is a rise in internet venues. Lastly, the third explanation refers to the characteristics of online platforms and social media such as networked communities, anonymity, algorithms, business models, and the general approach of these platforms.

Society can address the issue of disinformation in a number of ways. For example, interventions that range in form and intensity can be implemented in multiple potential areas. Disinformation is one part of many issues; therefore, intervention must be implemented in different areas. Beall explained that intervention must occur at five different layers. The first layer refers to the source or technology of disinformation. This layer includes foreign, domestic, and individual or state institutions. The second layer refers to the content of the disinformation. The content is designed with the goal of user engagement; engagement increases reach. The third layer refers to the means of the disinformation; the means may include paid human influencers. The fourth layer refers to the platforms used. For example, some websites use algorithms to personalize what each user receives/sees. The fifth layer refers to the citizens. The citizens are those who receive and interpret the information.

Our government is dealing with the issue of disinformation as a whole by way of a four-pillar approach. This approach seeks to combat foreign interference, build institutional resilience, enhance citizen preparedness, and address the role of online platforms. To combat foreign interference, the government is seeking international coordination as well as coordination with law enforcement and security agencies. To help build institutional resilience, the government created the Elections Modernization Act as well as a critical election incident public protocol. In addition, the government is also working with the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. Furthermore, the government is enhancing citizen preparedness through digital media literacy, partnerships with civil society and academia and through its “GetCyberSafe Campaign”. Finally, the government is focusing on the role of online platforms through their digital inclusion lab and establishing guiding principles.

4:30pm

Closing Comments, Acting Director Veronica Kitchen

Speaker's Biographies (in order of appearance)

Day 1 – July 8

Dr. Shannon Nash, University of Waterloo

Shannon Nash is a post-doctoral research associate examining education and training in national security and counter-terrorism in Canada and how the 'terrorism' label is informed and applied to a violent attack in Canada. She received her Ph.D. in History from the University of Toronto with a focus on the fields of 20th Century American History, Terrorism, and International Relations. She studies past and present terrorist threats and attacks as well as Canadian, American, and international security and counterterrorism policies. Shannon's doctoral thesis focused on the reality of al Qaeda espionage methodology and how the idea of a sleeper agent was perceived and adapted to fit the terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda from the 1990s onwards. She was a research affiliate with Public Safety Canada for which she produced a report on the foreign fighter threat and valuable international government initiatives. She is affiliated with the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS), The Centre for Foreign Policy and Federalism at St. Jerome's University, and the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project at the University of Toronto.

shannonhopenash.com

Dr. Stephanie Carvin, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

Stephanie Carvin is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Her research interests are in the area of international law, security, terrorism and technology. Currently, she is teaching in the areas of critical infrastructure protection, technology and warfare and foreign policy.

Stephanie holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and published her thesis as *Prisoners of America's Wars: From the Early Republic to Guantanamo* (Columbia/Hurst, 2010). Her most recent book is *Science, Law, Liberalism and the American Way of Warfare: The Quest for Humanity in Conflict* (Cambridge, 2015) co-authored with Michael J. Williams. In 2009 Carvin was a Visiting Scholar at George Washington University Law School and worked as a consultant to the US Department of Defense Law of War Working Group. From 2012-2015, she was an analyst with the Government of Canada focusing on national security issues.

Day 2 – July 9

Dr. Tanya Narozhna, Political Science, University of Winnipeg.

Dr. Tanya Narozhna (PhD, University of Alberta, 2005) is Associate Professor of global politics at the University of Winnipeg. Her key research areas include critical security studies, gender and terrorism. Prof. Narozhna's major research project over the last few years has focused on female suicide bombings. She was the principal investigator (together with W. Andy Knight) of the SSHRC-funded project entitled 'Female Suicide Bombers: Transcending Occidentalism'. In 2013, Prof. Narozhna organized an international workshop "Female Suicide Bombings: Challenges and Responses," featuring some of the lead academics specializing in the issue of female terrorism. She is the author of *Female Suicide Bombings: A Critical Gender Approach* (with W. Andy Knight) published by the University of Toronto Press in 2016. In 2017, Prof. Narozhna received the Faculty of Arts Achievement in Scholarly or Creative Activity Award for her book. Her work on female suicide bombings has appeared in various edited collections and has been presented at high-profile international conferences, including ISA annual conventions in Toronto, San Francisco and New Orleans, the Millennium Series conference in Potsdam, and Canadian Political Science Association conferences in Edmonton and Calgary.

Dr. Barbara Perry, Director, Centre on Hate, Bias and Extremism, OntarioTech University

Barbara Perry is a Professor in the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology, and the Director of the Centre on Hate, Bias and Extremism. She has written extensively on social justice generally, and hate crime specifically. She has published several books spanning both areas, including *Diversity, Crime and Justice in Canada*, and *In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crime*. She has also published in the area of Native American victimization and social control, including one book entitled *The Silent Victims: Native American Victims of Hate Crime*, and *Policing Race and Place: Under- and Over-enforcement in Indian Country* both of which were based on interviews with Native Americans (University of Arizona Press). She was the General Editor of a five volume set on hate crime (Praeger), and editor of Volume 3: *Victims of Hate Crime* of that set. Her work has been published in journals representing diverse disciplines: *Theoretical Criminology*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, *Journal of History and Politics*, and *American Indian Quarterly*. Dr. Perry continues to work in the area of hate crime, and has made substantial contributions to the limited scholarship on hate crime in Canada, including work on anti-Muslim violence, hate crime against LGBTQ communities, the community impacts of hate crime, and right wing extremism in Canada. She is regularly called upon by local, national and international media as an expert on hate crime and right-wing extremism.

Dr. Amarnath Amarsingam, Assistant Professor, Queen's University

Amarnath Amarasingam is an Assistant Professor in the School of Religion at Queen's University in Ontario, Canada. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, and an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. His research interests are in radicalization, terrorism, diaspora politics, post-war reconstruction, and the sociology of religion. He is the author of *Pain, Pride, and Politics: Sri Lankan Tamil Activism in Canada* (2015), and the co-editor of *Sri Lanka: The Struggle for Peace in the Aftermath of War* (2016). He has also written several peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, has presented papers at over 100 national and international conferences, and has written for *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *CNN*, *Politico*, *The Atlantic*, and *Foreign Affairs*.

Amarasingam is an experienced field researcher, having conducted hundreds of interviews for his PhD dissertation on social movement activism, organizational dynamics, and youth identity in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. He also conducted over 50 interviews with former fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers) throughout the former war zones of Sri Lanka in 2013 and 2014. He has also conducted field research in Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia, Lebanon, and Israel/Palestine. He co-directed a study on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, based at the University of Waterloo, for six years during which he conducted numerous social media and in-person interviews with current and former foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, as well as parents and close friends of those who travelled to fight. He has been interviewed on *CNN*, *PBS Newshour*, *CBC*, *BBC*, and a variety of other media outlets.

Dr. Benjamin Ducol, Director, Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV)

Benjamin Ducol is currently research manager at the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV). He holds a PhD in Political Science from Laval University and is a research associate at the International Centre for Comparative Criminology (CICC) at the Université de Montreal. His scholarly interests focus on the study of terrorism and political violence phenomena as well as prevention policies. He is particularly interested in the sociology of terrorism and the intersections between violent radicalization, radical subcultures (jihadism, far-right, radical...) and the contemporary new media ecology. His fields of expertise include militant jihadist radicalism, radicalization processes in the digital age, and PVE/CVE policy and practices.

Day 3 – July 10

Susheel Gupta, LLB. Air India Victims Association

Susheel Gupta was 12 years old when his mother was murdered by terrorists on board Air India Flight 182 as it crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Ireland. It was after this tragedy that Sush decided to embark on a career to work within the criminal justice system so that he could do his part to try and ensure no other Canadian or child would ever have endure a similar tragedy. With respect to National Security, Susheel was one of the co-counsels in Canada's first prosecution under the *Anti-Terrorism Act*.

He is the 2016 recipient of the Ontario Bar Association's President's Award which recognizes the significant contribution of an individual Canadian or Canadian organization to the advancement of Justice in Ontario or elsewhere. In Susheel's case, it was for his dedication to the rights of victims of crime and the improvement of the justice system.

He has served as a Federal Prosecutor with the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (formerly part of the Department of Justice) and as the A/Chairperson and CEO of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. He is currently serving as Senior Strategic Operations Advisor-National Security for the RCMP.

Sgt Brian Smith, Toronto Police Service

Detective Brian Smith has been with the Toronto Police Service (TPS) since 1989. Originally from Nova Scotia, he has spent most of his career working in a wide variety of investigative and specialized units. He is currently assigned to the Community Partnerships and Engagement Unit where he is the 'Coordinator' for FOCUS Situation Tables and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE). He also supervises and supports a team of officers that Coordinate: Victim Witness Support, Elder Abuse, Vulnerable Persons Issues, TPS Community Police Academy, and TPS Youth Academies.

Externally, he has been certified by the UK Association of Chief Police Officers as a Community Engagement Prevent instructor, accredited by the Ontario Police College as a Hate Crimes Investigator, accredited as an RCMP Terrorism Prevention Program Master Instructor, and certified as an Extreme Dialogue Radicalization Instructor. He has received further certifications from Psychometrics Canada as a Meyers-Briggs Type I and II Instructor and from the US Government/RCMP as a Pipeline-Convoy Criminal Interdiction Instructor.

Det. Smith is an adjunct faculty member of the TPS College specializing in Criminal Investigation, Search and Seizure, P/CVE, Crime Prevention, and Neighbourhood Policing. He is currently working with a multi-agency team advancing Toronto's Mass Casualty victim support responses. Brian holds a Teaching Certificate from Humber College and a Bachelor of Education in Adult Education from Brock University.

Lilah Elsayed, Research Associate, Hedayah

Lilah joined Hedayah in February 2013 and has been supporting the Executive Director Office since then in addition to all the translation work for the Center in her capacity as an Arabic-English legal translator - certified by the U.A.E Ministry of Justice.

Prior to joining Hedayah, Lilah served as a military field interpreter providing optimal interpretation and translation support to the Military personnel especially female soldiers of U.A.E Armed Forces & Presidential Guard Command. Lilah conducted language training programs in Arabic and English at the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit #3, American University and U.S. Embassy in Cairo, and was contracted by the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, VA.

Lilah graduated with a Masters degree in "International Law, Diplomacy and International Relations" from Paris-Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi in 2016.

**Navaid Aziz, Director of Religious and Social Services for the Islamic Information Society of Calgary & Director of Public Relations, Al-Maghrib Institute
& Islamic Editor for Little Explorers Magazine**

Navaid Aziz is a Canadian Muslim public figure with a diverse academic and social background. He is currently focused on the education and integration of Muslim youth, with the hopes of eradicating radicalization. He was raised in Montreal, Quebec where he completed a diplome d'études collégiales (D.E.C.) in commerce and Social Sciences from Champlain College before heading to the Islamic University of Madinah where he completed an Associates Degree in Arabic Language and Literature and Bachelors in Islamic Law.

Upon returning home to Canada, Navaid began teaching for Al-Maghrib Institute. He has since transitioned to their Director of Public Relations. During this period, he volunteered as the Islamic Editor for Little Explorers Magazine and began his work as a youth and family counsellor. It was also during this time that he established himself as a sought after public speaker. He has lectured across four continents and eighteen countries thus far.

In 2012 Navaid moved to Calgary, Alberta to become the Director of Religious and Social Services for the Islamic Information Society of Calgary, a position he currently holds. He also began volunteered as a chaplain at S.A.I.T. from 2012 to 2015. In Calgary his youth counselling work extended further to include helping in the mitigation of criminal radicalization. This included the implementation of civic engagement opportunities for Muslim youth. Among the programs started were youth groups, volunteer programs at the local shelters, community cleanups, and tree planting days. In 2015 Navaid became the first ever Muslim chaplain with the Calgary Police Services. Through his involvement with CPS he consulted in the development of their world renowned redirect program. He is currently working on establishing further opportunities for preventing radicalization and enhancing youth integration.

To read more about Navaid's counter-radicalization efforts as well as community programs in Calgary please see the following news coverage: [Calgary Herald](#). [VICE](#). [CBC](#). [Global](#). [Calgary Herald](#). [IISC](#).

Day 4 – July 11

Brittany McBain, Criminal Intelligence Analyst Supervisor, O Division, Integrated national Security Enforcement Team O-INSET and

Christina Galecki, Manager Criminal Analysis Program "O" Division, CIB, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, RCMP.

Dawn Parks, Deputy Director, Counter-Terrorism, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Stewart Bell, National Investigative Journalist, Terrorism and Security, Global News

Stewart Bell is an investigative journalist at Global News. The author of three non-fiction books, most recently Bayou of Pigs, he has reported from dozens of countries. His magazine article about child soldiers in West Africa, "Guerilla Girls," was awarded the Amnesty International prize. He won the South Asian Journalists Association award for his coverage of the Sri Lankan civil war. "The Terrorist Next Door" was a National Magazine Award finalist and was made into a CTV movie. His reporting from Syria was a finalist for this year's Canadian Association of Journalists Awards. He received the Queen's Diamond Jubilee Medal for his writing on terrorism. He has a Master of Journalism degree from Carleton

University, a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of British Columbia and a Certificate in Creative Writing from the Humber School of Writers.

Sadaf Kachalia, Strategic Intelligence Analyst, Strategic Intelligence & Data Exploitation Lab, FINTRAC

Sadaf Kachalia is a Senior Strategic Intelligence Analyst with the Strategic Intelligence and Data Exploitation Lab at FINTRAC. She is responsible for providing analytical expertise on the nature and extent of terrorist financing and money laundering in Canada and abroad to policy and decision-makers, with particular focus on terrorist organizations, the crime-terror nexus, organized crime, human trafficking and illicit money laundering networks. She has lead and contributed to strategic intelligence assessments, research reports, reporting-entity focused operational alerts as well as FINTRAC's contribution to the Financial Action Task Force typology development projects. Sadaf has previously worked as a Junior Policy Analyst at Public Safety Canada in the National Security Policy Division, and has experience in corporate immigration and the non-profit sector. She holds an Honors Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from York University and a Master of Arts in Globalization and International Development from the University of Ottawa.

Chris Beall, Director, Strategic Policy, Broadcasting and Digital Communication Branch, Department of Canadian Heritage, Government of Canada

Additional Faculty Participants for Networking Lunch, Tuesday July 9

Dr. Philip J. Boyle, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology & Legal Studies, University of Waterloo.

My research is broadly concerned with contemporary developments in policing, security, and public safety, particularly in relation to cities and urban governance. My previous research examined the securitization of the Olympic Games in the post-9/11 period. My recent is concerned with the historical origins of what is now recognized as the field of critical infrastructure protection and embrace of resilience in that field today. Publications based on this research have appeared in *Security Dialogue*, *Resilience*, and the *Canadian Journal of Law & Society*.

Dr. Vanessa Iafolla, Lecturer, Department of Sociology & Legal Studies, University of Waterloo

Vanessa Iafolla is a Lecturer at the University of Waterloo, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies. Vanessa's research interests centre broadly on the intersections of law, money, risk, and security. She is interested in how institutional and individuals manage the risks they encounter in different economic and financial contexts. She is currently a co-investigator on a TSAS grant with Dr. Lorne Dawson investigating the engagement of real estate agents with Canadian counter-terrorist financing legislation in major urban centres in British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario. She has published and presented research regarding institutional risk management practices in banking that centre on money laundering and terrorist financing detection.

Dr. Carrie Sanders, Associate Professor; Criminology, Wilfred Laurier University

Dr. Carrie B. Sanders is Associate Professor of Criminology at Wilfrid Laurier University and Director of the Centre for Research on Security Practices (CRSP). Her research focuses on policing technologies, police intelligence practices, plural policing, gender in policing, and technologically mediated interactions in criminal justice. Using qualitative methods, her research empirically studies how political, economic, organizational, situational and cultural contexts shape and influence policing practices and the use of police technologies. Her research has been published in high impact, international journals such as: *Gender & Society*; *British Journal of Criminology*; and *Policing & Society* and has received national funding by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. She is a fellow of the Balsillie School of International Affairs. Her new book (with Stacey Hannem, Christopher Schneider, Aaron Doyle and Antony Christensen) is *Security and Risk Technologies in Criminal Justice: Critical Perspective* (2019) Canadian Scholars Press.

Dr. Adam Molnar, Lecturer in Criminology, Deakin University, Australia

Adam Molnar's work focuses on policing and national security as they relate to practices of surveillance, the use of technology, and associated issues of privacy and social control.

Adam completed a Postdoctoral Fellowship in the Surveillance Studies Centre at Queen's University, and attained his PhD in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria. Currently, he is a member of Deakin's Alfred Deakin Research Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) and is Vice-Chair of the Australian Privacy Foundation (APF). Adam's research examines how technology-led surveillance strategies are used as a response to crime and terrorism, and assesses the implications for law, privacy, and social control.

Dr. Bruce White, Director, Organization for Identity & Cultural Development

Bruce was brought up in Nigeria, New Orleans, London and Mississippi, and has lived and worked in Japan, Italy, Canada, the UK and Malta. He holds degrees in Human Sciences and Social Anthropology from Durham University (BA, MA) and

Oxford Brookes University (PhD). He has developed undergraduate, graduate and professional courses in *conflict and identity studies*, *applied anthropology and executive education* and has taught at Durham University, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford University, Kyoto University and Doshisha University, Kyoto. He is an Honorary Research Fellow at University College London (UCL), and Professor and Dean of the Institute for the Liberal Arts (ILA) at Doshisha University, Kyoto.

Bruce conceived the basic framework for Intra-Cultural Development (the theory and practice upon which the OICD operates) in 1998 and has been developing and promoting the approach ever since ([read the OICD story](#)).

Bruce piloted applications of Intra-Cultural Development across Europe, Japan, Mali, Fiji, Guyana and Canada as means to develop a real world methodology for social transformation (now the [EMIC method](#)). As OICD executive director Bruce continues to work on expanding the organization's programs, membership, partnerships, projects and scope of activities.

In addition to his academic roles and in the OICD, Bruce is also a member of the Senegal-based NGO Imagine Africa, and an external consultant for the London-based NGO International Alert. Bruce has published on the topics of Civic Engagement, Conflict Transformation, Generational Change and Conflict and Identity.

Dr. Laura Hanby, Senior Research Manager, Operational Research, Research Branch, Correctional Service Canada.

Dr. Laura Hanby is a Research Manager at the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). Specializing in operational research, her current research efforts focus on correctional technology (e.g., electronic monitoring of offenders), staff training (e.g., simulated firearms training for correctional officers, onboarding programs for new staff), and Indigenous issues (e.g., healing lodges, Aboriginal Intervention Centres). Dr. Hanby began her career at CSC in 2007 and has held various positions in research, policy, operations and transformation and renewal.

Dr. Hanby received her Ph.D. in Forensic Psychology from Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. Her doctoral research focused on the impact of assessment timing and change over time in dynamic risk and protective factors on criminal recidivism. Her general research interests include effective community corrections, dynamic risk assessment and management, protective factors, offender competencies, treatment readiness and responsivity.

Colin Baulke, Ontario Office of the Provincial Security Advisor

Colin Baulke is an analyst at the Ontario Office of the Provincial Security Advisor responsible for files pertaining to counter-terrorism and public safety. He holds a Master of Global Affairs from the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and a Bachelor in International Relations from the University of Western Ontario.

Staff Sgt Jason MacDonald, Criminal Intelligence Unit, Waterloo Regional police Service

Staff Sergeant Jason MacDonald has been a police officer with the Waterloo Regional Police for over twenty years. His past policing experience includes Street Crime, Undercover Operations, and Guns and Gangs. He was the first WRPS officer to be seconded to the OPP-led Provincial Anti-Terrorism Section, a unit dedicated to the proactive collection of criminal intelligence for National Security issues. He was promoted from that position, and later assigned to Human Resources as the officer in charge of Recruiting. Jason is now the Staff Sergeant in charge of the Criminal Intelligence Unit, a unit responsible for the collection and dissemination of criminal intelligence, crime analysis, covert operations, and human source management.



Dr. Lorne Dawson, Director of TSAS (on sabbatical 2018-19), University of Waterloo

Dr. Dawson is a Full Professor in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies and the Department of Religious Studies. He has served as the Chair of both departments. He has published three books, four edited books, and sixty-nine academic articles and book chapters. Until 2008 most of his research was in the sociology of religion, in particular the study of new religious movements. Since then terrorism has become the primary focus of his research, in particular the process of radicalization leading to violence.

In 2012 he co-founded the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). He is the current Project Director (see www.tsas.ca) of this partnership. TSAS operates with funds competitively awarded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), Public Safety Canada, Defence Research and Development Canada, and other organizations. Dr. Dawson regularly makes invited presentations to a wide variety of government, academic, and public groups about various aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism, and is frequently interviewed by the media on these topics. He also has been involved in the supervision of over thirty PhD students.

Dr. Veronica Kitchen Acting Director of TSAS, Summer Academy Chair, 2018-19, University of Waterloo

Veronica M. Kitchen is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo and in the Balsillie School of International Affairs. Her research is primarily on national security in a Canadian context, from the perspective of critical and feminist security studies. Her most recent book is *Heroism and Global Politics* (Routledge, 2018), co-edited with Jennifer Mathers.

Kitchen is an executive member of the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS) and in 2018-2019 was its Acting Director. She is an active member of Women in International Security (WIIS) Canada, and part of the editorial board of *International Journal*.

Prior to joining the University of Waterloo, Kitchen was a SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Centre of International Relations at the University of British Columbia. She completed her PhD in political science at Brown University, where she was a Fulbright Scholar. She has an undergraduate degree in International Relations from Trinity College at the University of Toronto.

2019 TSAS Summer Academy Recommended Readings:

Day 1

Session 1: History of Terrorism in Canada

Nicole Tishler, Marie Ouellet, and Joshua Kilberg, "A Survey of Terrorism in Canada: 1960-2015" from *Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Canada*, edited by Jez Littlewood, Lorne L. Dawson, and Sara K. Thompson, © University of Toronto Press, 2019 (forthcoming).

Reading is available at: <https://secure.tsas.ca/> Password: 'paxcanadiana'

The Process of Radicalization: Right-Wing Skinheads in Quebec' Samuel Tanner and Aurélie Campana, Aug 2014

Session 2: National Security & Terrorism Institutional Landscape in Canada

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) Report, chapters 1-3: http://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2019-04-09/2019-04-09_annual_report_2018_public_en.pdf

Day 2

Session 1: Gender and Terrorism

Session 2: Far Right Extremism in Canada

"Broadening our Understanding of Anti Authority Movements in Canada" Barbara Perry, David Hofmann, Ryan Scrivens. <https://www.tsas.ca/publications/broadening-our-understanding-of-anti-authority-movements-in-canada/>

'Uneasy Alliances: A Look at the Right-Wing Extremist Movement in Canada' B. Perry and Ryan Scrivens. Jan 2016. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1139375>

Session 3: The Toronto 18 & its Legacy

Lorne L. Dawson, "Trying to Make Sense of Homegrown Terrorist Radicalization: The Case of the Toronto 18," In Paul Bramadat and Lorne Dawson, eds., *Religious Radicalization and Securitization in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014: 64-91.

Reading is available at: <https://secure.tsas.ca/> Password: 'paxcanadiana'

Session 4: Social Media and Big Data

Conway, M. (2017). Determining the role of the internet in violent extremism and terrorism: Six suggestions for progressing research. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(1), 77-98. This is an open-access journal article available here: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157408>

Day 3

Session 1: Air India Victims Association – The Victim's Perspective

Phase 1 Report of the Air India Inquiry Report, specifically pages 1-9

http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/air_india/2010-07-23/www.majorcomm.ca/en/reports/phase1/phase1report.pdf

Inquiry's Overview Volume http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/air_india/2010-07-23/www.majorcomm.ca/en/reports/finalreport/default.htm

Session 2: Toronto Police Services

“Situation Table Training, Centre for Public Safety and Well-Being | Wilfrid Laurier University.” n.d. Accessed May 1, 2019. <https://www.wlu.ca/professional-development/centre-for-public-safety-and-well-being/situation-table.html>. Scroll down to the bottom of the page and click the registration button, WLU will then send you your login information to begin accessing the training (you will receive this information within 3 days). For the purposes of the TSAS Summer Academy you are not required to read any of the additional resources found within the course but they can all be downloaded for future reference if you wish. Please note that the access to the site is time limited (30 days)

“FOCUS- brief outline”

Reading is available at: <https://secure.tsas.ca/> Password: ‘paxcanadiana’

Session 4: Islamic Society of Calgary

Ellis, B. Heidi, and Saida Abdi. 2017. “Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism through Genuine Partnerships.” *American Psychologist* 72 (3): 289–300. <https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-amp0000065.pdf>

Roberts, Nadim. “Peace Be upon You.” *The Walrus*, 13 Sept. 2018, thewalrus.ca/peace-be-upon-you/.

Day 4

Keynote Speaker: Stewart Bell

<https://globalnews.ca/news/4599308/id-sworn-never-to-go-to-syria-stewart-bell-on-his-journey-to-meet-a-captured-canadian-isis-fighter/>

<https://globalnews.ca/author/stewart-bell/>

<https://nationalpost.com/author/sbellnp>